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"[T]here's no black senator from Georgia or anyplace else down
there. It wasn't meant to be."'
- N.A.A.C.P. Chairman Julian Bond, reflecting on the ab-
sence of Black United States Senators from the South.
Consider the following events in the recent history of the United
States Senate:
In 1996, Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi was elected Majority
Leader of the Senate.2 Lott, who represents a state that is more than
35% Black,3 had previously voted against passage of the Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. federal holiday4 and had supported tax breaks for ra-
cially segregated schools.5 No, Lott did not take these positions
during the Jim Crow era, which might have allowed him to argue that
he was simply practicing the politics of the times; these votes occurred
in 1983 and 1982, respectively.6 Lott did, however, receive his polit-
ical tutelage from a devout segregationist, Congressman William Col-
mer,7 perhaps destining his politics to a time warp. Remember, Lott is
the Majority Leader of what many consider to be the most powerful
legislative body in the world, the United States Senate.8
1. Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. Post Gives Julian Bond New Start, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 1998, at A6.
2. See Donna Cassata & Jackie Koszczuk, Election-Year Politics Puts Added Pressure
on Lott, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1643, 1643 (June 15, 1996).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN DATA BOOK 1991 xiv
(1991) (Mississippi's population is 35.6% Black).
4. See Nadine Cohodas, To Reach Blacks, Lott Is Thinking Creatively, 46 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 132 (Jan. 16, 1988).
5. See Ronald Smothers, The Race for Congress: Surging Republican Threatens to
Cement Two-Party System in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1988, at A17; see also Neil A.
Lewis, Profiles: A Forceful Conservative as G.O.P. Whip, a Clinton Ally to Lead Demo-
crats-Trent Lott, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1994, at A10.
6. See Cohodas, supra note 4, at 132; Lewis, supra note 5, at A10.
7. See Curtis Wilkie, Secret History, GEORGE, June 1997, at 84.
8. See, e.g., Charley Reese, In Free Society, No One Has Right to Demand Approval
of Others, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 1996, at A14 (referring to the Senate as "the most
powerful single body in the world's last superpower"); Stephen Green, Robert Byrd Poised
Also in 1996, Jeff Sessions was elected to the United States Sen-
ate from the State of Alabama.9 Sessions's previous encounter with
the Senate involved his nomination by President Reagan to the fed-
eral district court in Alabama.10 The nomination was withdrawn after
revelations that Sessions had attacked the NAACP and ACLU as "un-
American" and "Communist inspired" and had said of the Ku Klux
Klan, "I used to think they're O.K."'11 The upshot: Sessions's remarks
made him unfit to sit on the federal bench but not to be elected to the
Senate which confirms that bench.
At the same time Sessions was being elected to the Senate, Sena-
tor Jesse Helms of North Carolina, a renowned race-baiter,' 2 was
breezing to re-election in a contest against a Black opponent in a state
that is 22% Black. 3 Harvey Gantt, Helms's opponent, was the lone
Black general election candidate for a Senate seat in 1996. During the
previous election cycle, in 1994, both of the two Black candidates-
one in Washington State, the other in Missouri-lost in the general
election.'4
Despite the much heralded revolution in voting rights, the results
of the 1996 elections left the Senate as disproportionately White as
ever, with one Black Senator (1% of the Senate), two Asian-Ameri-
cans and Pacific Islanders (2% of the Senate), one Native American
(1% of the Senate), and no Hispanics.' 5 Yet Blacks constitute 12.1%
of the nation's population, Asians 2.92%, Native Americans 0.79%,
and Hispanics 8.99%.16
In 1991, Clarence Thomas became the second Black American
confirmed to the United States Supreme Court. 7 Although his fitness
to Sink Balanced-Budget Amendment, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TB., Feb. 19, 1995, at A33 (re-
ferring to the Senate as "the most powerful upper chamber in the world today").
9. See Rhodes Cook et al., Senate Profiles, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 31 (Jan. 4,1997).
10. See id. at 31.
11. Richard L. Berke, Trent Lott and His Fierce Freshmen, N. Y. ThIMs, Feb. 2, 1997,
§ 6 (magazine), at 44; see also Philip Shenon, Senator Urges Withdrawal of Judicial Nomi-
nation, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 20, 1986, at A22.
12. See Alan Greenblatt & Robert Marshall Wells, Senate Steps to the Right as G.O.P.
Expands Majority, 54 CONG. Q. Wxi.Y. REP. 3233,3235 (Nov. 9, 1996) (noting that "Helms
proved willing to play the race card against Democrat Harvey B. Gantt, a black former
mayor of Charlotte"). Helms captured 52.6% of the vote to Gantt's 45.9%. See id. at 3255.
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at xiv.
14. See Donna Cassata, Freshman Class Boasts Resumes to Back Up 'Outsider' Image,
52 CONG. Q. WKu.Y. REP. 9, 11 (Supp. to No. 44, Nov. 12, 1994).
15. See Minorities in Congress, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 28 (Jan. 4, 1997).
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at xiv-xv.
17. See Clarence Thomas Wins Senate Confirmation, CONG. Q. WKL.Y. REP. ALMANAC
274 (1991).
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for office became suspect after allegations of sexual misconduct,18
although he possessed relatively meager qualifications for the highest
court in the land,19 and although Democrats, nominally the friends of
Black Americans, controlled the Senate, Thomas's nomination was
confirmed by a margin of four votes.2" His margin of victory was
attributable to a handful of White Southern Democrats who depended
heavily for their own elections on Black votes.21 In a nomination
shrouded by racial politics, White Democrats could not critically as-
sess Thomas's claims that he was being subjected to a "high-tech
lynching"'22 and racism.-3 Nor were they bold enough to acknowledge
that Thomas's conservative politics foreshadowed the votes he would
cast as a member of the Supreme Court. Black leaders, on the other
hand, openly voiced their suspicions that Thomas, if confirmed, would
depart radically from the liberal legacy of the first Black justice con-
firmed to the Court, Thurgood Marshall.24  They proved correct.-5
But there were no Black members of the United States Senate then,
and thus, no one in a position to vote on the Thomas nomination who
could challenge him from the perspective of an African-American. It
was important that Thomas be questioned from this vantage point, not
merely because the presence of an African-American voice is valuable
in and of itself, but because many observers suspected that President
George Bush had cynically nominated Thomas primarily on the basis
of his race.26
Something is terribly amiss about the United States Senate. Its
composition does not reflect all the citizens it purports to represent.
And, as the above examples portray, nor does its politics. It has, in
18. See id. at 280.
19. See id. at 276 (noting that while most nominees in the past decade were rated
"well-qualified," Thomas received a rating of only "qualified" from the American Bar As-
sociation's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary).
20. See id. at 274.
21. See id. at 285.
22. See id. at 284.
23. See id. ("Democrats, clearly unnerved by Thomas's injection of racism charges into
the proceedings, made little effort to counterattack or defend [Anita] Hill," the woman
who accused Thomas of sexual harassment).
24. See id. at 274. The N.A.A.C.P., for instance, opposed Thomas' confirmation. See
id.
25. See Christopher Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1, 4 (1996) (from 1991 through 1995, Thomas' vote coincided with the Court's most
conservative member, Antonin Scalia, 90.1% of the time).
26. See Maureen Dowd, Conservative Black Judge, Clarence Thomas, is Named to
Marshall's Court Seat, N.Y. TuviEs, July 2, 1991, at Al (stating that "[i]n choosing a black
[sic] nominee, Mr. Bush seemed to be aiming toward the less ambitious goal of insulating
himself against charges that he is hostile to blacks.").
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fact, often been denigrated as a "white male club,"2 7 with racial mi-
norities rarely among its members. In its 208-year history, the Senate
has had only four African-American members.28 Asian-American
Senators, hailing mostly from Hawaii, number a mere five in more
than 200 years.29 And only three Senate seat holders appear to have
Hispanic surnames.3
The paucity of color in the Senate is remarkable when contrasted
with the House of Representatives, where members are elected from
districts rather than entire states. There, the proportion of minority
members of Congress more closely approximates the percentage of
minorities in the general population.31 The Voting Rights Act of 1965
("the Act"),32 and the majority-minority districts created pursuant to
its mandates, can claim much of the credit for integrating the House.
Prior to the 1990 decennial redistricting, Blacks made up only 4.9% of
Congress compared with a voting age population of 11.1%, and His-
panics constituted only 2.5% compared to a voting age population of
7.3%. 3 On the heels of efforts by state legislatures and federal and
state courts to comply with the Voting Rights Act, the number of ma-
jority-Black and majority-Hispanic congressional districts nearly
doubled and the number of Black and Hispanic representatives in-
creased 50% and 38%, respectively, between 1990 and 1993. 34
It is no wonder that the Voting Rights Act has been hailed as the
centerpiece of the second Reconstruction, the era during which voting
27. Clarence Page, Taking A Chance On Thomas-A Model For Success, ORLANmo
SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 17, 1991, at All. See also Richard S. Dunham, Congress' Rookies
Will Be Ready To Rock, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1992, at 57 (discussing the common perception
of the United States Senate as a "white-male club" and noting that the presence of only
two female senators - a number which has since increased - was mere tokenage).
28. In addition to Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, elected in 1992 from Illinois, two
Blacks were seated during Reconstruction: Hiram Rhodes Revels and Blanche Kelso
Bruce. See 4 ROBERT C. BYRD, TiE SENATE 1789-1989: HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1789-
1992 299 (Mary Sharon Hall ed., 1988). During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s,
Senator Edward William Brooke represented the State of Massachusetts. See icL
29. See BYRD, supra note 28, at 83, 98.
30. See id. at 145 (listing three Senators with Hispanic surnames); BIOGRAPMcAL Di-
REcTORY OF TrE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1774-1989 (1989) (also listing three Senators
with Hispanic surnames).
31. Eight percent of House members are Black, 4% Hispanic, 1% Asian and .2% Na-
tive American. Minorities in Congress, supra note 15, at 28. This compares in part to
voting age populations of 11.1% for Blacks and 7.3% for Hispanics. See Parker, infra note
33 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
33. See Frank R. Parker, Shaw v. Reno: A Constitutional Setback for Minority Presen-
tation, POL. SCI. & POL., Mar. 1, 1995, at 47.
34. See id.
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rights reforms gave life to the moribund Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and eliminated barri-
ers to the right to vote." Architects of the second Reconstruction,
however, appear to have assumed that the Senate is off-limits for what
has been the remedy of choice in voting rights litigation: majority-
minority single-member districts.3 6 This unstated presupposition has
had a strikingly ironic consequence: the Senate, shielded from the
voting rights revolution, has confirmed a federal bench that has
stunted the progress of the second Reconstruction. 7 Consider the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno.3 8 Shaw held that White
voters state an equal protection claim where they demonstrate that a
Black-majority congressional district has been created for reasons of
race and in derogation of traditional districting criteria such as geo-
graphic compactness.39 Miller v. Johnson4 ° subsequently clarified that
while race may be considered in districting, it may not constitute the
predominant factor.41 Companion cases Bush v. Vera42 and Shaw v.
Hunt4 3 analyzed whether a state's compliance with section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, a provision aimed at protecting minorities
from vote dilution, 4 constitutes a compelling reason for subordinating
traditional districting criteria in order to draw a majority-minority dis-
trict. The Court assumed that compliance with section 2 sufficed as a
compelling interest but held that the districts' lack of geographic com-
pactness-a necessary element of a vote dilution claim under section
2-meant that the states had failed to use the least restrictive means
35. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVER-
siEn Mi No'ruR VOTING: Tim VOTnNG RIGHTS Acr rN PERsPEcrrvE 7 (Bernard
Grofman and Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
36. See LANi GUINMR, Tim TYRANNY OF THE MAjomrr 53-54, 91 (1994) (discussing
the centrality of the single-member district to Black electoral success theory).
37. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
38. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
39. Id. at 649.
40. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
41. Id. at 914.
42. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
43. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b. For a discussion of vote dilution, see infra notes 74-86 and
accompanying text. A shorthand definition of the term is as follows:
[A] process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, com-
bine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the vot-
ing strength of at least one other group. Ethnic or racial minority vote dilution is
a special case, in which the voting strength of an ethnic or racial minority group is
diminished or canceled out by the bloc vote of the majority.
Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MNoRITY VoTE DmrION 4
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
available to advance their presumptively compelling interests.45 And
finally, the Court in Abrams v. Johnson46 delivered its coup de grace
of the 1996-97 term. Having invalidated two of Georgia's three ma-
jority-Black congressional districts pursuant to Miller, the Abrams
Court concluded that it was not possible to create a second, let alone a
third, compact majority-Black district without violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.47 This in effect meant that the Equal Protection Clause
restricted Georgia's 27% Black population48 to 9% of the state's con-
gressional seats.
Lost amid the voting rights community's focus on House seats
and local elections is a simple reality: the Senate offers an avenue for
the protection of civil rights in general and voting rights in particular
that is singularly unique because it must confirm the federal judges
who decide such cases.4 9 During the 1960s and 1970s, electoral anom-
alies, like conservative Idaho's election of the very liberal Frank
Church,5" may well have diverted the attention of civil rights advo-
cates from the relationship between the way Senators are elected and
the politics of the Senate. The current Senate, however, is not the
product of such progressive aberrations. To the contrary, its Republi-
can majority has been described as "the most rambunctious, conserva-
tive and independent-minded group of Senators in nearly 70 years."'"
And even during different times, with Democratic majorities, the Sen-
ate has turned a blind eye to Black interests on critical votes, as evi-
denced by Justice Thomas's confirmation. In short, the Senate is
sorely in need of more Black and Brown influence, and, as with the
House of Representatives, the Voting Rights Act and the creation of
45. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 979; See Hunt, 517 U.S. at 914.
46. 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
47. Id. at 1934-35.
48. See STATE RANKINGs 442 (Morgan Quitino ed., 1997) (placing Georgia's Black
population at 27.5%).
49. See U.S. CONsT. art II, § 2, cl. 2. The constitutional role of the Senate in confirm-
ing Supreme Court justices is particularly important to the interests of racial minorities.
Because the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of statutory and constitutional anti-discrimi-
nation laws, it is essentially free to interpret those provisions in a manner that is detrimen-
tal to minority interests and preservative of majoritarian privilege. See Girardeau A.
Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 1422, 1424-25 (1995). Thus, the racial
sensibilities of the Senators who exercise the advice and consent authority of the Constitu-
tion is a first line of defense against the diminishment of minority rights.
50. See Matt Pinkus, Church: Counting on Democratic Stalemate, 34 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 612-13 (1976) (noting that Church was the first Democrat from Idaho to be re-elected
to the Senate).
51. Berke, supra note 11, at 40.
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majority-minority or minority-enhanced districts thereunder appear to
be the most effective vehicle for achieving this goal.
Senators, of course, are currently elected on a statewide, at-large
basis.5 2 I have argued elsewhere that the Constitution generally per-
mits states voluntarily to create United States Senate districts.5 3 The
states' volitions aside, however, the Voting Rights Act applies to con-
gressional races and Senate contests alike. States can thus be judi-
cially compelled to create Senate districts in order to remedy minority
vote dilution. Such a remedy finds support not merely in the text and
legislative history of the Act but also in the legislative history of the
Seventeenth Amendment, which instituted the direct elections of
Senators. 4
Legal commentators have explored various dimensions of the
Seventeenth Amendment, such as its effects on the separation of pow-
ers55 and federalism. 6 Absent from the legal literature, however, is
any exploration of a counter-intuitive yet compelling fact about the
Seventeenth Amendment: its passage reaffirmed the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against racial discrimination at the polls.5 7
Because the 62nd Congress that passed the Seventeenth Amendment
did so with the expectation that Congress would retain all powers al-
lowed under the Fifteenth Amendment to protect the Black franchise
in Senate elections,5 8 the Seventeenth Amendment affords Congress
at least as much authority to create remedial Senate districts as it has
to create remedial House districts. Congress has already exercised
that authority by broadly prohibiting vote dilution in section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thus, where a plaintiff successfully dem-
onstrates vote dilution in Senate races, the remedy of single-member
districts should presumptively be available under section 2.
52. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate
Districts, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1996).
53. See id. at 6.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ").
55. See generally Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347 (1996).
56. See generally Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the
Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1997).
57. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, §1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."). See also infra notes 89-118 and accompanying
text.
58. See infra notes 114-118.
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, moreover, do not insulate the Sen-
ate from race-conscious districting. To begin with, the Seventeenth
Amendment's re-ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment contradicts
many of Shaw's underlying premises as they would be applied to Sen-
ate districts. In any event, even assuming the applicability of these
premises, Senate districts present facts distinguishable from those in
Shaw. They are more likely to satisfy the Miller test because, in con-
trast to House districts, the existence of only two Senate districts per
state creates a fusion between partisan gerrymanders-which the
Court has virtually insulated from constitutional attack 59-and race-
conscious districting. In a state in which Blacks constitute a dispro-
portionate share of the Democratic Party and partisan affiliation is
racially stratified, Blacks must comprise a disproportionate share of
one of the two Senate districts in order to achieve a partisan gerry-
mander. Thus, unlike House districts, as to which it is widely believed
that maximizing the number of Black voters in a single district reduces
Democratic seats overall, Senate districting equates race and partisan-
ship in a co-dependent fashion.6" Even failing Miller, however, Senate
districts are more likely to withstand strict scrutiny because they do
not face the same geographic compactness requirement as House
districts.6 '
This Article advocates applying section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to Senate elections in order to prevent minority vote dilution and
to preserve the progress of the second Reconstruction by re-conceiv-
ing the Voting Rights Act's possibilities. Part I demonstrates that
Congress, in enacting the Seventeenth Amendment's provision for the
direct election of United States Senators, intended to prevent minor-
ity vote dilution in Senate elections to the same extent as in any other,
thereby making the remedy of single-member districts presumptively
applicable to such elections. Part I measures Shaw and its progeny
against the original intent of the 61st and 62nd Congresses that de-
bated and passed the Seventeenth Amendment. I argue that remedial
Senate districts must be evaluated not under Shaw, but instead under
the fundamentally different conception of race-based remedies that
these Congresses appear to have contemplated. Part III, in contrast,
assumes the applicability of Shaw to remedial Senate districts and sets
forth in more detail Shaw's guidelines for drawing districts to remedy
minority vote dilution. I apply these guidelines to a set of illustrative
59. See infra notes 254-55, 262-64 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 262-91 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
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Senate districts in five states-Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Alabama-in order to demonstrate that remedial Sen-
ate districts are more likely to pass constitutional muster than are
race-conscious House districts.
I. Busting the White Male Millionaires' Club: The
Seventeenth Amendment and the Re-Ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment
The Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for the direct election of United States Senators, stating in
relevant part:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of
the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.62
The Amendment's text is silent as to whether districts are permissible,
and no state has ever formally elected Senators by district since the
Amendment's passage.63 The quiet of the Amendment on this score
and the negative force of its post-enactment history64 appear to have
led voting rights advocates to accept the Senate as "a white male
club"'65 or "a gentlemen's club"'6 6 in which both wealth67 and "White-
ness" are the normal prerequisites for entry.68
The history of the Seventeenth Amendment, however, demon-
strates that such resignation is uncalled for. It explicitly reaffirms the
Reconstruction Amendments, in particular the Fifteenth Amend-
ment,69 whose enabling clause is the constitutional authority for the
62. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII, § 1.
63. Prior to passage of the Amendment, some states, either informally or by statute,
elected Senators under districting arrangements. See Smith, supra note 52, at 19.
64. See infra notes 142-158 and accompanying text.
65. See Page, supra note 27, at All.
66. Maureen Dowd, Candidate Dole's Place in Literature, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 1996, at All.
67. See C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seven-
teenth Amendment 190 (1995) (characterizing the Senate as "the Rich Man's Club"). This
characterization is not necessarily exaggerated. About 40% of Senators have a net worth
of more than $1 million. See Rachel Van Dongen & John Mercurio, 40% of Senate Looks
Like a Million Bucks-New Disclosures Show an Increase in Upper-Chamber Millionaires,
ROLL CALL, June 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ROLLCL fie.
68. The only case challenging at-large United States Senate elections under the Voting
Rights Act appears to be NAACP v. Fordice, Civil Action No. J92-0251(W)(C) (S. D. Miss.
Apr. 29, 1992), dismissed without prejudice, July 20, 1993.
69. The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
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Voting Rights Act of 1965,70 under which single-member districts have
been employed as remedies for minority vote dilution. Congress has,
in fact, already exercised its remedial prerogatives in section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, which prohibits minority vote dilution in all electo-
ral contests. Moreover, the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment
intended that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments apply to
Senate elections in the same manner as any other, thus permitting
Congress, in the exercise of its remedial authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment, to authorize the creation of Senate districts where nec-
essary to prevent minority vote dilution.7'
There are no special constitutional reasons for exempting federal
Senate elections from the Voting Rights Act's prohibition against vote
dilution or, more specifically, from the remedy of single-member dis-
tricts.72 To the extent that one attempts to rely on post-enactment
history to find an exemption, that history tells a complex but ulti-
mately pro-remedial story. The Seventeenth Amendment's post-en-
actment history-a history which does not include formal Senate
districts-parallels that of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
the Seventeenth Amendment incorporating the latter two and ratified
at a time when the legislative intent of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments was being actively undermined.73 We should, therefore, view
its post-enactment history with the same skepticism with which we
have come to view the early post-enactment history of the Recon-
struction Amendments. Just as the early post-enactment history of
the latter Amendments neglected the ameliorative goals of their draft-
ers, the Seventeenth Amendment has suffered a similar disconnection
between ameliorative legislative purpose and counter-ameliorative
post-enactment practice. But, as will be seen below, even if one cred-
its the post-enactment history of the Seventeenth Amendment, that
history supports Senate districts because it includes specific congres-
sional legislation that would in time grant states broad options as to
the manner in which they could elect Senators.
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
70. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
71. See discussion infra at notes 115-19.
72. See discussion infra at in Part I.B.
73. See discussion infra at in Part I.C.
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A. Racism and Constitutional Reform as Strange Bedfellows: The
Words and Deeds of the Seventeenth Amendment
Though the relationship between the Fifteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments-in particular, the extent to which the latter protected
the former from implied repeal-is not self-evident, their kinship ar-
gues for full applicability of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Sen-
ate elections. That is because the Seventeenth Amendment
incorporates the same remedial authority that Congress possesses
under the Fifteenth Amendment to prevent minority vote dilution.
Thus, remedies available the under the Fifteenth Amendment-spe-
cifically, single-member, majority-minority districts created pursuant
to the Voting Rights Act-are presumptively applicable to Senate
elections.
As amended in 1982, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
[hereinafter "the Act"] provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color .... 74
The Act is modeled after the Fifteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, which provides that the "right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."75 The Act was enacted pursuant to the Enabling Clause of the
Fifteenth Amendment: "Congress shall have power to enforce this ar-
ticle by appropriate legislation."76 The fundamental distinction be-
tween section 2 of the Act and the Fifteenth Amendment is that
section 2 does not require proof of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs
need only show that, under the totality of the circumstances,
[T]he political processes leading to nomination or election [in
the State or political subdivision] are not equally open to partici-
pation by members of a [protected class] .. . in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.77
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
75. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. See also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 277 ("Congress
exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an inventive manner when it
enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.").
77. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986) (quoting section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act). The Court concluded that "[the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to
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In its landmark decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,7 the Supreme
Court set forth the preconditions for establishing a claim of vote dilu-
tion in violation of section 2 of the Act:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a ma-
jority in a single-member district .... Second, the minority
group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that
the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts dis-
tinctive minority group interests. Third, the minority must be
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate running unopposed-usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.79
While not required under the Act, the remedy of choice for sec-
tion 2 violations has become the creation of majority-minority single-
member districts."0 A paradigmatic section 2 case involves a jurisdic-
tion employing an at-large scheme to elect members to a multi-mem-
ber legislative body.8' In such a case, minority plaintiffs contend that
their largely cohesive votes are submerged by a White majority's bloc
vote so as to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidate.8" The
the Act] dispositively rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) ... which required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was
adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters." Id. at 43-44
(footnote omitted). Subsection (b) of section 2 of the Act describes a plaintiff's burden of
proof:
A violation of subsection (a) ... is established if, based on the totality of circum-
stances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by mem-
bers of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) ... in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the polit-
ical process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis in original).
78. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
79. Id. at 50-51 (citations and footnotes omitted).
80. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests. The Question of Sin-
gle-Member Districts, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1135, 1167 (1993).
81. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. Another common type of section 2 case in-
volves a jurisdiction which employs single-member districts to elect representatives to a
multi-member body but is accused of having manipulated district lines so as to fragment
minority voters among several districts or cumulate them in one or a small number of
districts, in each instance reducing their electoral influence. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter,
507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993). In the latter type of action, the Gingles preconditions of compact-
ness, cohesiveness and white bloc voting remain applicable.
82. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34-35.
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single-member district removes this disadvantage by subdividing the
at-large electorate and placing the minority plaintiffs in a district in
which they constitute a majority and are therefore more likely to con-
trol the outcome of the election.8 3
As in the above example, United States Senators are elected to a
multi-member legislative body, with two distinctions. First, the body
to which Senators are elected is a national chamber. Second, the elec-
tion of each of the two Senators from each state is usually staggered,
occurring two to four years apart.84 Neither of these differences alter
the section 2 liability paradigm, however.8 1 Moreover, nothing in
either section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment
suggests that Congress's full authority to remedy vote dilution does
not extend to Senate elections. As matter of statutory construction,
section 2, as originally enacted:
[p]rotected the right to vote, and it did so without making any
distinctions or imposing any limitations as to which elections
would fall within its purview. As Attorney General [Nicholas]
Katzenbach made clear during his testimony before the House
83. See id. at 68.
84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (prescribing the sequence of elections for
Senators).
85. In recent years, controversy has arisen over the "single-member office" doctrine.
Under this theory, elections to fill offices that are incapable of simultaneous occupancy by
more than one person within a jurisdiction-for example, mayor or governor-cannot be
challenged under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the
Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1991). The Supreme Court has declined to completely exempt single-member offices from
the scope of the section's coverage. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501
U.S. 419, 426 (1991). However, where plaintiffs challenge a jurisdiction's right to maintain
a single-member office-as where, for example, plaintiffs seek to transform a county execu-
tive position into a multi-member county commission-the Court has precluded the use of
section 2. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881-82 (1994). In Holder, the Court concluded:
With respect to challenges to the size of a governing authority, respondents fail to
explain where the search for reasonable alternative benchmarks should begin and
end, and they provide no acceptable principles for deciding future cases. The
wide range of possibilities makes the choice inherently standardless, and we
therefore conclude that a plaintiff cannot maintain a section 2 challenge to the
size of a government body ....
Id. at 885 (citations and quotations omitted).
Neither the single-member office doctrine nor the concerns of Holder foreclose challenges
to vote dilution in United States Senate contests. A United States Senate seat is no more a
single-member office than the position of state senator. See Karlan, supra, at 18 ("[N]o
court has ever suggested that the position of state senator is a single-member office.").
Moreover, the Holder Court's concern that no benchmark for measuring vote dilution is
available where the office is occupied singularly is inapposite in Senate elections; plaintiffs
challenging these elections would not be attempting to increase the size of a government
body, but rather only the system of voting.
[concerning the 1965 Act], "[e]very election in which registered
electors are permitted to vote would be covered" under § 2.86
From its inception, then, the Act was intended to be "interpreted
in a manner that provides the broadest possible scope in combating
racial discrimination."'87 And the manifest purpose of the 1982
amendments to section 2, which removed any requirement of proof of
discriminatory intent, was to broaden the Act's protection even fur-
ther.88 Thus, there is no statutory impediment to a vote dilution claim
challenging at-large Senate elections.
Notwithstanding section 2's intended coverage, it is possible to
argue that the Constitution exempts the Senate from that provision's
most common remedy-single-member, majority-minority districts.
This argument is rooted in precepts of state sovereignty and in a long
history of statewide, at-large Senate elections. 89 These arguments for
a constitutional exemption, however, shed their persuasiveness when
one examines the valiant efforts made during the 61st and 62nd Con-
gresses to ensure that the remedial auspices of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment-of which majority-minority districts under the Voting Rights
Act is one-remained available in Senate contests. The 62nd Con-
gress which enacted the Seventeenth Amendment was as concerned
about the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment as it was about the di-
rect election of Senators.90 Indeed, it may be argued that this Con-
gress, as well as the 61st, re-ratified the Fifteenth Amendment in the
course of its debates. Thus, Congress's remedial power under the Fif-
teenth Amendment presumptively affords it as much, if not greater,
authority to prevent vote dilution in Senate elections as it has in other
elections.
The Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913, a period dur-
ing which Blacks and others were forced to acquiesce in the failure of
the first Reconstruction. 91 The first Reconstruction had collapsed
under the weight of Southern violence, fraud, structural discrimina-
tion, statutory suffrage restrictions, and constitutional disenfranchise-
ment.92 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had effectively
86. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991) (applying section 2 to judicial elec-
tions) (citations and footnotes omitted).
87. Id. at 403 (internal quotations omitted).
88. See id. at 403-04.
89. See Smith, supra note 52, at 24.
90. See infra notes 91-119 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
92. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in
CONTROVERSMS IN MINORrrY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECrIVE 141
(Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
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sanctioned the emasculation of the Fifteenth Amendment in a series
of decisions limiting Congress's enforcement powers. 3 These events
figured prominently in the congressional debates on the Seventeenth
Amendment. Having successfully abrogated the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in practice, Southern congressional Democrats now sought its de
jure repeal in United States Senate elections. Their efforts shaped the
contours of the debates, and, ultimately, the text of the Seventeenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
The Seventeenth Amendment was nearly sent to the states for
ratification two years earlier but became mired in Civil War rhetoric
during the 61st Congress. The core proposal for the direct election of
Senators was simple enough: "The Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the peoples
thereof, for six years .... ,"4 Sensing an opportunity to weaken the
Reconstruction Amendments and curtail future interference in South-
ern elections,95 however, the Democrats sought to amend the Elec-
tions Clause of Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, which provided that
"[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."96 Under
the Democrats' proposal, the federal government would no longer re-
tain oversight authority in Senate elections: "[tihe times, places, and
manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each
State by the legislature thereof."97 Although the language of the Dem-
ocrats' proposal, which eventually became known as the "race
rider,"9 " did not mention the Fifteenth Amendment, the Democrats
were remarkably unsubtle about their intentions, even as they tried to
dissemble them. The South did not intend to disenfranchise the for-
mer slaves, according to Senator Davis of Georgia, but the Fifteenth
Amendment had given to "the ignorant, vicious, half barbaric Negroes
93. See generally D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court, The Franchise, and
The Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. Rnv. 47, 48-60 (1988) (de-
tailing Supreme Court decisions narrowly construing Congress' enforcement powers under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
94. See 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE ISTORY OF
THE UNrrED STATES SENATE 389, 403 (Mary Sharon Hall ed., 1988) (quoting proposed
amendment).
95. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
97. 46 CONG. Rnc. 847 (1911) (statement of the Secretary).
98. See, e.g., 47 CONG. Rnc. 1483, 1889, 1899 (1911) (statement of Sen. Smith).
of the South the right to vote and the right to hold office."99 Such
indirection, however, no longer posed difficulty for the South, for
"[flew [Negroes] care to vote and none ask to hold office, except when
stirred by this same disturbing element of the Republican Party, usu-
ally imported from the North or East ... ."10
The South's opposition to federal control over Senate elections
resembled its opposition forty years earlier to the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, which, along with the Enforcement Acts passed under it, had
been effective for a decade or so.1°1 Indeed, Southern Democrats in
the 61st Congress remembered vividly the federal intervention
wrought by the Amendment. As Senator Rayner of Maryland
explained:
If you give Congress the right to override the regulations of a
State as to the manner of electing Senators, then you give Con-
gress the power to pass a bill like the force bill or any bill sub-
stantially similar. I object to putting the power in the hands of
the Federal Congress.1'0
Although the Republicans opposed the race rider for various rea-
sons, none was more resonant than their charge that the Democrats
were attempting to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment. One Republi-
can encapsulated his party's concerns:
Not content with a success obtained in suppressing the negro
vote through a curious variety of State constitutional provisions
and legislative devices, certain Senators now seek to absolutely
deprive the General Government of all power to guard and pro-
tect the elections of Members of this body not only from the
consequences of the provisions and devices suggested, but also
from such fraud, violence, or corruption as may taint a Senato-
rial election North or South. The adoption of the amendment
would give substantial though limited national sanction to the
disenfranchisement of the Negroes in the Southern States. In
their disenfranchisement we now passively acquiesce, but with
this supine attitude some Senators are not content; they ask us
to actually strip Congress of the power to question election
methods and actions in so far as the election of United States
Senators may be concerned, and by way of inducement to the
99. 46 CONG. REc. 1635 (1911) (statement of Sen. Davis).
100. Id.
101. See Kousser, supra note 92, at 139 ("The Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforce-
ment Acts were more effective than many scholars contend, and extensive black voting
continued long after 1877.").
102. 46 CONG. REC. 1162 (1911) (statement of Sen. Rayner). The force bill, which sub-
stantially increased penalties for violent obstruction of the right to vote and prohibited
excessive poll taxes, passed the House in 1875, but was never acted on in the Senate. See
Kousser, supra note 92, at 139.
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Congress and the Nation to consent to the permanent suppres-
sion of more than a million votes at elections to choose
Senators. 103
Whether or not the Republicans' assessment of the Democrats'
motives was accurate, their suspicions shifted the focus of the debate
from the merits of directly electing Senators to the question of
whether the Fifteenth Amendment should apply in Senate elec-
tions.104 If Republicans succeeded in defeating the race rider, it was,
to their minds, tantamount to a re-ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment." 5 A re-ratification in this context would have particu-
larly significant ramifications for assessing the scope of the remedies
available to Congress in order eliminate racial discrimination in Sen-
ate elections. Absent any evidence that the 61st and 62nd Congresses
103. 46 CONG. REC. 1218-19 (1911) (statement of Sen. Carter); id. at 1335 (statement of
Sen. Depew):
When the Democratic friends of the proposed amendment [to the Elections
Clause] are asked why they want this provision of our Constitution, which has
existed for 122 years, repealed, their answer is that under it the right has been
claimed for Congress to interfere with the elective franchise in the several States.
In other words, under it Congress has endeavored to so legislate, though that
legislation has never been passed, as to permit the Negro to vote in the Southern
States, and that under it may be found, when the question comes before the
Supreme Court of the United States, authority to declare the laws, which in one
form or another disenfranchises the Negro vote in some of the States,
unconstitutional.
See also id at 2426 (statement of Sen. Curtis):
For some reason, at this time, a majority of the committee have reported the
resolution to the Senate with an amendment which may well be termed a "rider"
or "joker," and which should, in my judgment, be defeated, for it has not been
considered by the people, and if agreed to, it might be used by the States that so
desire as recognizing their right to disfranchise [sic] the colored voters.
104. For their part, Southern Democrats were placed in the contradictory position of
claiming, on the one hand, that Congress maintained authority under the Reconstruction
Amendments to prevent Negro disenfranchisement while arguing, on the other hand, that
the failure to amend the Elections Clause impermissibly endowed Congress with the au-
thority to interfere in Southern elections-an act that might be necessary to protect the
Negro franchise. Compare 46 CONG. REc. 2759 (1911) (statement of Sen. Rayner) ("How
in the world is there a conflict between a resolution which gives the States the right to
determine upon the manner of electing Senators and the fifteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States?") with id. at 2129 (statement of Sen. Percy) (characterizing
the extant Elections Clause, as applied to direct Senate elections, as "a substantial, a vital
power.").
105. Contemporaneous news accounts reflect the racialized tenor of the congressional
debates and the centrality of the attempted repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Root Rouses Senate on Elections Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1911, at 3 (reporting that
Southern Democrats feared that federal control of Senate elections would nullify restric-
tions on the Negro franchise); Fails to Force Vote on Direct Elections, N.Y. TiMNs, Feb. 18,
1911, at 2 (reporting on the efforts of Republicans to maintain federal control of Senate
elections because they believed "there was no desire forever to deprive the negro [sic] of
the protection of the general Government.").
intended that the Fifteenth Amendment and any congressional reme-
dies promulgated thereunder operate differently in Senate elections,
one must conclude that they are to apply in the same manner as other
elections. Thus, measures Congress may take to prevent minority
vote dilution in, for instance, House elections-such as the creation of
majority-minority districts under the Voting Rights Act-may likewise
be taken with respect to Senate contests.
Republicans viewed the race rider with a mix of realism and ide-
alism. They acknowledged, realistically, that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment was not then currently being enforced in the South'016 but
deemed this inertia insufficient reason to repeal the ideal and promise
of the Fifteenth Amendment. Speaking to the permanency of the dis-
enfranchisement that would be wrought by passage of the race rider,
Senator Depew of Pennsylvania stated:
I, can conceive of nothing which would affect them [Northern
Blacks] so deeply and arouse them so thoroughly as a perma-
nent constitutional disenfranchisement of their brethren by the
votes of Republican Senators .... This resolution virtually re-
peals the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion. It validates by constitutional amendment laws under which
citizens of the United States, constituting in the aggregate more
than one-tenth of the electorate, are to be permanently deprived
of the right of suffrage. There is no pretense that any conditions
may arise in the future under which these laws will be liberalized
and the growing intelligence of the Negro electors will be recog-
nized. These laws have their origin in a fear of the Negro vote in
those States where it is equal to the white vote or larger than the
white vote.'0 7
Senator Root of New York similarly recognized that preventing
implied repeal of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was nec-
106. Nor, for that matter, was the Amendment being enforced in the North. Senator
Borah of Idaho charged Northern Republicans with outright hypocrisy for opposing the
race rider:
I do not know, Mr. President, how long the North is going to play the hypocrite or
the moral coward on this Negro question. The North always assumes when we
come to discuss the Negro question that there is in the North a superiority of
wisdom and judgment and of virtue and of tolerance with reference with dealing
with that question which is not found in other parts of the country. Call the roll in
this Senate Chamber of States where they have a Negro population and present
the record with reference to the manner in which the North has dealt with this
question, and tell me what authority any man has to stand upon the floor of the
Senate and chide any part of this Union about the manner in which it deals with
this question.
The Northern States have exhibited the same animosity, the same race preju-
dice and race hatred that has been developed in the other parts of the Union.
46 CONG. REc. 2656 (1911) (statement of Sen. Borah).
107. id. at 1336 (1911) (statement of Sen. Depew).
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essary, not so that Congress could take immediate action to protect
the Black franchise (which it had no intention of doing), but so that "if
it shall ever come that the spirit of lynching and peonage denies to
those poor people the protection that these amendments of the Con-
stitution were designed to give them, then the reserve power will be
reenergized."10 Thus, even as they acknowledged the failure of the
Fifteenth Amendment to integrate former slaves into the political in-
frastructure of the country, Republicans sought its preservation in
Senate elections on the future possibility that the government might
give effect to the Amendment. The political price of protecting the
Fifteenth Amendment in Senate elections was the defeat of the direct
elections proposal in the 61st Congress.1"9
The 62nd Congress offered fresh possibilities for passage of a di-
rect elections proposal, but the race rider re-emerged and, with it, the
ghosts of the Civil War. Republicans continued to cast their argu-
ments in terms of preserving the Fifteenth Amendment:
You southern Democrats believe that if you can insert in the
Constitution, as you are now proposing, the following provision,
"the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators
shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof,"
that this may be construed as a partial repeal of the fifteenth
amendment, and whether it so operates as a matter of theoreti-
cal law, you know that you intend that it shall operate so in
fact.1 0
And Democrats continued to incriminate themselves on the charge:
108. Id. at 2260 (statement of Sen. Root).
109. See Smith, supra note 52, at 42.
110. 47 CONG. RC. 2430 (1911) (statement of Rep. Mann). See also id. at 1483, 1889,
1899 (statements of Sen. Smith) (accusing Southern Democrats of proposing the race rider
to avoid federal interference with the South's disenfranchisement of Blacks); id. at 2418
(statement of Rep. Moon) (charging that Southern Democrats were attempting to undo
the national supremacy won as a result of the Civil War); id. at 219 (statement of Rep.
Miller):
We are frankly told by gentlemen from the other side of the Chamber that the
main purpose of this section is to prevent, on the part of the Federal Government,
interference with disfranchisement of the negro, now practically complete, in all
the Southern States. Such a statement condemns the [race rider] and gives em-
phatic reason why it should not become a part of the Constitution.
See also id. at 241 (statement of Rep. Jackson) (implying that passage of the race rider
would require representatives from Northern states to give a special explanation to their
Black voting constituents); id at 2425 (statement of Rep. Madden) ("It takes no superior
intelligence to understand their purpose. Their motive is that certain well known States
may have unlimited and unrestricted power to destroy the franchise of the negro[sic].
They want him while ostensibly free to remain the chattel of the designing politicians of the
South"). Representative Prouty of Iowa put it most bluntly: "Men only fear interference
when they are contemplating some wrong." Id. at 2425.
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The object of the Bristow amendment [eliminating the race
rider] is to wrest the political power of Mississippi and every
other Southern State from the virtue and intelligence of the peo-
ple and vest it in the ignorant and vicious class of the State. In
short, the object is to destroy the civilization of the South ....
It is perfectly clear that the ground of Republican conten-
tion in the Bristow amendment is to overthrow white supremacy
and to reinstate negro domination in the Southern States. The
Republican position, clearly expressed throughout the debate,
full of malignant tirades against the South, and breathing the
bitterness of hate toward the southern people, does not even
pretend to limit the operation of the Bristow amendment to the
control of the time and manner of the election throughout the
Union, but boldly warn [sic] us that the object and aim of the
amendment is negro rule in the South.11'
Even when the Democrats framed their objections to federal con-
trol of Senate elections in terms of state sovereignty-an idea associ-
ated with the Senate from its inceptionll 2 -this formulation, too, was
molded by the Southern legislators' fears of Reconstruction-style in-
tervention in federal Senate elections." 3 The fate of the Seventeenth
111. 47 CONG. REc. 2415 (1911) (statement of Rep. Witherspoon). The Democrats
never acknowledged that they intended to repeal the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.
One has difficulty, however, reconciling such reticence with statements clearly conveying
an unmistakable intent to continue repressing Blacks. See, e.g., id. at 215 (statement of
Rep. Tribble) (equating federal control of Senate elections with Reconstruction-style inter-
vention while assuring Congress that the South had "patiently and faithfully borne the
burden of an inferior race"). See also id. at 240 (statement of Rep. Sherley):
We in the South have had confronting us a very grave and very serious problem-
a problem that, according to the best judgment of the southern people, involved
the supremacy of the white race in those States. Out of much of turmoil, out of
much that might not be defended in the cold forum of law, has come now a solu-
tion that has been upheld by the courts and that today is making for the future
prosperity and safety of the entire land. We are not willing, many of us, to endan-
ger that status, believing it to be most vital, by giving a power as to elections more
extensive than now belongs to the Federal Government.
Underscoring the racialized opposition to federal control of Senate elections, Democrats
mocked the effort to rid the direct election proposal of the race rider:
In the last Congress it was what is known as the Sutherland amendment, and
it was voted down in the Senate, and the very Senator who is the author of this
amendment [to purge the race rider] in the Senate this Congress, a Senator from
Kansas, voted against this proposition, then known as the "Sutherland amend-
ment." When he returned home to Kansas meetings were held and certain orga-
nizations of colored voters demanded that Congress pass this amendment, and
the Senator from Kansas offered it again and became its chief champion.
So this might well be dubbed "the Kansas Negro amendment to the
Constitution."
Id. at 6347-48 (statement of Rep. Bartlett)
112. See Smith, supra note 52, at 24.
113. See, e.g., 47 CONG. Rnc. 226 (1911) (statement of Rep. Sisson) (referring to the
concept of state sovereignty in the context of the federal government refraining from
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Amendment literally rested not on the merits of directly electing Sen-
ators-which was hardly discussed by the 62nd Congress-but rather
on competing conceptions about what the absence of federal control
would mean for the operation of the Fifteenth Amendment in Senate
elections. After a tense stalemate, the advocates of federal control
prevailed, passing the Seventeenth Amendment without a modicum of
doubt that the Fifteenth Amendment would be applied to Senate
elections.114
Thus, the debates of both the 61st and 62nd Congresses simply
cannot be read in a race-neutral fashion. They are inundated with
references to Negro oppression and the Fifteenth Amendment. Those
debates and the defeat of the race rider reaffirmed the promise of the
Fifteenth Amendment, even as the letter of that provision lay mori-
bund at the time. In preserving the Fifteenth Amendment's applica-
tion to Senate elections, however, what if anything did the 61st and
62nd Congresses decide about how the Amendment would apply?
How do we reconcile the racially-charged debates of the 61st and 62nd
Congresses with the placid, race-neutral language of the Seventeenth
Amendment in determining the permissibility of remedial Senate dis-
tricts? Although the Amendment does not speak to the question of
districts, the debates themselves intimate how the prospect of reme-
dial districts should be evaluated.
I make no claim that in reaffirming the Reconstruction Amend-
ments the 61st and 62nd Congress's specifically contemplated the use
of districts to remedy vote dilution in Senate elections. The Fifteenth
Amendment was being actively undermined with little hope of rejuve-
nation in 1913, and Congress had no occasion to contemplate such a
"lay[ing] violent hands" upon that sovereignty); id. at 2424 (statement of Rep. Randell)
(equating Reconstruction with rights Republicans seek to confer on federal government in
Senate elections); id. at 240 (statement of Rep. Sherley) (discussing state control of Senate
elections as a matter of state sovereignty and claiming that state control had led to a "solu-
tion" in the challenge to the "supremacy of the white race"); id. at 2411 (statement Rep.
Dickinson) (citing the special appointment of marshals and other Reconstruction-style fed-
eral intervention as unjust encroachments on the rights of states); id- at 2414 (statement of
Rep. Witherspoon) (recalling the Reconstruction and opposing federal control over Senate
elections as a tool "to enable the Republican Party to destroy southern civilization when-
ever sectional conditions may so change that it can gratify its malignant feelings toward the
South without danger of being turned out of office"); id. at 2421 (statement of Rep. Can-
non) (accusing Southern Democrats supporting the race rider of "harking back to the
graveyard [of the Civil War] and conjuring up ghosts and then running from the ghosts");
see also Smith, supra note 52, at 44 n.235.
114. See 47 CONG. REc. 1923 (1911).
step." 5 More importantly, the Supreme Court did not recognize the
modem paradigm of vote dilution and its accompanying remedy of
single-member districts until 1969, ninety-nine years after the enact-
ment of the Fifteenth Amendment." 6 Thus, it is futile to argue that
the 61st and 62nd Congress's failure to consider the specific remedy of
single-member districts precludes such a remedy; remedial districts
were not contemplated with respect to any office until nearly one hun-
dred years after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment." 7 It is
Congress's broad enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, not a specific intent regarding Senate districts, which empowers
it to create Senate districts as a remedy for vote dilution.
A central premise of the Republicans' efforts to preserve the Fif-
teenth Amendment was the need to maintain remedial power should
the nation ever experience a change of thinking with respect to Negro
disenfranchisement. They understood well that they could not foresee
all the circumstances that might necessitate application of Congress's
authority:
I concede that in the placid days through which we are passing
there is no pressing need for a vigorous exercise of the power of
Congress to control the elections of Senators or Members of the
115. However, at-large voting schemes were being used to dilute Black voting strength,
see Davidson, supra note 35, at 25, and there is no reason to believe that the 61st and 62nd
Congresses were not aware of this.
116. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969). In Allen, the Court
concluded that a locality's change from a district to an at-large system for electing county
supervisors fell within the terms of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires
covered jurisdictions to pre-clear changes to a "voting qualification or prerequisite to vot-
ing, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
The Court wrote:
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. Voters who are members of a racial mi-
nority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a decided minority in
the county as a whole. This type of change could therefore nullify their ability to
elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them from
voting.
Allen, 393 U.S. at 569. See also Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights
Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION I THE SOUTH:
THE IMPAcr OF THE VoTrING RiGrS AcT 1965-1990 22, 32-33 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds. 1994) (recognizing Allen as the first case holding that the Voting
Rights Act covered laws which dilute minority voting strength).
117. It is likely that the drafters of the Fifteenth Amendment intended the Amendment
to cover claims of vote dilution. Because racial gerrymanders and other dilutive measures
were in force at the time of the Fifteenth Amendment's enactment, this is a reasonable
construction of the Fifteenth Amendment's command that the right to vote shall not be
"abridged ... on account of race .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. See Kousser, supra
note 92, at 137 (noting that legislative history of Fifteenth Amendment is silent on the
meaning of abridgment, but arguing that the term is broad and prophylactic).
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House of Representatives; but the centuries will bring curious
conditions of which we now can have little conception .... The
Congress will, as time goes on, determine the appropriate ac-
tion, if any, to be taken."'
Having exercised its power by enacting the Voting Rights of 1965,
it would be anomalous to exempt Senate elections from the Act's rem-
edies when the 61st and 62nd Congresses specifically strove to ensure
that federal authority under the Fifteenth Amendment would extend
to Senate elections. Since the scope of section 2 of the Act undeniably
reaches Senate elections, and since the debates of the 61st and 62nd
Congresses manifest no intention to limit Congress's ability to apply a
provision like section 2 to such elections, section 2's most common
remedy-single-member, majority-minority districts-should be avail-
able in Senate elections"1
9
B. Special Reasons for Exempting Senate Elections
Assuming the validity of the claim that the 62nd Congress passed
the Seventeenth Amendment with the express objective of preserving
the full force of the Fifteenth Amendment in Senate elections-in-
cluding, majority-minority single-member districts created under the
Voting Rights Act-there may nevertheless be special constitutional
reasons for exempting Senate elections from Congress's remedial au-
thority. In other words, until now, I have focused solely on the rela-
tionship between the Seventeenth Amendment and the
Reconstruction Amendments to prove the permissibility of remedial
Senate districts. This account is most convincing, however, if it is rec-
oncilable with other parts of the Constitution as well as with post-
enactment developments under the Seventeenth Amendment itself.
The Constitution is simply silent as to districts of any sort, be they
for Senators or Congressmen.120 I have argued, however, that such
silence with respect to districts for Representatives supports Senate
districting, because the Seventeenth Amendment is modeled after Ar-
118. 46 CONG. REc. 2766, 2768 (1911) (statement of Sen. Carter).
119. My argument for the permissibility of remedial Senate districts does not presup-
pose that the Fifteenth Amendment itself reaches vote dilution claims such that a plaintiff
may sue thereunder on a vote dilution theory. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (limiting scope of constitutional claims under the Fifteenth
Amendment to a "purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the
freedom to vote"). However, once it is established that the enabling authority of the Fif-
teenth Amendment permits Congress to recognize vote dilution claims, see supra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text, remedial Senate districts are placed on a par with all other
remedies available under the Voting Rights Act.
120. See Smith, supra note 52, at 2.
ticle I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which provides for the
election of Congressmen.121 This parallel, as well as the language of
other relevant provisions, 122 supports the permissibility of voluntary
Senate districting by states. Whether or not one is convinced of this,
for purposes of the present argument, it is sufficient that no provision
of the Constitution expressly forbids Senate districts.
On the other hand, the Constitution as a whole arguably implies
that the Senate is to function as an instrument of each state's sover-
eign voice.' 3 Certainly that was one vision of the Framers in creating
an upper house. 24 However, even if the twentieth-century Senate
does act as a guardian of state sovereignty, the sovereign has changed,
and so too can the means of representing it. The very notion of the
Senate representing the sovereign interests of states evolved during a
period when racial minorities were legally precluded from speaking
for the sovereign. They could neither vote for nor be elected Sena-
tors.' Indeed, the Framers could not have possibly intended that a
state's sovereign interests include the interests of Blacks, most of
whom were counted as only three-fifths of a human being. 126 Thus,
the participation of minorities in the electorate of the sovereign vastly
transforms the functional role of an institution devoted to its
protection. 27
121. See id. at 10-11. The Seventeenth Amendment provides:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII, cl. 1. Similarly, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitu-
tion states that: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
Other commentators have noted that "[a]lthough the Seventeenth Amendment does
specify that the 'two Senators from each state' are to be 'elected by the people thereof,'
this language is arguably consistent with the division of a state into single-member Senate
districts of equal population." Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Insti-
tution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 43-44 n.72 (1997).
122. See Smith, supra note 52, at 13-19.
123. See id. at 19.
124. See id. at 24, 26-34. While I have refuted some historical components of the state
sovereignty argument elsewhere, see id., I relent momentarily for purposes of supposition.
125. See id. at 57 n.282.
126. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
127. Moreover, the increasing heterogeneity of each state's electorate renders ever
more elusive a sufficiently unitary definition of what constitutes a state's sovereign
interests.
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The Madisonian expectation that shifting majorities would rule at
different intervals does not address the problem of representation
posed by the changes in the sovereign's electorate. 2 " In theory, since
different majorities within a state will prevail in different Senate elec-
tions, the increased heterogeneity of the electorate will not make eq-
uitable representation of the state in its sovereign capacity impossible.
By taking turns at power-sharing, the whole of the state will be repre-
sented over time, though perhaps not at any single point in time. 12 9
Moreover, the increased heterogeneity of the state's electorate will
theoretically encourage the broadest possible consensus in order to be
successful at the polls. However, as evidenced by racial bloc voting,
racial minorities have fit uneasily, if at all, into the Founders' para-
digm of coalition-building. 30
The prevalence of racial bloc voting belies any notion that the
White majority is too diffuse and disorganized to effectively counter
the political advantages that some, most notably public choice theo-
rists, presume accrue to the benefit of discreet and insular minorities:
For masses of white voters to consistently reject minority candi-
dates in successive elections and jurisdictions, a simple and di-
rect behavioral cue must be at work.
Given the centrality of the racial divide in American his-
tory, from slavery forward, the race card is the perfect mecha-
nism to overcome the collective action problem in moving broad
masses to act in a disciplined fashion. Race is the perfect cue: it
is a simple call and it elicits intensely held beliefs and values.
Race serves more than perhaps any other single issue in contem-
porary American life as a defining ideological bellwether. 131
Senate districts remedy the failure of Madisonian democracy by
insisting that states give voice to significant populations in the sover-
eign which are otherwise shut out. 132 In so doing, Senate districts also
address what Professor Lani Guinier has termed the "deliberative ger-
128. See GUINMR, supra note 36, at 3-6. As Guinier explains:
The conventional case for the fairness of majority rule is that it is not really the
rule of a fixed group-The Majority-on all issues; instead it is the rule of shifting
majorities, as the losers at one time or on one issue join with others and become
part of the governing coalition at another time or on another issue .... I call a
majority that rules but does not dominate a Madisonian Majority.
Id. at 4.
129. See id.
130. See id. See also Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan
Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2512 n.23 (1997) (noting that bloc voting remains espe-
cially prevalent in the South).
131. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. Rnv. 1833, 1889 (1992).
132. Unlike the House of Representatives, under present circumstances,
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rymander"-the transfer of the White bloc voting problem from the
electorate to the legislature.133 Because legislative action in the Sen-
ate often requires the vote of a supermajority, the "bargaining power
to all numerically inferior or less powerful groups, be they black, fe-
male, or Republican," is enhanced. 34
Finally, remedial Senate districts are entirely consistent with the
purposes of according states sovereign power. As the Supreme Court
has stated:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract polit-
ical entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials gov-
erning the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protec-
tion of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
"Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive
from the diffusion of sovereign power., 1
35
The liberty-protecting function of sovereignty is therefore implicit
in Article V's command that "no State, without its Consent, shall be
[s]ince each state comprises a single Senate district, the approval of minority vot-
ers is not likely ever to be sufficient, and will often not even be necessary, for a
Senate candidate to be elected. Thus, to the extent that race-based group inter-
ests may exist or arise, racial minorities might often expect not to find any repre-
sentation of their interests in the Senate. House districts, in contrast, comprise
only one-ninth of a state, on average. Thus, the approval of minority voters is
much more likely to be necessary or sufficient for a candidate to be elected to the
House than to the Senate. Therefore, a racial minority is likely to find that her
group interests are more often represented, and consistently better represented,
in the House than in the Senate.
Baker & Dinkin, supra note 121, at 43 (footnotes omitted).
133. See GUINIER, supra note 36, at 65.
134. Id. The filibuster exemplifies this point. Only a vote of cloture can prevent a
Senator from speaking for an unlimited amount of time, potentially killing legislation that
she dislikes. See CONGESSIONA. QuARTERLY, INC., CONGRESS FROM A TO Z 144 (1988).
And even with the availability of cloture, which can be time-consuming to invoke, an indi-
vidual Senator might use the mere threat of a filibuster to affect the course of legislation.
See JAMES A. MILLER, RuNNING IN PLACE INSIDE THE SENATE 160-63 (1986).
Other rules also uniquely empower individual Senators in determining the fate of leg-
islation or presidential appointees. A Senator, for instance, might object to consideration
of a bill on the Senate floor, refusing to give her "unanimous consent." Such a refusal
requires a debatable motion on whether to consider the bill. See id. at 36. And, as the
recent controversy surrounding Massachusetts Governor William Weld's nomination to be-
come United States Ambassador to Mexico illustrates, a Senate committee chairman also
possesses unusual power in preventing disfavored presidential nominees from reaching the
Senate floor for consideration. See Steven L. Meyers, Helms to Oppose Weld As Nominee
for Ambassador, N.Y. TiMiEs, June 4, 1997, at Al (noting that Senator Jesse Helms "has
sweeping powers as committee chairman to hold up nominations" and "has often used that
power to force concessions from his opponents on a range of issues").
135. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citations omitted).
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deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.' 1 36 The Senate was cre-
ated to protect geographic minorities. 13 7 In the absence of Madis-
onian democracy, however-that is, where there is racial bloc
voting-this constitutional guarantee cannot be realized. Compare
Mississippi's population to California's. California is nearly nine
times larger, 38 yet, as is the command of Article V of the Constitu-
tion, both states enjoy equal representation in the Senate.139 Where
there is racial bloc voting, however, only White Mississippians receive
the protections of Article V, and only they are represented equally.
Surely the equal representation command of Article V cannot be read
with a formalism that sanctions racial bloc voting.' 40
It is precisely because the notion of state sovereignty must co-
exist with the remedial commands of the Fifteenth Amendment that
the Court has sustained the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
against charges that it infringed state sovereignty:
[T]he Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of
state power. "When a State exercises power wholly within the
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial re-
view. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is
used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected
right."'141
In sum, remedial Senate districts are neither expressly forbidden
by the Constitution nor impliedly prohibited by notions of state sover-
eignty. To the contrary, Senate districts, upon the requisite showing of
136. U.S. CONST. art. V.
137. See Smith, supra note 52, at 57.
138. See STATE RANMNGs 418 (Morgan Quitino ed., 1996) (California has 8.76% of the
total U.S. population and Mississippi has 1.21%).
139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140. The creation of majority-minority or minority-enhanced Senate districts may pose
an equal protection problem that is unrelated to Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its
progeny. Because such districts will tend to exaggerate minority voting strength in one of a
state's two districts, minorities are presented with a greater opportunity to elect a Senator
than their statewide numbers would ordinarily allow. In the illustrative district for Missis-
sippi, for instance, although Blacks make up only 35% of the state's population, the pro-
posed Senate district might give them effective control over 50% of that state's Senate
seats. See discussion infra part II.B. The Supreme Court appears to have rejected this type
of equal protection claim in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). In De Grandy, the
Court held that the failure to maximize minority representation is not the measure of vote
dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 1017. But if section 2 does not
entitle minorities to maximum numerical strength, neither should the Constitution entitle
Whites to such a fringe benefit. In any event, the alternative to the Mississippi scenario
would be the status quo, in which Whites, who constitute only 65% of the state, have
effective control over 100% of the Senate seats.
141. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347
(1960)).
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vote dilution, facilitate the very purposes for which sovereignty exists:
the protection of individual rights.
C. The Perils of Post-Enactment History
Although textual and sovereignty arguments fail to exempt Sen-
ate elections from the modem vote dilution paradigm, it is possible to
glean evidence of a contrary intent from the post-enactment history of
the Seventeenth Amendment. No state currently elects Senators by
districts, 42 and all states have used an at-large system since the pas-
sage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Such post-enactment history
may be the strongest evidence that Senate districts of any kind are
constitutionally impermissible. Post-enactment history is also, how-
ever, the least probative evidence of original intent because "there can
be no guarantee that a later lawmaker's understanding in fact bears on
the intent animating an earlier enactment."'143 Post-enactment history
lends itself to revisionism even when congressional actions interpret-
ing a constitutional provision are relatively close in time to the provi-
sion's ratification. 144
To the extent one can reasonably rely on the post-enactment his-
tory of the Seventeenth Amendment, there is specific support for Sen-
ate districts. Although there is currently no federal statutory
requirement for the statewide election of Senators, 45 at-large elec-
tions were apparently encouraged by passage of a 1914 federal law
which temporarily provided for statewide elections. That measure,
passed by the 63rd Congress, provided in relevant part:
142. See Smith, supra note 52, at 2.
143. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (1994).
144. See id. at 558. See also Jack Rakove, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 9 (1996) (arguing that
"the understanding of the ratifiers is the preeminent and arguably sole source for recon-
structing original meaning"). Cf Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (stating
that actions of the First Congress are only persuasive evidence in interpreting the Bill of
Rights, which was adopted by that Congress); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-90
(1983) (also stating that post-enactment actions of Congress are only persuasive evidence
of original intent).
145. Federal law governs only the timing of senatorial elections:
At the regular election held in any State next preceding the expiration of the term
for which any Senator was elected to represent such State in Congress, at which
election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United
States Senator from said State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term
commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter.
2 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). In contrast, House districts are specifically mandated by federal law.
See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1997).
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Sec. 2. That in any State wherein a United States Senator is
hereafter to be elected either at a general election or at any spe-
cial election called by the executive authority thereof to fill a
vacancy, until or unless otherwise specially provided by the leg-
islature thereof, the nomination of candidates for such office not
heretofore made shall be made, the election to fill the same con-
ducted, and the result thereof determined, as near as may be in
accordance with the laws of such State regulating the nomina-
tion of candidates for and election of Members at Large of the
National House of Representatives:
Provided, That in case no provision is made in any
State for the nomination or election of Representatives at
Large, the procedure shall be in accordance with the laws of
such State respecting the ordinary executive and adminis-
trative officers thereof who are elected by the vote of the
people of the entire State ....
Sec. 3. That section two of this Act shall expire by limita-
tion at the end of three years from the date of its approval.'46
The 1914 law was enacted as an interim measure to fill the gaps of
state laws which did not address the popular election of Senators.' 47
The debate on its passage is remarkable for its tendency to confirm
that the Seventeenth Amendment itself decided noting about the spe-
cific manner in which Senators would be elected-only that they
would be elected by the people. While no one expressly challenged
the sponsor of the bill's premise that Senators should be elected at-
large, 48 legislators were compelled to acknowledge that "Senators
differ gravely concerning the import of the [Seventeenth Amend-
ment]'1 49 and that the Amendment is not "self-executing."' 50 More-
over, the provisions of the 1914 Act only corroborated the interstitial
discretion that many legislators believed the Seventeenth Amendment
vested in the states and Congress.' 5' If the Seventeenth Amendment
was self-executing, it was unnecessary to specify a statewide require-
146. Act of June 4, 1914, ch. 103, 38 Stat. 384.
147. See 48 CONG. REC. 509 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
148. See id. at 1335 (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (equating the election of a Senator
with the election of a member of Congress at-large or a governor).
149. Id. at 1347 (statement of Sen. Robinson).
150. Id. at 1339 (statement of Sen. Bradley).
151. See, e.g., id. at 3271 (statement of Sen. Borah):
[W]hile I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress to pass this kind of a law
[the 1914 Act], I have always been very much in favor of leaving the question of
elections entirely to the States. It is for that reason that I opposed the Bristow
amendment and the Sutherland amendment [which retained in the federal gov-
ernment override authority regarding the time and manner of Senate elections]. I
have always felt that the States could better deal with these matters and that they
are peculiarly local.
ment in the 1914 Act. Equally significant, if statewide elections were
a constitutional command, it would be peculiar to make this require-
ment merely temporary, while the remainder of the statute would be
permanent. 152 These provisions are persuasive proof that states, after
expiration of the statute, could elect Senators by district.
The temporary at-large requirement in the 1914 statute is best
explained as an act of self-interest on the part of Senators who sup-
ported it. Twenty-five of the Senators voting on the 1914 Act were up
for re-election the following November. 3 Most had supported the
Seventeenth Amendment. 54 Those incumbent Senators who had not
supported the Amendment still enjoyed statewide name recognition
and possessed power and resources sufficient to mount a statewide
campaign. These incumbents thus had nothing to fear, and much to
gain, from statewide elections.' 55 Those who supported the Seven-
teenth Amendment would be celebrated as heroes. Those who op-
posed it, while perhaps at a disadvantage, still stood to benefit from
the statewide constituencies they had cultivated. In the end, twenty-
three of the twenty-five incumbents won re-election. 56
Self-interest in the context of the 63rd Congress also meant White
interest. The 63rd Congress passed the 1914 Act at a time when the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had been effectively abro-
gated for Blacks. Because African-Americans were largely shut out of
the political process, it is entirely unsurprising that the 63rd Congress
did not implement a Senate electoral scheme, such as districting, more
conducive to Black interests. This historical neglect, however,
shackles no constraints upon the modem polity. We are often loath to
152. Section 1 of the 1914 law pertained to the timing of Senate elections. It is cur-
rently memorialized, as amended, in 2 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
153. See HoFnaEK, supra note 67, at 190 (1995). The 1914 Act originated in the Senate
and its provisions were largely shaped by that body. See 48 CoNG. REc. 8460 (1913) (state-
ment of Rep. Rucker) ("[T]his is a Senate bill in which every Senator is profoundly inter-
ested and to which the Senate has given careful consideration."). The primary role of the
House was to insist on an amendment that made the at-large provision of the statute tem-
porary. See id. at 9195 (reading of the conference report by Clerk); id. at 9214 (statement
of Sen. Walsh); id. at 9382 (colloquy between Reps. Rucker and Barlett); id. at 9434 (read-
ing of final conference report by the Vice President).
154. Of the twenty-five Senators seeking re-election, seventeen had supported the Sev-
enteenth Amendment. Compare 46 CONG. REc. 1925 (1911) (roll call vote on Amend-
ment) with GUME TO U.S. ELECTIONS 457-81 (1975) (Richard A. Diamond ed.) (listing
terms of senators).
155. See HOEBEKE, supra note 67, at 190 (citing Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania
as an example of a machine politician who opposed the Seventeenth Amendment but nev-
ertheless won popular reelection).
156. See id.
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look to the early post-enactment history of the Reconstruction
Amendments to determine their proper application today. 5 7 Early
post-enactment history of the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance,
would support adherence to the doctrine of separate-but-equal an-
nounced in Plessy v. Ferguson.58 We clearly now reject that doctrine.
If we refuse to permit ourselves to be bound by the racially-tainted
post-enactment history of the Reconstruction Amendments, we must
likewise resist an identical outcome in interpreting the Seventeenth
Amendment, which, after all, reaffirmed the Reconstruction
Amendments.
In sum, post-enactment history, like textual and sovereignty argu-
ments, supports applying the full remedial breadth of the Fifteenth
Amendment and, by extension, the Voting Rights Act, to Senate
elections.
H. Fleeing the Re-Ratification: Shaw v. Reno's Clash with
Original Intent
If I am correct that Congress, in enacting the Seventeenth
Amendment, intended also to re-affirm the Reconstruction Amend-
ments-the Fifteenth in particular-then it follows that we should
evaluate remedial Senate districts in light of the 61st and 62nd Con-
gresses' understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments. That un-
derstanding differs radically from Shaw v. Reno 5 9 the Supreme
Court's incipient reverse-racial gerrymandering decision. Thus, the
Seventeenth Amendment can reinvent Black politics by returning the
Court to the original intent of the re-enactors of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
Below I explain Shaw and its progeny and discuss three ways in
which the Court's holdings are inconsistent with the re-ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment. First, and principally, the Court ignores
the Fifteenth Amendment, construing the right to vote in the compar-
ative context of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in the sub-
stantive contours of the Fifteenth, and thus ignoring the possibility
that the right, in order to be equally exercised, may require different
schemes of implementation, such as majority-minority districts. Sec-
ond, the Court inverts the 61st and 62nd Congresses' concern with
invidious discrimination against racial minorities by recognizing a
cause of action, the effects of which resembles invidious discrimina-
157. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 143, at 557.
158. See id.
159. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
tion. Third, Shaw and its progeny ignore a principle of deference to
congressional judgments regarding federal elections that was widely
relied on throughout the debates leading to the re-ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment.
A. The Forgotten Amendment
Shaw v. Reno marked the first case in which the Supreme Court
permitted voters to assert a claim of invidious discrimination in dis-
tricting without alleging a cognizable injury. 160 There, White voters in
North Carolina complained that two majority-Black congressional dis-
tricts created as a result of the 1990 redistricting constituted impermis-
sible racial gerrymanders.161 One of the two districts was created at
the insistence of the United States Department of Justice, which was
charged with enforcing section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 62 Section
5 required North Carolina and several other "covered" jurisdictions to
submit redistricting plans to the Justice Department for pre-clear-
ance. 163 The Justice Department then reviewed the proposed redis-
tricting to ensure that it "[did] not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color."' 6 4 Despite the famously contorted shapes of the two new
Black districts,' 65 the Justice Department pre-cleared North Caro-
lina's redistricting plan, and its legislature enacted it into law.' 66 As a
result of the new districts, North Carolina sent Black Representatives
to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. 67
The 1990 redistricting left White voters as a majority in 83% of
North Carolina's congressional districts, even though Whites consti-
tuted only 76% of the state's total population. 68 Thus, the White
plaintiffs in Shaw could not claim that their votes had been diluted, a
cognizable constitutional injury.1 6 9 Instead, they complained that the
bizarre shapes of the districts made it self-evident that they had been
constructed along racial lines.170 This, according to the Court, was in-
jury enough, because the classification of citizens based on race
160. See id. at 663 (White, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 633-34, 638.
162. See id. at 630.
163. See id. at 634 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
165. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635.
166. See id.
167. See id at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 666 (White, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 666-67 (White, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 645-46.
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"threaten[s] to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership
in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.' 171 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
72
In locating the injury to White voters in Shaw under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fif-
teenth Amendment, the Court perpetuated a conflict that has long
inhered in its redistricting and reapportionment cases. Unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment directly addresses
voting, prohibiting denials and abridgments of the right to vote. 73
Moreover, the Fifteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, is race-
conscious, prohibiting denials or abridgments of the right to vote "on
account of race."' 74 The Fourteenth Amendment does not mention
race; it merely forbids the state to "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.'1 75 Thus, the scope of the
Fifteenth Amendment's language lends itself to affirmative action-
type measures such as majority-minority districts, particularly in juris-
dictions where there is a prior history of voting discrimination.'76 Yet
treating Black voters differently from Whites by consciously creating
Black districts may violate the equality norms embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. 77 Shaw does noth-
ing to resolve this conflict and instead builds on it.
Shaw's exclusive reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment to af-
ford a remedy to White voters challenging a redistricting scheme is
problematic from both a historical and doctrinal standpoint. First, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intentionally excluded the
right of suffrage from the Amendment's scope.' 78 Second, even as the
Supreme Court began to interpolate political rights and matters of
171. Id. at 643.
172. Id. at 642.
173. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. See Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fif-
teenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REv. 389, 440-42 (1985) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment permits remedial districting intended to correct present effects of past
discrimination).
177. See id. at 441 (noting that commentators have argued that the creation of safe
districts for minorities but not for all other voters violates the Constitution's equality
norms).
178. See Robert I. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 881-82 (1986).
voting into its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, it did so "by re-
ferring to earlier fifteenth amendment race discrimination prece-
dents."' 79 Thus, quite apart from the deliberations of the 61st and
62nd Congresses, it is difficult to justify Shaw's surrender of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.
A fair reading of the 61st and 62nd Congresses' debates on the
re-ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment demonstrates that these
legislators viewed that Amendment as an essential-if not the exclu-
sive-source of the protection of the right to vote. Some lawmakers
viewed the race rider as an assault on both the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, but saw it as more directly aimed at the latter.
Such appeared to be the view of Senator Carter of Montana, who ar-
gued that the race-rider had been improperly joined at the hip with
the proposal to directly elect senators:
It may well be taken for granted that an overwhelming majority
of the voters and members of the legislature of the State might
favor the election of Senators by popular vote and at the same
time stand unalterably opposed to the permanent disfranchise-
ment of the colored man in such States as might think proper to
deny him a voice in the selection of United States Senators.
Had the committee joint resolution proposed the repeal of the
fifteenth amendment to the Constitution in conjunction with the
proposal for the election of Senators by popular vote, uniting
the question so as to make them indivisible, how many Senators
would approve the dual amendment if submitted ....
A state desiring to avoid accountability to the Senate under
the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments would of course choose
United States Senators at special elections to be held at such
times and conducted in such manner as the State authorities
might see fit to approve.'
Other legislators focused specifically on the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, as did Representative Mann of Illinois:
They [supporters of the race rider] are afraid that Congress may
interfere to prevent the disfranchisement of the Negro vote in
the South. They are in favor of repeal of the fifteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution, which says that "the right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
179. James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile
v. Bolder Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HAs-
TNGs L.J. 1, 9 (1982) (discussing the derivation of the Fourteenth Amendment's one-per-
son, one-vote standard).
180. 46 CoNG. REc. 1217-18 (statement of Senator Carter) (emphasis added). See also
id. at 2260 (statement of Senator Root) (describing the race-rider as "the surrender by the
Government of the United States of the power necessary effectively to enforce the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments").
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United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude. '18 1
Regardless of whether they also recognized the Fourteenth
Amendment implications of their position, opponents of the race rider
viewed their cause as nothing less than the preservation of the
franchise for the Negro, and, more importantly, viewed retention of
the Fifteenth Amendment as crucial to their endeavor. How, then,
could Shaw legitimately ignore the Fifteenth Amendment in finding
that White voters may state a cognizable constitutional claim for race-
conscious redistricting intended to benefit racial minorities? Profes-
sor Barbara Phillips explains the untoward consequences of this
oversight:
In Shaw v. Reno, described by Justice O'Connor as presenting
one of "the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has
faced in recent years," the Court revealed its dysfunctional ap-
proach to minority vote dilution by placing the claim within the
Fourteenth Amendment analysis rather than within the Fif-
teenth Amendment analysis. The primary complex and sensi-
tive issue in the case was "the meaning of the constitutional
right to vote," and a second issue was described as "the propri-
ety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members
of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups." This char-
acterization of the second issue reflects underlying premises
such as: (a) non race-based state redistricting legislation exists;
(b) a decision not to create Shaw's challenged district would
have been neutral and not race-based; (c) redistricting legisla-
tion that is not designed to benefit members of historically dis-
advantaged racial minority groups is constitutionally preferable
to ameliorative legislation; and (d) the concept of "benefitting"
members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups
implies a favoritism at the expense of the dispreferred group. I
Professor Phillips, like Professor Emma Coleman Jordan before
her, seeks to relocate the right to vote back into the substantive con-
tours of the Fifteenth Amendment rather than the comparative stric-
tures of the Fourteenth. 83 The debates of the 61st and 62nd
Congresses support this approach. Shaw's insistence that all voters be
treated comparatively equal by forcing the state to adhere to tradi-
181. 47 CONG. REc. 2430 (statement of Rep. Mann).
182. Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic
Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561, 581 (1995).
183. See Jordan, supra note 176, at 441 (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment is the
correct source of the right to participate in the political process free of discrimination and
that this Amendment permits race-conscious districting because "[t]rue equality of political
participation can best be achieved by preserving meaningful access for racial and ethnic
minorities").
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tional districting criteria and not to otherwise categorize voters based
on race may conflict with the substantive command of the Fifteenth
Amendment where departures from tradition or uses of race may be
necessary to ensure that minority votes are not abridged. Moreover,
even if one views the source of constitutional protection of the right to
vote as hybrid-emanating from both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments-Shaw's grant of standing to voters who cannot satisfy
the Fifteenth Amendment's requirement of a denial or abridgment of
the right to vote effectively displaces the Fifteenth Amendment, con-
trary to the clear intentions of the 61st and 62nd Congresses.184
Thus, a principal way in which Shaw abrogates the re-ratification
of the Fifteenth Amendment is by ignoring it entirely. But the pros-
pect of remedial Senate districts should be evaluated in accordance
with the original intent of those who enacted the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. These legislators intended, contrary to Shaw, that the remedial
contours of the Fifteenth Amendment play a primary role in assessing
steps taken to ensure equal participation in Senate contests.
B. The Inversion of Invidiousness
Cast against the backdrop of the debates of the 61st and 62nd
Congresses, Shaw's teachings are paradoxical. Shaw required North
Carolina to justify the creation of its Black districts under strict scru-
tiny if it could not demonstrate reasons other than race for their crea-
tion.185 The difficulty with this holding is twofold. It assumes that
strict scrutiny is a means for finding justifications rather than an end in
itself. In fact, however, the Court has never upheld a race-based rem-
edy under strict scrutiny.'86 Thus, Shaw began the development of a
strict scrutiny web that would ensnarl primarily Black and Hispanic
184. In this regard, the Shaw Court's validation of a Fourteenth Amendment attack on
majority-minority districts at the expense of the Fifteenth Amendment resembles the
Court's earlier elevation of its Fourteenth Amendment one-person, one-vote principle
over comparable claims of minority vote dilution. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note
179, at 62 (criticizing as an "intolerable inversion of constitutional and historical priorities"
the greater quantum of proof required to demonstrate minority vote dilution compared to
plaintiffs' burden in the population malapportionment cases). Any argument that the
Court respects Fifteenth Amendment remedial principles by allowing the state to justify
the creation of majority-minority districts under strict scrutiny is belied by both the ease
with which strict scrutiny is applied to such districts and the virtual impossibility of their
passing muster under this exacting standard. See infra Part II.B.
185. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
186. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1,
22-23 & nn.104-05 (1995) (noting that no racial classification has survived strict scrutiny
since the Supreme Court's decision in the now-discredited case of Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which did not involve the remedial use of race).
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districts. And hence the second and even more serious problem: the
elimination of Black and Hispanic districts can be characterized as in-
vidious discrimination just as easily as their creation. Yet, given the
ease with which the Court has allowed strict scrutiny to be applied and
the virtual impossibility of a state passing muster under it, Shaw and
its progeny have facilitated an inversion of the invidious discrimina-
tion that the 61st and 62nd Congresses foresaw that they might need
to prevent in the future. Harms which Congress may rightly seek to
curtail are results that the plaintiffs in Shaw and its progeny can, with
relative ease, employ the courts to achieve.
The Court in Shaw predicated its recognition of a constitutional
claim for White plaintiffs on the stigmatic harm caused when voters
are assigned to districts based on their race. But the Court's invoca-
tion of stigma was as elliptical as it was inapposite. Precisely who was
stigmatized by the creation of the two Black-majority districts? To the
extent that Black North Carolinians themselves were stigmatized, it
was anomalous that White plaintiffs would be permitted to assert the
injury of minorities. To the extent that Whites suffered injury, the
proper plaintiffs were those Whites "segregated" in a White district
rather than the relatively integrated ones challenged in Shaw.187
Moreover, under the Court's definition of stigma, if Whites were in-
deed stigmatized by the creation of Black districts, the stigma could
not be eliminated, only transferred. If the creation of some majority-
minority districts stigmatizes Whites, the failure to create these same
districts may be equally stigmatizing to minorities.188 The message
conveyed by a colorless Congress can be described in terms similar to
187. See Deval L. Patrick, What's Up is Down, What's Black is White, 44 EMORY L.J.
827, 833-34 (1995) (noting that North Carolina's Twelfth District, under attack in Shaw,
was 55% Black and 45% White, thereby making it one of "the most integrated congres-
sional districts in the country").
188. See Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
Hous. L. REv. 289, 307 (1997). Karlan writes:
[In seeking to avoid one expressive harm, the Court inflicted another. When the
Court simply presumes that deviations from traditional districting principles
"cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message that political iden-
tity is, or should be, predominantly racial," the Court denigrates the choices made
by those black voters who voluntarily affiliate themselves along racial lines.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Elsewhere, Karlan with Daryl J. Levinson argues:
If the intentional creation of a predominantly one-race district by itself gives rise
to representational harms, then every voter assigned to a district where members
of a different race predominate is prone to such injuries. It would follow, then,
that black voters in majority-white districts (a group that comprises the majority
of black Americans) as well as white residents of majority-black districts could cry
constitutional foul, making every district in an area with a significant nonwhite
population vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
those the Court used to describe the injury to the White plaintiffs in
Shaw-that minorities are unqualified to share equally in the govern-
ance of the country's affairs and that their perspectives are unwel-
come. 8 9  Moreover, lack of a significant minority presence
perpetuates racial stratification, making it difficult for Blacks and
Whites to ignore race where the presence of Blacks in the nation's
polity remains a novelty. Finally, the absence of a significant minority
presence in the body politic of the nation is far more evocative of
"political apartheid"' 90 than any concerted effort to include minori-
ties. Sidestepping the double-edged sword of stigma, however, the
Court in Shaw simply transferred stigmatic injury from Whites to
Blacks. Thus, a harm that one may reasonably infer that the 61st and
62nd Congresses would have intended to avoid is given constitutional
sanction by the Court's holding in Shaw.
Miller v. Johnson' muted some of Shaw's rhetoric but did not
change the outcome. As in Shaw, White voters in Miller challenged
the creation of two new majority-Black congressional districts for
Georgia. 92 Like Shaw, the United States Attorney General's en-
forcement powers under section 5 were brought to bear in the crea-
tion of those districts. 93 Finally, as in Shaw, the districts at issue
possessed odd shapes, though less distorted than those in Shaw.194
The issue confronting the Miller Court was whether the plaintiffs had
presented sufficient evidence to warrant the application of strict scru-
tiny to Georgia's districting plan.' 95 Rejecting the suggestion that race
could never be used in a districting plan without subjecting that plan
to heightened constitutional review, the Miller Court held that so
called traditional districting factors, such as geographic compactness,
could not be subordinated to race.' 96 Where race predominated in the
creation of a district, the state had to proffer a compelling interest
Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1212
(1996).
189. "[I]n putting forward the idea that white voters within a predominantly black dis-
trict suffer 'special' harms (that black voters within an oddly shaped white district have
presumably managed to escape), the Court communicates that legislators elected from
predominantly black communities are less even-handed and public-regarding than their
white-elected counterparts." See Karlan, Just Politics, supra note 188, at 307.
190. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
191. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
192. See id. at 910.
193. See id. at 905-08.
194. See id. at 917.
195. See id. at 901.
196. See id. at 916.
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narrowly tailored -to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. 197 The
Supreme Court's predominance test, however, was as amorphous as
any "totality of the circumstances" inquiry that American jurispru-
dence has recently seen. The Court conceded that "[t]he distinction
between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by
them may be difficult to make."'198 It nevertheless offered this
guidance:
The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predom-
inant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a sig-
nificant number of voters within or without a particular district.
To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, in-
cluding but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for
political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations. 199
Aside from its general vagueness, 20 0 the predominance standard
suffers from the same misallocation-of-injury problem as Shaw. The
test is premised on the assumption that since legislators engaging in
redistricting are always aware of race, race cannot be eliminated en-
tirely from the decision-making process.20 ' Hence, a little race is tol-
erable, a significant amount objectionable. Once race is recognized as
an inevitable part of the districting process, however, judicial efforts to
quantify the acceptable amount will inevitably create a constitutional
double-standard. Absent patterns of residential segregation that char-
acterize historically Black congressional districts, legislators will usu-
ally have to consciously employ more race to create a majority-
minority district than is used to create a White district. This is simply
a mathematical reality: the smaller the numbers, the greater the ef-
forts to achieve a majority in a given district; the greater the numbers,
the less the effort.202 The result is that majority-minority districts will
197. See id. at 920.
198. Id. at 916.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics,
1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 45, 56 (1995) (criticizing the predominance test for failing to convey a
concrete level of causation).
201. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("[r]edistricting legislatures will ... almost always be
aware of racial demographics.. ."); see also id. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that the vast majority of congressional districts are free of constitutional infirmity under
Shaw "even though race may well have been considered in the redistricting process").
202. See Karlan, Just Politics, supra note 188, at 309 ("A group whose districting pos-
sibilities are more constrained is, of course, more likely to find itself left out. By imposing
a compactness requirement on deliberately created majority-nonwhite districts, and no one
inevitably be challenged with more regularity and greater success than
majority-White districts, which have seemingly been insulated from
constitutional attack.2 °3
It is highly unlikely that members of the 61st and 62nd Con-
gresses would have sanctioned a constitutional test (be it predomi-
nance or strict scrutiny upon a showing of predominance) that so
easily invalidated Black districts. Concededly, these Congresses did
not specifically address remedial districts of any sort for Blacks. This
is unsurprising since Blacks had been stripped of the rudimentary lib-
erty of access to the polls, a prerequisite to larger aspirations of actual
influence. But rather than confine its authority one way or the other,
these Congresses sought to keep in tact the broad remedial powers of
the Fifteenth Amendment for application as future Congresses would
see flt.2°4
else, the Court has impose[d] a special disability upon [Blacks and Hispanics] alone within
the redistricting process.") (alterations in original) (footnotes and internal quotations
omitted).
203. See id. at 307. A second and related defect of the predominance test is procedural
in nature. The findings of lower courts that race predominated in the creation of a district
have been reviewed with deference. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 918 (applying "clearly errone-
ous" standard). Thus, even when the Supreme Court has acknowledged the permissibility
of a different outcome, it has felt constrained to let the lower court findings stand. See
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 963 (1996) ("Several factors other than race were at work in the
drawing of the [challenged majority-minority] districts."). Bush in particular is testament to
the folly of the federal courts' incursion into the fact-and-politics-laden inquiry of predomi-
nance. While the Supreme Court refused to overturn the lower court's finding that race
predominated in the creation of two Black districts and one Hispanic district in Texas, on
remand to the lower court, the two Black districts were not significantly altered. District
11 went from 49% to 44% Black voting-age population, and District 30 was reduced from
47% to 42%. See Kevin Sack, Victory of Five Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering
Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al. Indeed, the three-judge court to which the case
was remanded boasted that the reconfigured districts were designed to "include large num-
bers of minority voters." Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (S.D. Tex. 1996). But how
could race have predominated so as to offend equal protection if the challenged districts
changed only marginally in their recompositions? And if it was legitimate for the court to
include "large numbers" of minorities in the redrawn districts, why was it not proper for
the Texas legislature to do the same? The waste and futility of the Miller predominance
test could not be more self-evident.
204. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also 47 CONG. Rnc. 2430 (1911)
(statement of Rep. Mann):
We are not willing to abandon national sovereignty and national preservation and
forsake the race which we set free. The slave power of the South in its palmiest
days was no more imperious and impudent in its demands than you [Southern
Democrats seeking passage of the race rider] are in this demand to-day. But
there will come an awakening. I repeat there will come an awakening. You will
not always be permitted to stamp derisively upon the colored race which is mak-
ing a heroic struggle for proper place and position.
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Moreover, three features of the 61st and 62nd Congresses' de-
bates demonstrate that Shaw and its progeny have departed long and
far from the concept of invidiousness that the re-enactors of the Fif-
teenth Amendment contemplated. First, the debates are emphatically
and unmistakably about protecting a disenfranchised racial minor-
ity-not members of a politically and numerically dominant race. Re-
latedly, in referring to federal measures which might in the future be
enacted to benefit Blacks, there was no indication in the congressional
debates that such measures would be subjected to the same legal stan-
dard as the discriminatory laws they were meant to correct. Indeed,
this approach would not have made sense to a group of men who were
witnessing the subjugation of Blacks. Race was not repugnant to the
Republicans of the 61st and 62nd Congresses; racism was. Accord-
ingly, every statement in defense of the Fifteenth Amendment mani-
fested a distinction between the harms at which the Amendment was
directed and the potential race-based remedies that might be enacted
to mitigate those harms. Finally, contrary to the Court's inability to
distinguish invidious from benign discrimination in the absence of
strict scrutiny, Republicans in the 61st and 62nd Congresses needed
no special test (nor implied that courts should use one) to distinguish
from remedies harms.
A court evaluating the permissibility of remedial United States
Senate districts must do so not within the strictures of Shaw, but in-
stead consistently with the legislative history of the Seventeenth
Amendment. That history is substantially at odds with the Court's
propensity to apply strict scrutiny to (and thereby hasten the demise
of) majority-minority districts. To apply the legislative history of the
Seventeenth Amendment is to exempt Senate districts from the strict
scrutiny web so misguidedly constructed for House and other districts.
C. The Neglect of Deference
The debates of the 61st and 62nd Congresses are evocative of a
constitutional principle that the Supreme Court has recognized yet
failed to apply in its Shaw line of cases: when the federal government
exercises its remedial powers under the Reconstruction Amendments,
the courts must defer to its reasonable judgment. °5 The principle is at
its greatest force when Congress legislates with respect to federal of-
205. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) ("It is for Congress
in the first instance to determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its conclusions are entitled to much defer-
ence.") (internal quotations omitted).
fices, for the Constitution expressly establishes federal legislative su-
periority: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations ... ,206
The 61st and 62nd Congresses both reaffirmed and expanded
these principles of deference. First, in striving to preserve federal au-
thority over federal elective offices in the face of efforts to enact the
race rider, these Congresses staked a claim of federal supremacy.
"[W]hy should not the Federal Government have power to regulate,
when it may be necessary to regulate, the election of its own of-
ficers? '2°7 Republicans asked insistently.
More importantly, however, the imperative of federal control was
even greater with respect to United States Senate seats, for "a Senator
of the United States, while he may be... a representative of the State,
is more a representative of the United States than is a Member of the
House. '2 8 Thus, the greater national scope of the Senator's duties,
from the confirmation of judges to the passage of treaties, made fed-
eral control over the manner of his election even more important than
federal supervision of House elections. 0 9
The Supreme Court in Miller v. Johnson expressly declined to de-
fer to the Justice Department's determination that the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 required Georgia to create two additional Black-majority
districts.210 In so doing, the Court intimated that even if the Justice
Department had correctly interpreted congressional intent in main-
taining that the Voting Rights Act required the creation of these dis-
tricts, the Act itself might be unconstitutional.21' But at no point does
it reconcile its position with (or even acknowledge) the principle of
federal superiority over federal elective offices re-affirmed by the 61st
and 62nd Congresses. Remedial Senate districts, however, must be
assessed in light of these Congresses' determinations regarding federal
supremacy, and, more importantly, in light of the special relationship
between Congress's regulatory authority and the national scope of
Senators' duties.
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
207. 47 CONG. REc. 2407 (statement of Rep. Olmstead) (1911).
208. 47 CONG. REc. 1488 (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (1911).
209. See Smith, supra note 52 at 51.
210. 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995).
211. See id at 926 ("The Justice Department's maximization policy seems quite far re-
moved from [section 5's legislative purposes]. We are especially reluctant to conclude that
§ 5 justifies that policy given the serious constitutional concerns it raises.").
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In sum, if I am correct that the Seventeenth Amendment, be-
cause it is coterminous with the Fifteenth, permits the creation of re-
medial Senate districts, then it is also true that such districts must be
assessed according to the expectations and understandings of the leg-
islators who passed the Seventeenth Amendment. Because these leg-
islators' understanding of race-based remedies with respect to federal
elective offices differs from both Shaw's and its progeny's understand-
ing, the difficulties encountered by House districts under Shaw should
be avoided by Senate districts under the remedial warrant of the Sev-
enteenth Amendment.
III. Reinventing Black Politics: Are Senate Districts
Really Different?
Alas, suppose Senate districts must comport with the authority of
the Shaw v. Reno212 line of cases, the effect which has been to erect an
obstacle to the remedial use of race-based districting. Assuming Sen-
ate districts can be created upon a finding of vote dilution, are they
any more likely than House districts to avoid or ultimately survive the
strict scrutiny web created by Shaw?
A systematic answer requires, first, an analysis of how Shaw has
affected section 2 vote dilution litigation. Specifically, the level of
scrutiny to be applied to remedial districts created pursuant to section
2 of the Voting Rights Act is central to determining the viability of
Senate districts because the Supreme Court has yet to uphold a race-
based remedy to which it has applied strict scrutiny.213 Also required
is a comparison of House districts and Senate districts. Senate dis-
tricts are more likely to evade strict scrutiny because there is a greater
probability of demonstrating that race has been used for partisan pur-
poses rather than for its own sake. Even barring such a showing, Sen-
ate districts are more likely to survive strict scrutiny because they are
not constrained by a narrow definition of compactness, a standard
which has defeated claims by states that their race-conscious district-
ing furthered a compelling interest in complying with section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. 4 Below I undertake both these inquiries in order
to show that Senate districts, even under the strictures of Shaw, are
probably more viable than majority-minority House districts.
212. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
213. See Spann, supra note 186, at 22-23 & nn.104-05.
214. See infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
A. Section 2 in the Shadows of Shaw v. Reno
The full impact of Shaw and Miller v. Johnson21 5 on section 2 vote
dilution claims remains ominously unclear. The Shaw Court declined
to answer an important question relevant to the continued viability of
section 2 remedial districts. The Court stated:
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportion-
ment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms
successfully could be challenged. Thus, we express no view as to
whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts,
without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. 6
Subsequently, in Bush v. Vera,21 7 a majority of the Court held
that states have a compelling interest in complying with section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, a provision which often requires the inten-
tional creation of majority-minority districts.2 8 The Court's plurality
opinion admonished that strict scrutiny does not apply to "all cases of
intentional creation of majority-minority districts '21 9 and that the de-
cision to create a majority-minority district is not "objectionable in
and of itself. '22 1
However, while the Supreme Court appears to have clarified that
compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling
state interest, it has not announced clear guidelines for when strict
scrutiny must be applied to a district created pursuant to section 2.221
This indeterminacy has unfolded in the lower courts in two distinct
ways. First, in section 2 cases brought by minority plaintiffs, courts are
divided over whether a district proposed as a section 2 remedy must
be subjected to strict scrutiny. The Fifth2 2 2and Tenth CircuitsZhave
declined to adopt a strict scrutiny per se approach, instead appearing
to hold that a section 2 district which does not subordinate traditional
215. 515 U.S 900 (1995).
216. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
217. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
218. See id. at 994 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); id. at 1065 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer). See also Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 128 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (noting that a majority of five justices believe that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act is a compelling state interest).
219. Bush, 517 U.S. at 958.
220. Id. at 962.
221. But see Dewitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (sustaining race-
conscious districting plan that adhered to California's traditional redistricting principles),
affd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
222. See Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996).
223. See Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 1996).
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districting principles to race will pass constitutional muster.224 Other
courts adjudicating section 2 claims have essentially conflated the stat-
utory liability inquiry of vote dilution with the equal protection in-
quiry under Shaw.2'
The second procedural context in which the Supreme Court's ad-
monitions regarding strict scrutiny have played out is in equal protec-
tion claims challenging majority-minority districts. With respect to
majority-minority congressional seats created as a result of the 1990
decennial census, these admonitions have proven to be paper tigers,
for courts have liberally applied strict scrutiny to such districts and
have, in most instances, found them unconstitutional.22 6 These are
cases, like Shaw itself, in which (1) states covered by section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act created majority-minority districts in order to sat-
isfy or foreclose Justice Department objections to their decennial re-
districting;227 (2) the districts were found to have been drawn
predominantly for racial reasons;28 and (3) the states in turn prof-
fered compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a compel-
ling state interest.229 Mimicking Bush v. Vera's treatment of
compactness, 230 however, courts have found that nothing in section 2
requires the creation of a non-compact majority-minority dis-
trict 231and that the districts therefore fail the narrow tailoring prong of
the strict scrutiny test.232
224. See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1408 (section 2 district satisfying Gingles test "exemplifies the
narrowly tailored district"). See also Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1328 ("[S]tates may intentionally
create majority-minority districts and otherwise take race into consideration without com-
ing under strict scrutiny so long as traditional districting criteria are not subordinated.")
(citations omitted); Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 966 F. Supp. 1435, 1447 (E.D. La. 1997)
(upholding a section 2 district against a Shaw attack: "While race, through the force of § 2
of the Voting Rights Act, provided the genesis for the majority minority district, it did not
dictate the eventual boundaries of District 3."); Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 946 F. Supp.
946, 951-52 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (recognizing, in the context of a § 2 case, that as long as a § 2
district does not subordinate traditional districting criteria to race, it will avoid strict
scrutiny).
225. See, e.g., Gause v. Brunswick County, 1996 WL 453466, **4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 1996)
("[A] plaintiff seeking to meet its burden of showing compactness under the first Gingles
precondition should not be permitted to rely on a plan which, if subsequently adopted by
the Court after a finding of a Section 2 violation, would have no chance of being found to
be narrowly tailored to redress the violation.") (citation omitted).
226. See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y 1997); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F.
Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997).
227. See, e.g., Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 128; Moon, 952 F. Supp. at 1141.
228. See, e.g., Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 128; Moon, 952 F. Supp. at 1141.
229. See, e.g., Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 128; Moon, 952 F. Supp. at 1141.
230. See infra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 128; Moon, 952 F. Supp. at 1141.
232. See, e.g., Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 128; Moon, 952 F. Supp. at 1141.
The Court recently forefeited an opportunity to clarify the rela-
tionship between section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause in
Abrams v. Johnson. 3 There, Black voters challenged the redrawing
of Georgia's majority-Black Second and Eleventh congressional dis-
tricts, which had been reconfigured as majority-White districts on re-
mand from Miller.234 The minority intervenors argued that the lower
court's redrawing of the districts diluted their voting strength in viola-
tion of section 2.31 This claim, however, was destined for failure be-
cause the lower court had also determined, and the Supreme Court
had agreed, that to create a second Black-majority district would re-
quire the subordination of traditional districting policies to race.
Thus, the Abrams Court in effect applied strict scrutiny to the Black
voters' proposed section 2 districts. Following a familiar tact, the
Court found the districts unable to satisfy the first of three threshold
requirements for a showing of vote dilution-compactness. 37 Once
again, the Court's hopeful caveats that the intentional creation of a
majority-minority district would not instantly trigger strict scrutiny
was overshadowed in Abrams by the reality of the restrictions it has
placed upon the creation of such districts.
In sum, Shaw and its progeny have not invalidated the Voting
Rights Act. However, while it remains unclear when remedial con-
gressional districts created pursuant to section 2 will be subjected to
strict scrutiny, the trend is decidedly in favor of its application.
B. Comparing House and Senate Districts
Majority-minority or minority-enhanced Senate districts would
not share the same characteristics as House districts. It is in this way
that Senate districts can reinvigorate the second Reconstruction and
thereby reinvent Black politics. Application of the principal criteria
from the Shaw line of cases-the non-proxy principle and compact-
ness-to illustrative Senate districts demonstrates this potential.
1. The Non-Proxy Principle
In applying strict scrutiny to majority-minority congressional dis-
tricts, and thus hastening their demise, the Supreme Court has fre-
quently cautioned that race may not be used as a "proxy" for
233. 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
234. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1929.
235. See id. at 1930.
236. See id. at 1931.
237. See id.
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accomplishing otherwise permissible ends in districting.2 8 This prohi-
bition is only slightly more instructive than Miller v. Johnson's pre-
dominance test,1 9 of which it is a variant. In Bush v. Vera,240 the
Court acknowledged that race may correlate with political and socio-
economic data in a manner which renders it possible to explain the
creation of a majority-minority district in non-racial terms.24' The
Court recognized that
[i]f district lines merely correlate with race because they are
drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which correlates with
race, there is no racial classification to justify, just as racial dis-
proportions in the level of prosecutions for a particular crime
may be unobjectionable if they merely reflect racial dispropor-
tions in the commission of that crime. 4 2
Thus:
[i]f the State's goal is otherwise constitutional political gerry-
mandering, it is free to use.., precinct general election voting
patterns, precinct primary voting patterns, and legislators' expe-
rience... to achieve that goal regardless of its awareness of its
racial implications and regardless of the fact that it does so in
the context of a majority-minority district.24 3
Nor does conscious allocation of Black voters to particular dis-
tricts to secure the election of a Democratic incumbent or to achieve a
partisan gerrymander offend equal protection.2 " On the other hand,
the Court cryptically admonished that "to the extent that race is used
as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring
strict scrutiny is in operation. '2 45 But when is race an acceptable cor-
relation versus an impermissible proxy?
A specific application of the non-proxy principle to the facts of
Bush v. Vera sheds some light. In Bush, the State of Texas defended
238. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 912.
239. See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the predomi-
nance test.
240. 515 U.S. 952 (1996).
241. See Bush, id. at 964.
242. Id. at 968 (citation omitted).
243. Id. (citations omitted).
244. See id. ("And the fact that, as it happens, many of the voters being fought over by
the neighboring Democratic incumbents were African-American, would not, in and of it-
self, convert a political gerrymander into a racial gerrymander, no matter how conscious
redistricters were of the correlation between race and party affiliation.") (citations and
internal quotes omitted). While this practice was condemned by the lower court, that court
ultimately held that the practice did not render the districts of White Democratic incum-
bents unconstitutional. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
This ruling was not challenged in the Supreme Court.
245. Bush, 517 U.S. at 968.
the creation of a majority-Black congressional district, District 30, in
part on the ground that the district was a permissible political gerry-
mander.246 While acknowledging that partisan gerrymanders gener-
ally are not constitutionally objectionable,24 7 the Court determined
that District 30 was not protected by this principle and that it was not
clear error for the lower court to disbelieve the state's explanation.248
Although District 30 was both a Black district and a Democratic
stronghold, the Court suspected that partisanship was merely a post-
hoc rationalization put forward to rescue the district, given that much
of the data on which Texas now relied was not available to it at the
time it created District 30.249 Moreover, the state made inconsistent
claims about the preeminence of race in the creation of District 30, at
times conceding that it had attempted to "'maximize the voting
strength for [the] black community in Dallas County."'250 The state's
use of race-sensitive computer technology and the shape of District 30
only reinforced its own admission- 5 1 Finally, the configuration of
some of District 30's boundaries undercut the state's claim of partisan
gerrymandering because these boundaries contained far more Repub-
lican-leaning precincts than Democratic precincts. 2 Against this fac-
tual backdrop and constrained by a deferential standard of review of
the trial court's findings of fact, the Court left undisturbed the trial
court's determination that race, not partisan affiliation, predominated
in the creation of District 30.253
The Court's fact-bound analysis conspicuously avoided address-
ing the inherent tension between Shaw and partisan gerrymandering.
The Bush plurality was forced to accept that race must be employed
even in a partisan gerrymander, given the correlation between race
and partisanship. Thus, even as it acknowledged the "intensive and
pervasive use of race.., to protect the political fortunes of adjacent
[White Democratic] incumbents," '54 it did not suggest that the incum-
bents' districts, like District 30, were unconstitutional racial gerryman-
ders.255 White politicians would be permitted to benefit from the
246. See id. at 963.
247. See id. at 968.
248. See id. at 970.
249. See id. at 966-67.
250. Id. at 969 (citations omitted).
251. See id. at 970.
252. See id. at 971.
253. See id. at 970.
254. Id. at 972-73.
255. But see id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("District 30 also involved the illicit use
of race as a proxy when legislators shifted blocs of African-American voters to districts of
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conscious use of race because they could attach a benign name to it-
partisan gerrymandering-but Black voters would be denied the same
benefit, even though the intentional creation of a Black district results
in a partisan gerrymander. The difference in outcome is purely for-
malistic, and, as with the predominance test, imposes a disproportion-
ate burden on minorities to justify receiving the same political
treatment that flows to Whites as a matter of course.
The Republican Party, for instance, has few Blacks." 6 Thus, to a
draw a Republican district is essentially to draw a White district.
Under the Court's reasoning, however, this outcome does not matter
as long as the legislature is stealthy enough not to state it is acting with
the intent of creating a White district. Of course, the legislature need
not profess this aim because its intended result will follow from the
partisan gerrymander anyway. Thus, the difference between a parti-
san gerrymander and a racial gerrymander in this context is in name
only. And, unlike coincidental racial disproportions in, for example,
the level of prosecutions for a particular crime that has a higher rate
of commission by a certain minority group, district line drawers af-
firmatively exploit racial disproportions in voting to achieve their leg-
islative objective-a partisan gerrymander. Again, once the use of
race is recognized as permissible to any degree, judicial efforts to
quantify the acceptable amount only create a constitutional double-
standard. The Court nevertheless rested its equal protection analysis
on the sophistic assumption that race can always be sorted from parti-
sanship and that the purported aim of achieving a partisan gerryman-
der is quantitatively more color-blind than explicitly racial goals .1 7
Lower court decisions applying Bush have essentially mimicked
the Court's approach, allowing that "[i]f the creation of a safe black
district can be said to favor a particular political party, the law does
not condemn political partisanship," but then eschewing the task of
incumbent Democrats in order to promote partisan interests.") (citations omitted). It is
unclear why the intentional allocation of minority voters to a White Democratic district
would render the majority-Black district from which these voters were taken an unconsti-
tutional racial gerrymander. On the contrary, the districts of White Democratic incum-
bents who benefited from the raid on Black voters would appear to be the source of the
constitutional offense. Yet neither the lower court nor the Supreme Court held that these
districts infringed the Equal Protection Clause.
256. See R.W. Apple Jr., GOP Tries Hard To Win Black Votes, But Recent History
Works Against It, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1996, at Bll (stating that recent polls showed that
only 3% of Blacks intended to vote for the Republican ticket in the 1996 presidential
elections).
257. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 188, at 1209 (describing the Court's distinction
between racial and partisan gerrymanders as "incoherent in theory and unadministerable
in practice").
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distinguishing race from partisanship. 2 s Commentators, on the other
hand, have weighed in more thoughtfully. Richard Briffault, who has
argued for a "political motivation" defense to Shaw claims, has
written:
It is difficult to see why, in places in which a racial divide is
politically central and race functions like party in organizing
electoral groups and dividing political opinion, a jurisdiction
ought to be barred from using a "politically fair" plan to assure
appropriate representation of racial minorities .... The case for
permitting polities to use race in a nondilutive way when race is,
in fact, politically salient is at least as strong as the case
for... voluntary bipartisan gerrymandering."
Briffault would require jurisdictions asserting the political moti-
vation defense to prove, through the use of established statistical
methods, that race correlates with partisanship and that there is a sig-
nificant political chasm between the minority and majority groups.26
While this approach would in some respects mirror the vote dilution
inquiry under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, it would in substance
constitute an independent justification for the creation of a majority-
minority district.26'
Briffault's political motivation defense finds support in decades of
Supreme Court decisions which have held that states have an impor-
tant interest in the maintenance of a stable two-party political sys-
tem. 262 States have been permitted to further this interest through the
districting process since "[t]he very essence of districting is to pro-
duce ... a more 'politically fair' result than would be reached with
elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the
legislative seats. ' 263 Thus, parties are free to use a "political fairness
principle" to achieve rough partisan balance in districting, and such
arrangements are generally insulated from constitutional attack.26 4
Where partisan balance cannot be achieved in the absence of race-
consciousness, courts should be reluctant to find that race predomi-
258. Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1997).
259. Richard Briffault, Race And Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 23, 74-75 (1995).
260. See id. at 76-77.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1374 (1997)
("States ... have a strong interest in the stability of their political systems .... [This]
permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the tradi-
tional two-party system.., and that temper the destabilizing effects of party-splintering
and excessive factionalism.") (citations omitted).
263. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
264. See id. at 750.
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nates or has otherwise been over-used, since race in this instance is
central to the state's acknowledged interest in political fairness be-
tween the two major parties.
The political motivation defense or political fairness principle is
best illustrated by Senate districts because such districts present line
drawers with a two-district dilemma. Though the practice of maximiz-
ing Black voters in given districts to create majority-minority constitu-
encies was a constitutional death knell in the Shaw line of cases, a
dispositive distinction exists between House and Senate districts. In
the case of the former, it was never demonstrated that it was necessary
to maximize the number of Black voters in order to achieve a partisan
gerrymander.265 Indeed, although their assumptions have been ques-
tioned, partisans have long viewed majority-minority districts as anti-
thetical to Democratic partisan interests.266 Although not uniform in
their estimates of the magnitude of Republican gains, political scien-
tists have found that the more Black voters are aggregated in a single
district, the greater the electoral success of the Republican Party be-
cause of the reduced opportunities to elect moderate White Demo-
crats.267 Thus, a frequent assumption in congressional districting is
265. See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 971 (finding that parts of District 30, a majority-Black
congressional district, were "tailored perfectly to maximize minority population ...
whereas it is far from the shape that would be necessary to maximize the Democratic vote
266. Many have observed that the reason Republicans, not otherwise known for their
support of racial preferences, have aggressively pursued the creation of majority-minority
districts, is that these districts have the effect of reducing the number of Democratic-lean-
ing or toss-up seats and increasing the number of Republican seats. See, e.g., Steven A.
Holmes, For Very Strange Bedfellows, Try Redistricting, N.Y. TNIMES, July 23, 1995, at A16
("Democrats want to curb the number of Black-majority districts, on the ground that con-
centrating Black voters in a few districts means removing blacks from adjacent districts, in
turn making these districts more vulnerable to Republicans. Conversely, Republicans
want an abundance of black districts.") Civil rights activists increasingly view districting as
a choice between maximizing the number of minority seats at the expense of increasing
Republican seats, or dispersing the Black vote to enable moderate White Democrats to be
elected to Congress. See id. But see Lani Guinier, Don't Scapegoat the Gerrymander, N.Y.
Timrs, Jan. 8, 1995, sec. 6 (magazine), at 36 (noting that "Democrats did no worse in the
nine states that drew new black districts after the 1990 Census than in states with no new
black districts," and pointing to other factors for the 1994 Democratic loss of the House of
Representatives to the Republicans); REPORT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDU-
CATIONAL FUND, Tim EFFEcr OF SECFION 2 OF THE VOTnNG RIGHTS AcT ON THE 1994
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 3 (1994) (disputing arguments that the creation of majority-
minority congressional districts contributed significantly to the 1994 Republican takeover
of Congress and concluding that "[t]oo few Democratic voters was the Democrats' prob-
lem in the mid-term election, not the arrangement of those voters into districts").
267. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock, III, Winners and Losers in the Latest Round of Redis-
tricting, 44 EMORY L.J. 943, 952-57 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence linking the crea-
tion of Black congressional districts in the South to the corresponding increase in the
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that Black districts reduce overall Democratic representation.26
Whether or not this assumption is true, Senate districting would often
proceed on the opposite assumption, requiring the aggregation of
Black voters and creating a fusion of the partisan gerrymander and
concerns of racial justice.
Blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic. In the eight House elec-
tions prior to 1996, an average of 87% of Blacks have voted Demo-
cratic, while the Republican share of Black votes has not exceeded
21%.269 Nowhere is this polarization more pronounced than in the
South. Throughout the 1980s in this region, the Republican share of
the Black vote never surpassed 12%.270 Meanwhile, the shift among
Whites to the Republican Party has been dramatic. By 1992, the once
solidly Democratic South had equal numbers of White Democrats and
Republicans.271 This shift translated into substantial, even lopsided,
Republican electoral victories. By 1994, Republicans held a majority
of both the Senate and congressional seats in the South.272 And from
1980 to 1992, Republicans Ronald Reagan and George Bush won 71%
of southern congressional districts in their presidential bids.273 Most
importantly, Republicans managed this feat with virtually no Black
support, while the bloodline of the Democratic Party in the South be-
came increasingly Black:
number of Republican seats); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts
Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern
States, 57 J. POL. 384, 400 (1995) (finding that nearly half of nine districts that changed
from Democratic to Republican hands in 1992 did so because of the loss of significant
numbers of Blacks to majority-Black districts and concluding that "the link between the
rising fortunes of blacks and Republicans as a result of redistricting is [sic] unmistakable").
But see Kimball Brace et al., Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help
Republicans?, 49 J. POL. 169, 177 (1987) (concluding that "helping blacks will help Repub-
licans when creating majority black districts almost inevitably creates 'packed' Democratic
districts").
268. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
269. See Portrait of the Electorate: Who Voted for Whom in the House, N.Y. TiMES, Nov.
13, 1994, at A24. In 1996, most Republicans in congressional elections received Black sup-
port of only between 10 to 18%. See Nancy E. Roman, Black Republicans Assail Party's
Efforts; Candidates See GOP as 'Insensitive', WASH. TiMEs, Nov. 25, 1996, at A7 (placing
Black support of GOP congressional candidates at 10 to 15%); Jonathan Tilove, Million
Man March Got Out the Vote; More Black Men Made It to Polls, TIMEs-PIcAYUtE, Nov.
24, 1996, at A21 (reporting that GOP congressional candidates received 18% of the Black
vote).
270. See JAMES M. GLASER, RACE, CAMPAIGN POLMCS, AND THE REALIGNMENT IN
THE SoutH 9 (1996).
271. See id. at 10.
272. See id. at 12-13.
273. See id. at 13.
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While the South has produced more examples of biracial coali-
tion than any other region, the general thrust in the South is a
steady movement toward a politics of Black and White. The Re-
publican party, especially for the younger voters of the region, is
becoming the political party of the White South. In some of the
deep southern states, in turn, Blacks are steadily moving toward
majority status in Democratic primaries, and very few Whites
are prepared to be part of a coalition in which they are a minor-
ity. ABC election-day exit polls in 1988 showed that young,
White voters, ages 18-29, lined up with the Republican party
over the Democratic party by a margin of 56% to 30%, with the
remaining 14% describing themselves as independent. Blacks,
young and old, describe themselves as Democratic by a margin
of 88% to 6%. Looked at another way, among young Missis-
sippi Democrats between ages 18 to 29, 62% were Black and
38% were White. Virtually all Republicans in Mississippi were
White. These kinds of divisions are an open invitation to those
seeking to build a political majority on the basis of racial
polarization. 74
Accordingly, Southern Democrats cannot win unless they enjoy
overwhelming Black support, and Republicans cannot prevail without
a substantial majority of the White vote.275 While this state of affairs
requires Democrats to strategically disperse minority voters in order
to remain politically competitive in House contests," 6 precisely the
opposite would be true for Senate districts. Because Blacks are over-
whelmingly Democratic, Senate districts created in states where the
274. THoMAs BYNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACnON 259-60 (1991)
(footnotes omitted). So pronounced is the Democrats' dependence on Black support that
in 1989, Joe Reed, the chairman of the Alabama Democratic Conference, a Black political
group, sued the Alabama Democratic Party, demanding racial parity in control of the
party: "'Blacks are 50 percent of the party in Alabama,' Reed argued ... ." Id. at 271. See
also Attempts to Link Campbell with Bribery May Goad Him into Senate Race, Wrrn
HousE BuLL., Apr. 21, 1997 (noting that Blacks make up as much as 25% of the Demo-
cratic presidential primary vote).
275. See generally Edward Carmines & Robert Huckfeldt Party Politics in the Wake of
the Voting Rights Act, in CorrRovERslEs IN MINO=m VOTING: TiH VOTING RIGHTs
AcT IN PERsPEcrTvE 117-34 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (present-
ing a historical analysis of the convergence of race and party in the South). See also Ber-
nard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L.J. 205, 268 (1995)
("Increasingly, in the South, the Republicans have become the party of white voters and
the Democratic party has become the party of black voters"); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM,
WHOSE VoTEs CoUNT? 234 (1987) ("[u]nless unopposed, Democrats could not win in dis-
trict that contained few blacks . ").
276. See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 972-73 (describing the disbursement of minority voters
in order to secure the election of White incumbent Democrats); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss
and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REv. 291, 304-05
(1997) (describing the 1990 process of Democrats allocating their voters through
redistricting).
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parties are racially stratified-as in Southern states-must concen-
trate Blacks into a single district if that state is to have a Democratic-
leaning district. In such jurisdictions, it is impossible to employ parti-
sanship as a districting criterion without including race. Thus, the re-
ality of the correlation between race and partisanship that the Court
recognized, but eschewed, in Bush v. Vera is presented more intracta-
bly in the Senate districting context because there is a greater need to
exploit that correlation.
An illustration from the 1996 elections will illuminate this propo-
sition. Democrat Max Cleland survived an exceedingly close election
in Georgia to replace retiring Democratic Senator Sam Nunn. Black
votes constituted one quarter of the 2,260,953 votes cast.277 Exit polls
revealed that Cleland had captured 85% of the Black vote, or 480,452
votes.278 This number constituted more than 43% of Cleland's
1,103,492 votes.2 9 Because fewer than 28,000 votes separated Cleland
from his Republican opponent,2s0 and because only two Senate dis-
tricts can exist per state, a partisan gerrymanderer seeking a Demo-
cratic-leaning district or seeking to secure Cleland's reelection would
be wise, if not compelled, to keep intact the Black vote and place
Black voters in a single district. This, in turn, would lead to a Senate
district that is substantially more Black than Georgia's statewide aver-
age of 27%.2s Of course, a Democratic gerrymanderer might attempt
to shed Black voters in exchange for White Democrats, but these sub-
stitute voters may prove difficult to find. Only 38% of White Georgi-
ans voted for Cleland.' Moreover, these substitute voters are
unlikely to be as loyal as Black Georgians, who, like Black Democrats
nationally, have consistently voted in overwhelming numbers for
Democratic candidates.283 Here, the racial gerrymander and the par-
tisan gerrymander converge in a manner that leaves little doubt about
their co-dependence. Similar disproportions in the racial composition
277. See Mark Sherman, Election '96: Georgia, ATANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 7, 1996, at
3C.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See STATE RANKINS, supra note 138, at 442 (noting that Georgia is 27.5% Black).
282. See Sherman, supra note 277, at 3C.
283. See, e.g., Leonard Pallats, Georgia Voters Split Evenly on Parties, CHATrANOOGA
FREE PRESs, Dec. 1, 1996, at Cl (noting that Georgia Blacks remain "strongly Democratic
despite continued efforts by the GOP to reach them"); Nancy E. Roman, Georgia GOP
Seeks to Pick Democratic Lock on Blacks, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1996, at A8 (stating that
polls showed that 95% of Georgia's Blacks voted Democratic in the November 1996
elections).
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of winning statewide Democratic coalitions would dictate similar dis-
proportions in the racial composition of Democratic-leaning Senate
districts.284 Unlike District 30 in Bush v. Vera, then, these districts
could be justified as partisan gerrymanders and thereby escape strict
scrutiny.
We need not limit proof of this race/partisanship dependence to
the 1996 Georgia Senate race. Figure 1 is a county map of Georgia
containing a proposed minority-enhanced Senate district. The minor-
ity-enhanced District 1 increases the voting-age Black population
from 24.6% to 39.8%, and increases the overall Black population from
a statewide figure of 27% to a district proportion of 43.1%.
While the proposed district does not achieve majority status for
Blacks-a result I defend in Part III.C.2 8-the voting behavior of the
counties contained in the Black-enhanced district are substantially
Democratic and those of the White district are substantially Republi-
can. In other words, the districts are unmistakable partisan gerryman,
ders which also empower Black voters.
Appendix A confirms this characterization. Using county vote
returns for select statewide elections, I have sought to estimate the
partisan voting behavior of counties included in the minority-en-
hanced district versus the White-enhanced district. I have included in
the appendix tables only the results of competitive statewide con-
tests-those decided by a 10% margin or less-for major offices.286
This limitation is necessary because electoral landslides, where there is
by definition only nominal partisan competition, would tell us little
about the partisan predilections of voters in each of the districts.
Also, in order to avoid the skew of examining too small a time period,
I have culled statewide elections, including presidential contests, dat-
ing back to 1970. Figure 2 summarizes the results for Georgia.
In the contests surveyed, Democrats took 55.21% of the overall
votes in District 1, the minority-enhanced district, and won 78.10% of
the counties.287 In District 2, the White-enhanced Senate district,
284. See, e.g., Stephanie Grace, Black Turnout Boost Landrieu, TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Nov.
6, 1996, at All (reporting that Democratic Senator-elect Mary Landrieu captured 92% of
the Black votes while receiving only 37% of the White vote).
285. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
286. I adopt the 10% figure because scholars of congressional elections ordinarily view
a winning percentage of 55% or more as a "safe" congressional seat. See Charles M.
Tidmarch et al., Interparty Competition in the U.S. States: Legislative Elections, 1970-1978,
in 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 361-62 (1986); Thomas M. Holbrook & Emily Van Dunk, Elec-
toral Competition in the American States, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 955, 956 (1993).
287. As is evident from the map of Georgia, both the Black-enhanced and White-en-
hanced districts contain split counties. The splitting of counties was necessary in order to
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Figure 2
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Georgia District 1
55.210
E Democratic 0 Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Georgia District 1
U Democratic D Republican
Republicans captured 53.57% of the votes of the counties included
and won 60.81% of the counties. These illustrative Georgia Senate
districts are suggestive of the two-district dilemma in Senate district-
ing. Unless the Democratic vote in a jurisdiction is so overwhelming
that Democrats can gerrymander both districts in their favor, or unless
equalize the populations between districts. For purposes of estimating the voting behavior
of the hypothetical districts, the entire population of a split county was placed in the Senate
district where most of its voting age population would be located. This results in an under-
estimation of the Democratic and Republican voting patterns for the minority-enhanced
and White-enhanced districts, respectively. Subdividing the split counties and placing each
of their separated populations into the respective district in which they actually reside
would increase the relative Democratic and Republican partisan indices for Districts 1 and
2, respectively. District 1, the minority-enhanced district, would actually be more Demo-
cratic than the estimate indicates because the split county populations actually residing in
District 1 contain substantially more minority voters than the split county populations actu-
ally residing in District 2, the White-enhanced district. A similar methodology, and hence
a similar undercounting of partisan behavior, obtains with respect to Arkansas and Missis-
sippi, discussed in the text. Information regarding the split counties, including the racial
breakdown of the splits, are on file with the author and at the Southern Regional Counsel
in Atlanta, Georgia.
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Figure 2 Continued
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Georgia District 2
46.43%6
* Democratic [] Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Georgia District 2
39.19%6
Democratic El Republican
the Black vote is so small as not to figure significantly in either party's
electoral success, one would expect a Democratic gerrymanderer to
aggregate as many Black voters in a single district as would be neces-
sary to create a safe Democratic seat. One would also expect that this
number would reflect the party's traditional reliance on a dispropor-
tionate Black vote as well as the constraint of having only two dis-
tricts. Unlike House districting, which usually presents line drawers
with more than two choices with which to maximize partisan advan-
tage, partisan maximizing assumptions in the two-district dilemma will
demand the type of race aggregation that raises suspicions of the gra-
tuitous use of race in the House context. Thus, in the two-district con-
text, it would not be surprising to find that a partisan gerrymander has
resulted in a majority-minority district, or at least a district containing
an overwhelming majority of the minorities in the state, as is the case
in the Georgia example.
Georgia and other Southern jurisdictions provide the most com-
pelling proof of both the utility and feasibility of Senate districts be-
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cause racial bloc voting is most prevalent in the South."a Some
Southern states, of course, are more Democratic than others, some are
more Republican, and some are more evenly split. This affects the
degree of electoral competition in the state and possibly affects the
interdependence of race and partisan gerrymanders. Georgia, for ex-
ample, is one of the most competitive two-party states in the South
and represents the two-district dilemma in a highly emulous con-
text.289 Arkansas, on the other hand, had been one of the least com-
petitive Southern jurisdictions until 1996, when it elected its first
Republican Senator since Reconstruction and appointed a Republican
governor.290 Arkansas represents a historically Democratic-leaning
Southern state. Figure 3 is a county map of Arkansas containing a
Black-enhanced district that increases the Black voting age population
from 13.73% statewide to 25.40% in the proposed district.
Here again, partisanship correlates with race. Using the same
methodology as applied to Georgia, in the counties included in the
minority-enhanced district, District 1, Democrats took 55.88% of the
votes and won 83.82% of the counties. Conversely, in the White-en-
hanced district, District 2, Republicans captured 55.21% of the vote
and won 66.46% of the counties. Figure 4 summarizes these results,
and Appendix B contains the underlying data.
288. See Pildes, supra note 130, at 2512 n.23.
289. See MICHAEL BARoNm & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLmCS 327
(1994) ("Georgia has become not just the center of the South, but also a center of vibrant,
competitive two-party politics in the South .... ").
290. See Alan Greenblatt, Ex-Rep. Lincoln to Seek Bumpers' Senate Seat, 55 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1825, 1887 (1997) (noting that "[t]he state GOP has broken the longtime
Democratic stranglehold on Arkansas politics .... ").
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Figure 4
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Arkansas District 1
U Democratic l Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Arkansas District 1
U Democratic [ Republican
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Figure 4 Continued
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Arkansas District 2
44.79%
U Democratic El Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Arkansas District 2
33.54%
1 Democratic El Republican
Mississippi, as one of four out of twelve Southern states with two
Republican Senators and a Republican governor, 'reflects the two-dis-
trict dilemma in a Republican-leaning jurisdiction.29' Mississippi is
also a significant indicator because it contains a higher proportion of
Blacks than any other state in the nation. Figure 5 is a county map of
Mississippi that contains a minority-enhanced district, District 1,
which increases the Black voting-age population from 31.63% state-
wide to 42.46% and increases the overall Black population from
35.56% to 47.17%. Figure 6 summarizes the data contained in Appen-
dix C with respect to Mississippi.
In District 1, the Black-enhanced district, Democrats received
52.16% of the votes and carried 70.07% of the counties. District 1, then,
is clearly a Democratic-leaning district and a near-majority Black dis-
trict. By contrast, District 2, with a voting age population that is 77.72%
White, is solidly Republican. Republicans took 55.46% of the votes in
constituent counties and carried 60.93% of the counties.
291. To be precise, Mississippi is most Republican-leaning in its senatorial and presi-
dential politics. See BARoirm & UnFUSA, supra note 289, at 709.
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Figure 6
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Mississippi District 1
52.11%
1 Democratic [-0 Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Mississippi District 1
1 Democratic D Republican
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Figure 6 Continued
Estimated Distribution of Votes: Mississippi District 2
1 Democratic [I Republican
Estimated Distribution of Victories: Mississippi District 2
U Democratic LI Republican
The data for Georgia, Arkansas and Mississippi is not presented
to prove that a given set of district lines must mirror the illustrative
maps in order to be an effective partisan gerrymander in a two-district
setting. The data does indicate, however, that the populations in-
cluded in the Black districts have Democratic voting tendencies, while
the counties included in the White districts have voted largely for
Republicans in the contests surveyed. While other combinations of
counties with a reduced Black population might also yield Demo-
cratic-leaning districts in any of the three states, Bush v. Vera imposes
no requirement that a state draw the "Whitest" district possible in
seeking to remedy minority vote dilution. A state need only approach
districting with partisan objectives in mind at the inception. Nor must
a state seeking to effectuate a partisan gerrymander demonstrate that
it has drawn optimal lines for achieving that purpose. The political
fairness principle defers to the judgment of the states on such matters.
Thus, given the constraints of compactness and the well-docu-
mented reliance of the Democratic party on a disproportionate share
of Black votes for electoral success in the South, districts such as those
[Vol. 25:277
proposed for Georgia, Arkansas, and Mississippi should be deemed
permissible racial gerrymanders because they are allowable partisan
gerrymanders. In some cases, perhaps even these specific cases, the
latter may compel the former. Because Senate districts and the two-
district dilemma present the most credible case of the partisan gerry-
mander that permissibly employs race, these districts, unlike District
30 in Bush v. Vera, will more easily escape strict scrutiny.
2. Compactness
When majority-minority districts have not escaped heightened
scrutiny, they have met their demise due to a lack of compactness,
which has emerged as the most important inquiry in evaluating the
constitutionality of such districts. Compactness plays two roles, both
of which have engendered confusion. First, in each of the Supreme
Court cases striking down a majority-minority district, the district's
lack of geographic compactness has weighed heavily in the Court's
determination that the district was created for predominantly racial
reasons. Hence, lack of geographic compactness has substantially
contributed to the decision to apply strict scrutiny. Second, compact-
ness affects the narrow tailoring inquiry of the strict scrutiny test itself.
In Bush v. Vera and Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II'), the Court as-
sumed, without deciding, that compliance with section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act constituted a compelling state interest. Earlier, however,
Thornburg v. Gingles held that a minority group seeking section 2 re-
lief must first show that it "is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. '2 92
Transforming this first Gingles requirement from a statutory criterion
into a constitutional talisman, the Court in Bush and Shaw II held that
because the majority-minority districts in question were not geograph-
ically compact, the states had failed to narrowly tailor their districting
to achieve their stated interest in preventing minority vote dilution in
violation of section 2.293
Nowhere in the Shaw line of cases has the Court defined pre-
cisely what is meant by geographic compactness. In Bush, Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality of three, insisted that
A [section] 2 district that is reasonably compact and regular,
taking into account traditional districting principles such as
maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries,
292. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1985).
293. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 979 ("[Section] 2 does not require a State to create, on
predominantly racial lines, a district that is not 'reasonably compact."').
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may pass strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact
districts designed by plaintiffs' experts in endless "beauty
contests.,
2 94
Rather than defining compactness, the Bush Court's opinion is
festooned with tautologies such as "reasonably compact,' 295 "far from
compact, '296 and "bizarrely shaped. ' 297 In his separate concurrence,
Justice Kennedy added to the cacophony by distinguishing the com-
pactness required for the creation of a section 2 district from the com-
pactness required to satisfy the Court's equal protection inquiry.298
According to Justice Kennedy, "The first Gingles condition refers to
the compactness of the minority population, not to the compactness of
the contested district. '299 But Justice Kennedy's opinion also begged
the question: how geographically compact must a majority-minority
district be in order to survive constitutional scrutiny? In the absence
of specific guidance from the Court, district-line drawers and lower
courts have employed a wide range of definitions of compactness,
from comparisons to the districts in Shaw3°° to mathematical
measurements.3 o'
Senate districts would more easily satisfy equal protection com-
pactness requirements than would House districts because it is indis-
putable that a very different definition of compactness would apply to
Senate districts.3 02 There can, after all, be only two Senate districts
per state into which roughly equal populations must be placed.30 3
Thus, "the benchmark for compactness must be the geographic con-
tours, demographics and population dispersion of the entire state;
smaller electoral units are simply inapposite. ' 304 For instance, the
Court in Miller v. Johnson struck down Georgia's Eleventh congres-
sional district because it spanned too much of the state, "connecting
the black neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black
populace of coastal Chatham County, though 260 miles apart in dis-
294. Id. at 977.
295. Id. at 979.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun City, 21 F.3d 92, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1994).
301. See, e.g., NAACP v. Austin, 857 F. Supp. 560, 575 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
302. See Smith, supra note 52, at 64.
303. See id.
304. Id. Cf Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1366 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated sub nom
(for reasons other than compactness) (recognizing that compactness considerations for the
124-seat South Carolina House of Representatives would differ from those for the six Con-
gressional districts of South Carolina).
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tance and worlds apart in culture. ' 30 5 But, as Figure 1 indicates, a
Senate district in the same State may have to do precisely what the
Eleventh district did if it is to satisfy the constitutional requirements
of one-man, one-vote, not to mention the other legitimate aims of dis-
tricting. The effect of Senate districts is to necessitate the consolida-
tion of minorities too dispersed to form a House district but too
proximate to be deemed non-compact in an enlarged electoral unit.
The illustrative maps of Georgia, Arkansas, and Mississippi indi-
cate that compactness is more easily attained for Senate districts,
where greater population and topography must be accounted for.
Compare these districts to North Carolina's District 12 from Shaw,
contained in Figure 7.
Figure 7
The dissimilarities could not be greater. Georgia's districts run
along a north/south axis, while Arkansas's diagonally divide the state,
and Mississippi's Black-enhanced district is largely composed of the
historically Black Delta area in the southwestern region of the state.
For another perspective on the relative compactness of these pro-
305. Miller, 515 U.S. at 908.
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posed districts, compare them to the congressional districts for New
Hampshire (Figure 8) and Nevada (Figure 9).
Figure 8
Figure 9
2
The juxtaposition is, of course, appropriate because states which
have only two Congressmen essentially undertake the equivalent of
Senate districting when they draw congressional lines. Certainly the
proposed Senate districts for Georgia, Arkansas, and Mississippi are
no odder in shape than the congressional districts for New Hampshire
and Nevada.
Compact Senate districts can also be created in other Southern
states with relatively dispersed Black populations. Figures 10 and 11
contain proposed districts for Alabama and South Carolina. These
states have been selected because they contain some of the highest
concentrations of minorities in the country, as well as dispersed mi-
nority populations placed into congressional districts which have been
challenged under Shaw. Like Georgia, the districts proposed for Ala-
bama run along a north/south axis. South Carolina's districts run
along an east/west axis. In each of the state's minority-enhanced dis-
tricts, the Black voting age population is increased substantially, rising
by nearly 12% in Alabama and 10% in South Carolina. These in-
creases would have more than offset the margin by which two ultra-
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conservative Republicans won these states' most recent Senate
elections.30 6
In sum, whether or not Senate districts avoid strict scrutiny, their
geographic peculiarities distinguish them from House districts and al-
low states to assert compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as a compelling interest for the creation of a Black-majority or Black-
enhanced district.
C. A Note on Influence Versus Majority-Minority Districts: Too Little
and Too Much Influence
The districts proposed above are, of course, illustrative. The
existence of vote dilution in any state is a matter to be determined in
litigation. The illustrative districts are intended to demonstrate that
constitutional remedies are possible.
Minorities do not constitute a majority in any of the exemplary
districts. Rather, these are so-called "influence districts," in which mi-
norities constitute a substantial percentage short of a majority. While
the Supreme Court has not decided whether influence districts are a
cognizable remedy in section 2 litigation, it has recently intimated its
approval of such claims.30 7 Moreover, the validity of influence districts
flows inextricably from the predominance test of Miller v. Johnson. If
race is an acceptable districting criterion only when used in modera-
tion, then a majority-minority district will sometimes be impossible
without running afoul of the predominance rule. However, when
traditional districting principles are not subordinated to race, the re-
suit will often be influence districts. Indeed, in the Shaw line of cases,
most of the districts redrawn as a result of the Court's rulings became
influence districts.30 8 Thus, the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed
this type of remedy for vote dilution.
The proposed districts may be attacked simultaneously as afford-
ing racial minorities too much and too little influence. As is true in
the case of House districts, districting to enhance minority representa-
tion in one district reduces minority influence in adjacent districts. In
this regard, critics might charge that the creation of the minority-en-
hanced districts are a net loss for racial minorities because the repre-
sentative in the White-enhanced district will now be free to ignore
306. Republican Strom Thurmond won by 9.2% in South Carolina. See Greenblatt &
Wells, sapra note 12, at 3256. Republican Jeff Sessions won by 6.2% in Alabama. See id. at
3250.
307. Smith, supra note 52, at 61 n.306.
308. See Sack, supra note 203, at Al.
Spring 1998] REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS 351
minority concerns. Unless one posits that Senators are inherently
more responsive to minorities than Congressmen, however, there is
inferential evidence that minority concerns are being ignored even in
the absence of Senate districts. As Grofman and Handly concluded in
their 1995 study of the effects of the Voting Rights Act on House
elections:
Because it [is] clear that blacks are unlikely to have voted for
the Republican candidate, the Republican representative has no
incentive to take black interests into account. Indeed, there is no
relationship between the percentage black of a district and sup-
port for issues endorsed by blacks among southern Republican
House members-southern Republicans in the 1990s are simply
uniformly very conservative.31 9
Moreover, the actual outcomes of Senate contests in the South
belie claims that Blacks have significant influence in the current sys-
tem of at-large elections. Conservative White Republicans now out-
number Democrats in the South's Senate delegation by three to
one.310 And even in recent contests where moderate, Black-sup-
ported candidates have prevailed, they have done so by only the nar-
rowest of margins.311 Senate districts, by contrast, would create safer
Democratic seats-and hence more secure Black influence scena-
rios-than presently exist.
If minority-enhanced districts over-aggregate minority influence
in a single district, some will argue alternatively that these same dis-
tricts do not provide enough influence. Although majority-minority
Senate districts are certainly feasible,3 12 the illustrative districts, which
reflect states with some of the highest concentrations of racial minori-
ties, suggest that Senate districting would tend to produce more influ-
ence than majority-minority districts. In this sense, Senate districts
may be said to provide too little influence. This criticism, however,
simply underscores the modesty of my proposal and the likelihood
that Senate districting can be accomplished without over-using race in
309. Grofnan & Handley, supra note 275, at 258 (emphasis added).
310. There are eight Democrats out of the twenty-four Senators from the South. See
Greenblatt & Wells, supra note 12, at 3238.
311. See id. at 3234 ("The razor-thin victories of [Mary] Landrieu and [Max] Cleland-
neither won more than 50 percent of the vote-masked a greater-underlying Republican
trend in the South. Republicans defended eight Southern seats, most with relative ease,
and won seats in Alabama and Arkansas that had long been held by Democrats.").
312. For instance, by combining the Black and Hispanic populations of southern Texas,
a majority-minority Senate district can be drawn in that state. Because of the size of Texas,
it is not possible to display the proposed Senate district graphically. However, the underly-
ing data for such a district is on file with the Southern Regional Counsel in Atlanta,
Georgia.
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violation of Shaw v. Reno. Moreover, the criticism is misplaced. Even
if a majority-minority district is always preferable to an influence dis-
trict, where it is not possible to create the former, surely critics of
influence districts would not prefer the status quo.
While minority-enhanced Senate districts do not assure the elec-
tion of a minority candidate, as is characteristic of majority-minority
districts, such districts can increase the opportunity to elect a minority
candidate in less apparent, yet still significant, ways. For example, mi-
nority candidates seeking statewide office often have difficulty raising
sufficient campaign funds.313 This burden is lessened by having to run
in half the state rather than in an entire jurisdiction. Similarly, be-
cause minority candidates often lack the name recognition of their
White opponent, running in a smaller geographic area may allow them
to overcome this handicap more easily. I do not suggest that either of
these variables is as important as race. In assessing the likely effect of
a minority influence Senate district, however, we should not overlook
these considerations.
Setting aside the race of the eventual winning candidate, minor-
ity-enhanced Senate districts would reinvent Black politics by making
Southern White Democrats elected to the Senate more responsive to
Black concerns. An anomaly of race and partisanship in the South is
that while victorious White Democrats often owe their elections to
overwhelming Black support, their voting patterns will not necessarily
reflect this fact. In a 1995 study of congressional roll call votes on
issues of particular importance to Blacks, Charles Cameron, David
Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran concluded that districts in the South
containing a Black population of between 25 to 35 percent did not
significantly improve White representatives' responsiveness to Black
313. The ill-fated Senate bid of former governor Douglas L. Wilder, the nation's first
Black elected governor, amply illustrates the limitations of transferring success at obtaining
one office to obtaining a Senate seat. See Kent Jenkins, Jr., & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Wil-
der, In Exchange for Endorsement, Asks Robb for Help Paying His Debts, WASH. POST.,
Oct. 21, 1994, at D1 (stating that Wilder had to lend his Senate campaign $54,000 of his
own money and ended up $50,000 in debt). See also Kenneth J. Cooper, More Blacks Run
for Statewide Offices, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1994, at A12 (noting the fund-raising difficul-
ties of two Black Senate candidates-United States Representative Alan Wheat and Ron
Simms, a county commissioner in Washington state-who had previously represented
predominantly White constituencies); U.S. Senate Struggles with Campaign Finance Re-
form; Complex Plan to Set Spending Limits Spurs Bickering Between Democrats, GOP,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 14, 1993, at Al (reporting view of Hispanic congressman who con-
tends that minority representatives have difficulty raising money from individual
contributors).
Sorina 19981 RBINVENTING BLACK POLITICS 353
interests.314 Thus, the authors concluded, "there is no reason to have
districts that are between 25 and 35 percent black, as those voters
could be usefully allocated in other districts.- 315 In contrast, when the
Black population is increased to the 35% to 50% range, "significant
improvements in representation occur." '31 6 Extrapolating these find-
ings to the Senate, it is significant that, with the exception of Arkan-
sas, each of the proposed minority-enhanced districts caused an
increase in the minority voting age population to within the range
where the authors of the study observed a significant increase in re-
sponsiveness to minority concerns. As for Arkansas, the 35% to 50%
optimal range model does not imply that Senate districting would not
be beneficial to minorities in that state. Rather, this model simply
suggests that the minority-enhanced district should contain less than
the 25.40% Black voting age population proposed.
Finally, if the failure to focus on the Senate holds any lessons for
voting rights advocates it is that the long term is as important as the
short term. By the middle of the twenty-first century, racial minorities
will comprise nearly one-half the nation, and the possibilities for cre-
ating majority-minority Senate districts will be correspondingly
greater.31 7
Conclusion
The second Reconstruction is the product of daring, innovative
litigation and legislative stratagems by civil rights advocates. Its pres-
ervation and advancement will require nothing less. Some may argue
that the time and attention of the voting rights community should be
devoted to surer bets than Senate districts, but Shaw and its progeny
demonstrate that there are no sure bets anymore. A right achieved
one day is just as likely to be deprived the next unless minorities play
a meaningful role in constituting the Senate, which confirms the judi-
ciary that enforces and interprets federal rights.
If Senate districts sound novel, it is because legal scholars have
heretofore under-appreciated the significance of the Seventeenth
Amendment. Debates regarding the Amendment are substantially
discussions about race and remedies, and a fair reading of the legisla-
tive history reveals that the 62nd Congress which enacted the Amend-
314. See Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Black Repre-
sentation in Congress? 29 (March 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See Smith, supra note 52, at 62 n.314.
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ment was as concerned about the possible implied repeal of the
Fifteenth Amendment as it was about the direct election of Senators.
The enabling authority of the Fifteenth Amendment is the constitu-
tional basis for the Voting Rights Act under which courts have im-
posed single-member districts on a variety of at-large electoral
schemes. The Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act em-
power courts to do the same with respect to at-large Senate contests.
It is highly unlikely that the 61st and 62nd Congresses intended
that the remedial powers that Republicans fought so hard to preserve
under the Fifteenth Amendment could be as easily invalidated under
the Fourteenth Amendment as Shaw v. Reno and its progeny have
allowed. Shaw v. Reno simply does not apply to Senate districts.
Even assuming its applicability, however, the characteristics of race-
based districting that have imperiled House districts-namely a sup-
posed over-use of race and a lack of geographic compactness-do not
threaten the constitutionality of Senate districts. Partisan gerryman-
ders for Senate districts will in most instances correlate with racial
gerrymanders. And because Senate districts, by necessity, are larger
and more populous than House districts, they are not constrained by
the restrictive definitions of compactness that have been applied to
House districts.
It is appropriate to end where I began. Perhaps the Senatorial
prerogative most directly relevant to the preservation of the second
Reconstruction is the Senator's role in selecting members of the fed-
eral bench. Since 1840, it has been customary for Senators of the
same party as the President to select the federal district judges for
their states."' This is no small source of power, for despite widely-
held beliefs to the contrary,
district judges do make lots of law, not only in their opinions
but, perhaps more importantly, in the basic fact-finding they
perform .... The trial record critically determines whether an
appellate court will sustain a ruling that prison conditions are
unconstitutionally cruel or inhumane; that market power exists
in an antitrust suit; or that Title VII sexual harassment has
occurred.319
More broadly, in recent times, the Senate's advice and consent
has proved pivotal in the shaping of law that profoundly affects racial
minorities. Recall that Justice Clarence Thomas was confirmed by
only four votes, an outcome which might have been altered had the
318. See JOSEPH P. HAMus, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT oF THE SENATE 314-25 (1953).
319. Patricia M. Wald, Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting Appellate
Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 15, 15-16 (1989).
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Southern Democrats who provided his margin of victory been elected
from Senate districts, or had there been more minorities in the Senate.
Perhaps the seeds of Shaw v. Reno and the beginning of the demise of
the second Reconstruction were planted in the Senate with this vote.
Shaw and its progeny were decided by votes of five to four, with Jus-
tice Thomas, the lone person of color, voting in the majority.
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Appendix A
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DF. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFIcE DEMocRAT VoTEs REPuBcAN VoTEs VICroRY VICTORY
APPLING 1980 Senate 3,098 1,622
1990 Governor 1,988 1,483
1992 President 2,455 2,514
1992 Senate 2,413 2,616
1992 Senate** 1,255 1,493
1994 Governor 1,550 2,417
1996 President 2,070 2,572
1996 Senate 2,068 2,275
TOTAL 16,897 49.86% 16,992 50.14% 25.00% 75.00%
ATKINSON 1980 Senate 1,517 531
1990 Governor 844 607
1992 President 1,056 779
1992 Senate 1,059 533
1992 Senate** 611 413
1994 Governor 629 672
1996 President 823 784
1996 Senate 929 625
TOTAL 7,468 60.17% 4,944 39.83% 87.50% 12.50%
BACON 1980 Senate 2,047 1,021
1990 Governor 1,072 745
1992 President 1,423 1,301
1992 Senate 1,441 1,129
1992 Senate** 636 665
1994 Governor 726 916
1996 President 1,360 1,580
1996 Senate 1,724 1,312
TOTAL 10,429 54.61% 8,669 45.39% 62.50% 37.50%
BAKER 1980 Senate 1,253 178
1990 Governor 722 346
1992 President 864 391
1992 Senate 881 308
1992 Senate** 669 205
1994 Governor 565 331
1996 President 955 408
1996 Senate 933 367
TOTAL 6,842 72.97% 2,534 27.03% 100.00% 0.00%
BALDWIN 1980 Senate 4,176 3,926
1990 Governor 4,473 3,241
1992 President 5,813 4,262
1992 Senate 5,956 4,006
1992 Senate** 3,492 2,982
1994 Governor 4,313 4,031
1996 President 5,740 4,570
1996 Senate 6,096 4,182
TOTAL 40,059 56.22% 31,200 43.78% 100.00% 0.00%
BEN HILL 1980 Senate 3,149 1,225
1990 Governor 1,908 1,357
1992 President 2,348 1,476
1992 Senate 2,796 1,404
1992 Senate** 1,334 733
1994 Governor 1,605 1,249
1996 President 2,198 1,516
1996 Senate 2,330 1,399
TOTAL 17,668 63.04% 10,359 36.96% 100.00% 0.00%
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Coumry YER On'sCi
BERRIEN 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BIBB 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BLECKLY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BRANTLEY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BROOKS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BRYAN 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VICrORY VICrORY
3,254 1,225
1,709 1,211
2,103 1,637
2,797 1,771
1,391 851
1,861 1,636
2,066 1,950
2,863 1,754
18,044 59.99% 12,035 40.01% 100.00% 0.00%
23,979 19,610
22,686 13,653
28,070 19,847
32,778 19,799
19,688 14,098
21,171 16,279
26,727 20,778
29,024 19,718
204,123 58.67% 143,782 41.33% 100.00% 0.00%
2,290 1,098
1,268 1,238
1,710 1,570
1,995 1,272
1,040 947
1,074 1,570
1,365 1,632
1,694 1,339
12,436 53.83% 10,666 46.17% 75.00% 25.00%
2,146 725
1,461 684
1,883 1,541
2,000 1,437
982 932
958 1,639
1,464 1,739
1,715 1,555
12,609 55.16% 10,252 44.84% 75.00% 25.00%
2,418 1,146
1,503 1,230
1,895 1,779
2,163 1,418
1,297 1,045
1,533 1,268
1,977 1,738
1,982 1,471
14,768 57.10% 11,095 42.90% 100.00% 0.00%
1,977 1,066
2,198 1,303
2,031 2,789
2,207 2,933
1,176 1,714
1,795 2,580
2,152 3,577
2,520 3,379
16,056 45.36% 19,341 54.64% 25.00% 75.00%
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COUNTY YEAR OFFcE
BULLOCK 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BURKE
TOTAL
CALHOUN
TOTAL
CAMDEN
TOTAL
CANDLER
TOTAL
CHARLTON
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTFs REPUBuCAN VoTEs VICTORY VIcroRY
4,937 3,325
4,126 3,614
4,903 5,690
5,839 6,349
3,161 3,790
4,350 4,626
5,396 6,646
6,413 6,440
39,125 49.15% 40,480 50.85% 25.00% 75.00%
3,334 1,343
2,345 1,665
3,647 2,390
2,866 2,853
2,052 2,049
2,214 2,137
3,915 2,590
3,635 2,464
24,008 57.85% 17,491 42.15% 100.00% 0.00%
1,581 479
941 452
1,301 464
1,617 434
1,049 221
950 458
1,217 541
1,307 512
9,963 73.67% 3,561 26.33% 100.00% 0.00%
2,019 1,107
1,737 1,119
2,952 3,517
2,970 3,041
1,247 1,817
2,026 2,363
3,644 4,222
3,144 4,236
19,739 47.96% 21,422 52.04% 25.00% 75.00%
1,501 830
1,028 618
1,192 1,014
1,224 1,052
711 752
909 894
1,097 1,131
1,230 1,061
8,892 54.74% 7,352 45.26% 75.00% 25.00%
1,284 543
782 482
1,127 1,333
1,043 790
395 681
724 769
1,386 1,374
1,131 1,253
7,872 52.14% 7,225 47.86% 50.00% 50.00%
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COUNTY YEAR OFFICE
CHATHAM 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
CHATrA-
HOOCHEE
TOTAL
CLAY
TOTAL
CLAYTON
TOTAL
CLINCH
TOTAL
COFFEE
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. %REP. %DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPuBIicAN VoTEs VIcroRY VIcroRy
28,027 28,728
28,843 16,935
31,533 31,925
33,189 32,633
21,424 21,143
25,149 22,865
35,781 31,987
35,097 29,719
239,043 52.54% 215,935 47.46% 75.00% 25.00%
442 268
378 120
604 413
525 403
250 196
389 228
565 398
463 420
3,616 59.65% 2,446 4035% 100.00% 0.00%
928 201
547 247
778 264
769 295
493 137
569 218
787 293
564 294
5,435 73.61% 1,949 26.39% 100.00% 0.00%
15,422 23,123
20,016 15,296
25,890 23,965
28,682 26,766
15,119 14,111
18,372 16,015
30,687 20,625
30,653 21,449
184,841 53.39% 161,350 46.61% 87.50% 12.50%
1,264 440
688 353
759 790
892 440
394 357
598 440
973 789
953 613
6,521 60.70% 4,222 39.30% 87.50% 12.50%
3,885 2,523
3,246 2,869
3,275 3,778
3,582 2,996
1,975 1,870
2,505 3,117
3,407 3,934
4,128 3,364
26,003 51.54% 24,451 48.46% 62.50% 37.50%
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CoUNTY YEAR OFFICE
COLQUITT 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
COOK
TOTAL
CRAWFORD
TOTAL
CRISP
TOTAL
DECATUR
TOTAL
DODGE
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBICAN VoTEs VIcroRY VicroRY
5,631 3,179
3,318 4,033
3,891 4,680
4,779 4,463
3,047 2,701
3,852 4,202
4,135 4,847
5,053 4,222
33,706 51.04% 32,327 48.96% 50.00% 50.00%
2,597 1,138
1,396 971
1,731 1,318
2,327 1,364
1,301 690
1,523 1,011
1,780 1,354
2,177 1,234
14,832 62.03% 9,080 37.97% 100.00% 0.00%
1,705 617
1,277 704
1,648 974
1,745 939
1,029 733
1,202 935
1,534 1,290
1,593 1,165
11,733 61.46% 7,357 38.54% 100.00% 0.00%
3,662 1,480
2,083 1,917
2,610 2,253
3,050 1,899
1,646 1,172
2,161 1,919
2,504 2,321
2,919 2,068
20,635 57.86% 15,029 42.14% 100.00% 0.00%
3,687 2,107
2,360 2,561
3,198 3,142
3,566 2,650
1,921 1,903
2,252 2,280
3,245 3,035
3,022 2,665
23,251 53.34% 20,343 46.66% 75.00% 25.00%
5,004 1,492
2,280 1,718
3,002 2,287
3,313 1,705
1,768 1,310
1,877 2,287
2,696 2,478
3,270 1,995
23,210 60.31% 15,272 39.69% 87.50% 12.50%
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CoUTY YEAR OFMaCE
DOOLY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
DOUGHERTY 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
EARLY 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
ECHOLS 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
EFFINGHAM 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
EMANUEL 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DmL. % REP. % Dm. % REP.
DEMOcRAT VoTrs REPuBjL-cAN VOTES VICroRY VcroRY
2,473 690
1,606 912
1,993 1,034
2,004 702
1,712 549
1,416 826
1,951 990
1,728 965
14,883 69.06% 6,668 30.94% 100.00% 0.00%
12,882 13,577
11,976 9,025
15,236 12,455
17,355 13,225
10,687 8,660
12,992 8,650
15,600 11,144
17,121 10,850
113,849 56.52% 87,586 43.48% 87.50% 12.50%
2,768 864
1,455 1,139
1,970 1,457
2,718 1,111
1,314 586
1,469 957
1,648 1,374
1,954 1,258
15,296 63.62% 8,746 36.38% 100.00% 0.00%
602 160
305 170
312 361
439 227
154 158
237 233
308 335
343 300
2,700 58.14% 1,944 41.86% 75.00% 25.00%
2,984 2,321
3,127 1,916
2,690 3,814
3,070 4,197
1,673 2,473
2,103 3,149
3,031 5,022
3,711 4,625
22,389 44.86% 27,517 55.14% 25.00% 75.00%
3,838 1,865
2,555 1,787
2,951 2,662
2,480 2,676
1,324 1,772
1,961 1,900
2,947 2,451
2,787 2,131
20,843 54.72% 17,244 45.28% 75.00% 25.00%
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CoUNTY YEAR Os''ICE
EVANS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
FAYETTE
TOTAL
FULTON*
TOTAL
GLASCOCK
TOTAL
GLYNN
TOTAL
GRADY
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoEs REpuBICAN VoTEs VlCrORY VICrORY
1,617 850
1,327 732
1,230 1,244
1,281 1,296
721 796
993 898
1,117 1,206
1,225 1,024
9,511 54.17% 8,046 45.83% 50.00% 50.00%
3,789 7,666
7,423 11,239
8,430 17,576
10,149 20,375
5,765 12,542
8,743 13,385
9,875 21,005
11,257 20,004
65,431 34.58% 123,792 65.42% 0.00% 100.00%
82,652 109,513
88,499 60,151
147,459 85,451
155,972 95,001
90,022 53,965
100,894 62,824
143,306 89,809
139,636 93,106
948,440 59.34% 649,820 40.66% 87.50% 12.50%
774 283
342 456
316 516
310 476
149 379
182 434
348 532
468 410
2,889 45.32% 3,486 54.68% 25.00% 75.00%
6,531 9,898
6,978 6,701
8,581 11,242
10,100 12,299
5,161 7,888
5,526 10,179
8,058 12,305
8,796 12,239
59,731 41.92% 82,751 58.08% 12.50% 87.50%
3,485 1,398
1,964 1,700
2,520 2,370
2,851 2,050
1,684 1,362
2,266 1,736
2,862 2,674
2,825 2,405
20,457 56.59% 15,695 43.41% 100.00% 0.00%
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COUNTY YEAR OFFICE
GREENE 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate"*
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
HANCOCK
TOTAL
HOUSTON
TOTAL
IRWIN
TOTAL
JEFF DAVIS
TOTAL
JEFFERSON
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DaaM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs R_PuBLicAN VOTES VICrORY VICroRY
2,866 758
1,694 829
2,259 1,307
2,464 1,454
1,299 814
1,904 1,092
2,115 1,702
2,180 1,807
16,781 63.22% 9,763 36.78% 100.00% 0.00%
1,576 546
1,272 433
2,461 506
1,875 398
1,200 275
1,326 431
2,135 438
1,755 502
13,600 79.40% 3,529 20.60% 100.00% 0.00%
9,975 11,219
11,299 8,844
12,270 14,119
16,426 15,035
7,875 10,311
11,720 11,509
12,760 17,050
16,031 15,941
98,356 48.60% 104,028 51.40% 50.00% 50.00%
Senate 1,969 646
1,034 923
1,366 973
1,688 853
1,101 470
1,082 893
1,225 1,085
1,462 882
10,927 61.90% 6,725 38.10% 100.00% 0.00%
2,184 1,014
1,323 1,012
2,031 1,947
1,862 2,056
774 1,074
1,247 1,435
1,576 1,796
1,760 1,595
12,757 51.68% 11,929 48.32% 37.50% 62.50%
3,039 1,355
2,430 1,834
3,220 2,077
2,603 2,256
1,801 1,768
2,303 1,972
3,404 2,077
3,160 1,840
21,960 59.13% 15,179 40.87% 100.00% 0.00%
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CorTrv YEAR OsMcE
JENKINS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
JOHNSON 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
LAMAR 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate*"
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
LANIER 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
LAURENS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate"t
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
LEE 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate"*
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
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GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% D~m. % REP. % DEM. % RE'.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VIcroRy VIcroRY
1,847 615
769 871
1,401 929
1,133 1,195
611 696
835 807
1,336 955
1,215 944
9,147 56.61% 7,012 43.39% 50.00% 50.00%
2,186 862
1,143 903
1,473 1,314
1,821 928
1,010 1,045
775 1,189
1,194 815
855 1,049
10,457 5634% 8,105 43.66% 62.50% 37.50%
2,337 1,339
1,792 1,203
2,065 1,707
2,293 1,774
1,397 1,198
1,897 1,391
2,125 1,988
2,462 1,973
16,368 56-56% 12,573 43.44% 100.00% 0.00%
1,164 329
689 349
811 600
870 429
450 287
758 330
818 519
826 485
6,386 65.74% 3,328 3426% 100.00% 0.00%
7,232 3,997
4,917 4,229
6,184 6,146
6,858 4,375
3,838 3,667
4,503 5,904
5,792 6,118
5,757 5,517
45,081 53.02% 39,953 46.98% 75.00% 25.00%
1,876 1,708
1,798 1,847
1,811 3,061
2,466 3,167
1,372 1,929
1,801 2,272
2,005 3,983
2,740 3,669
15,869 42.31% 21,636 57.69% 12.50% 87.50%
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COUNTY YEAR OFMCE
LIBERTY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
LONG
TOTAL
LOWNDES
TOTAL
MACON
TOTAL
MARION
TOTAL
McINTOSH
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% D~m. %REP. % Dm. %REP.
DEMoCRAT VOTES REPUBucAN VoTEs VICrORY VICToRY
2,849 1,488
2,837 1,502
3,853 2,832
3,565 2,935
2,117 1,602
3,153 2,464
4,462 3,042
4,297 2,862
27,133 59.16% 18,727 40.84% 100.00% 0.00%
1,181 506
821 477
874 719
838 745
491 370
575 658
936 791
1,003 734
6,719 57.33% 5,000 42.67% 100.00% 0.00%
7,070 7,336
6,626 6,158
9,019 10,276
11,300 10,289
5,908 6,372
7,024 7,269
9,470 10,578
10,968 10,362
67,385 49.54% 68,640 50.46% 37.50% 62.50%
2,672 959
1,960 910
2,491 944
2,322 967
1,722 705
1,920 901
2,618 1,006
2,223 1,030
17,928 70.72% 7,422 29.28% 100.00% 0.00%
1,058 501
1,019 546
1,145 711
1,165 698
727 435
814 514
977 678
1,026 749
7,931 62.14% 4,832 37.86% 100.00% 0.00%
1,929 861
1,822 571
1,925 1,027
1,858 1,120
1,095 739
1,684 1,205
1,927 1,219
2,090 1,166
14,330 64.44% 7,908 35.56% 100.00% 0.00%
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CoUNry YEAR OFFICE
MERIWETHER 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
MILLER
TOTAL
MITCHELL
TOTAL
MONTGOMERY
TOTAL
MUSCOGEE*
TOTAL
PEACH
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DaaM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT Vomrs REPUBLICAN VOTEs VIcroRY VICroRY
3,910 1,765
3,589 1,733
4,002 2,364
4,535 2,731
2,440 1,489
3,825 2,398
3,492 2,259
3,659 2,486
29,452 63.10% 17,225 36.90% 100.00% 0.00%
1,547 401
604 626
934 826
1,206 590
564 351
437 760
909 847
969 678
7,170 58.54% 5,079 41.46% 75.00% 25.00%
4,167 1,549
2,680 1,790
3,052 1,917
4,095 1,778
2,688 955
3,024 1,345
3,165 2,033
3,806 1,929
26,677 66.74% 13,296 33.26% 100.00% 0.00%
1,930 598
957 720
1,185 1,009
1,265 1,033
592 731
774 909
1,233 1,163
1,456 1,104
9,392 56.38% 7,267 43.62% 100.00% 0.00%
15,391 21,565
23,505 12,498
25,476 21,386
28,164 21,568
15,773 13,860
19,724 12,258
24,867 19,360
25,584 19,234
178,484 55.74% 141,729 44.26% 87.50% 12.50%
3,401 1,840
2,901 1,753
3,677 2,327
4,061 2,204
2,635 1,842
2,815 2,142
3,582 2,676
3,778 2,464
26,850 60.89% 17,248 39.11% 100.00% 0.00%
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GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % Dnms. % REP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFIcE DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBICAN VoT s VICrORY VICTORY
PIERCE 1980 Senate 2,173 846
1990 Governor 1,518 973
1992 President 1,852 1,899
1992 Senate 2,241 1,659
1992 Senate** 1,100 1,072
1994 Governor 1,200 1,700
1996 President 1,420 2,319
1996 Senate 1,610 2,178
TOTAL 13,114 50.91% 12,646 49.09% 50.00% 50.00%
PIKE 1980 Senate 1,912 1,126
1990 Governor 1,459 1,316
1992 President 1,651 1,822
1992 Senate 1,822 2,071
1992 Senate** 1,001 1,276
1994 Governor 1,334 1,685
1996 President 1,475 2,054
1996 Senate 1,686 2,102
TOTAL 12,340 47.84% 13,452 52.16% 25.00% 75.00%
PULASKI 1980 Senate 2,318 856
1990 Governor 1,293 915
1992 President 1,756 1,075
1992 Senate 2,005 893
1992 Senate** 1,245 653
1994 Governor 1,123 989
1996 President 1,554 1,196
1996 Senate 1,633 1,061
TOTAL 12,927 62.86% 7,638 37.14% 100.00% 0.00%
QUITMAN 1980 Senate 520 185
1990 Governor 370 125
1992 President 523 284
1992 Senate 417 217
1992 Senate** 217 150
1994 Governor 485 184
1996 President 514 224
1996 Senate 378 215
TOTAL 3,424 68.37% 1,584 31.63% 100.00% 0.00%
RANDOLPH 1980 Senate 2,183 510
1990 Governor 1,564 707
1992 President 1,756 887
1992 Senate 1,979 762
1992 Senate** 1,226 402
1994 Governor 1,115 635
1996 President 1,438 816
1996 Senate 1,415 881
TOTAL 12,676 69.36% 5,600 30.64% 100.00% 0.00%
RICHMOND 1980 Senate 21,128 24,254
1990 Governor 18,382 15,593
1992 President 28,910 24,227
1992 Senate 29,608 28,439
1992 Senate** 16,199 19,627
1994 Governor 19,751 18,023
1996 President 30,738 23,670
1996 Senate 32,019 23,020
TOTAL 196,735 52.66% 176,853 47.34% 87.50% 12.50%
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
CouNTY YEAR OFICE
SCHLEY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
SCREVEN
TOTAL
SEMINOLE
TOTAL
SPALDING
TOTAL
STEWART
TOTAL
SUMTER
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % RP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLCAN VOTFS VicroRY VICToRY
668 362
468 451
601 511
618 491
341 307
579 439
576 470
534 466
4,385 55.63% 3,497 4437% 100.00% 0.00%
2,291 1,208
1,566 1,205
1,940 1,705
1,569 1,765
998 1,174
1,437 1,276
2,087 1,862
2,010 1,683
13,898 53.92% 11,878 46.08% 75.00% 25.00%
2,313 604
1,273 849
1,193 850
1,783 923
741 427
935 808
1,265 1,003
1,468 944
10,971 63.13% 6,408 36.87% 100.00% 0.00%
6,359 5,972
5,788 4,994
6,392 7,262
6,292 8,019
3,380 5,069
4,952 5,824
6,017 7,376
6,127 7,325
45,307 46.64% 51,841 53.36% 25.00% 75.00%
1,223 539
1,019 393
1,540 1,186
1,183 556
928 370
940 407
1,537 525
1,147 595
9,517 67.55% 4,571 32.45% 100.00% 0.00%
4,781 3,191
3,014 2,976
4,489 3,616
4,717 3,202
2,739 1,841
3,527 2,333
4,239 3,358
4,197 3,158
31,703 57.25% 23,675 42.75% 100.00% 0.00%
[Vol. 25:1
REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS
COUNrY YEAR OFFICE
TALBOT 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
TALIAFERRO 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
TATTNALL 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
TAYLOR 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
TELFAIR 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
TERRELL 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % REP. % DEm. % REP.
DEMocRAT VoTEs REPunucAN VoTs VICTORY VICTORY
1,306 637
1,025 565
1,768 671
1,274 590
874 431
1,100 549
1,579 652
1,258 680
10,184 68.08% 4,775 31.92% 100.00% 0.00%
674 177
402 214
755 269
676 374
355 172
680 306
615 235
559 232
4,716 70.44% 1,979 29.56% 100.00% 0.00%
3,341 1,538
2,512 1,427
2,360 2,566
2,649 2,338
1,437 1,384
1,840 2,152
2,369 2,518
2,896 2,111
19,404 54.75% 16,034 45.25% 62.50% 37.50%
1,934 620
1,372 876
1,508 1,078
1,789 1,000
878 728
1,050 860
1,450 1,002
1,616 1,013
11,597 61.77% 7,177 38.23% 100.00% 0.00%
3,326 748
1,581 1,203
2,238 1,324
2,160 1,031
1,161 653
1,321 1,154
1,856 1,143
1,897 1,053
15,540 65.16% 8,309 34.84% 100.00% 0.00%
2,188 946
1,524 916
1,942 1,143
2,024 907
1,398 620
1,213 869
1,509 1,111
1,485 1,013
13,283 63.84% 7,525 36.16% 100.00% 0.00%
Spring 19981
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CoUTrY YEAR OFICE
THOMAS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
TIFT
TOTAL
TOOMBS
TOTAL
TREUTLEN
TOTAL
TURNER
TOTAL
TWIGGS
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLCAN VoTEs VICroRY VICrORY
5,699 4,100
3,639 3,879
4,841 5,500
5,840 5,913
3,174 3,638
4,590 3,695
5,183 5,649
6,047 5,343
39,013 50.84% 37,717 49.16% 37.50% 62.50%
4,402 3,380
2,858 3,140
3,930 4,485
4,575 4,387
2,847 2,505
3,554 3,756
4,198 5,613
5,154 4,897
31,518 49.49% 32,163 50.51% 50.00% 50.00%
3,806 2,315
2,565 2,413
2,648 3,609
2,584 3,737
1,421 2,735
2,463 3,280
2,763 3,646
3,038 3,573
21,288 45.69% 25,308 54.31% 12.50% 87.50%
1,542 500
945 530
1,116 898
1,123 728
700 492
652 816
912 723
1,033 675
8,023 59.94% 5,362 40.06% 100.00% 0.00%
2,384 596
1,126 722
1,669 936
1,978 836
1,039 388
1,079 847
1,272 924
1,561 887
12,108 66.37% 6,136 33.63% 100.00% 0.00%
2,215 603
1,534 569
2,097 853
2,517 830
1,392 628
1,264 850
1,927 958
2,017 941
14,963 70.60% 6,232 29.40% 100.00% 0.00%
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GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
COUNTY YEAR OmcF DEMOCRAT VoTEs REpuBLIcAN VoTEs VICrORY VICTORY
UPSON 1980 Senate 5,010 2,631
1990 Governor 3,188 2,545
1992 President 3,740 4,053
1992 Senate 4,682 4,290
1992 Senate** 2,119 2,190
1994 Governor 2,876 3,127
1996 President 3,491 3,783
1996 Senate 4,084 3,874
TOTAL 29,190 52.42% 26,493 47.58% 37.50% 62.50%
WARE 1980 Senate 6,224 3,710
1990 Governor 3,551 2,466
1992 President 4,573 4,573
1992 Senate 5,224 3,741
1992 Senate** 2,841 2,986
1994 Governor 2,963 3,451
1996 President 4,171 4,746
1996 Senate 4,824 4,718
TOTAL 34,371 53.07% 30,391 46.93% 57.14% 42.86%
WARREN 1980 Senate 1,438 626
1990 Governor 756 623
1992 President 1,239 751
1992 Senate 986 722
1992 Senate** 672 609
1994 Governor 859 617
1996 President 1,230 735
1996 Senate 1,103 645
TOTAL 8,283 60.86% 5,328 39.14% 100.00% 0.00%
WASHINGTON 1980 Senate 3,489 1,564
1990 Governor 2,432 1,617
1992 President 3,508 2,384
1992 Senate 3,609 2,020
1992 Senate** 2,239 1,588
1994 Governor 2,711 1,826
1996 President 4,057 2,348
1996 Senate 3,630 2,254
TOTAL 25,675 62.20% 15,601 37.80% 100.00% 0.00%
WAYNE 1980 Senate 3,421 2,331
1990 Governor 2,459 2,244
1992 President 3,052 3,381
1992 Senate 3,399 4,019
1992 Senate** 1,960 2,082
1994 Governor 2,051 3,344
1996 President 2,734 3,709
1996 Senate 3,742 3,361
TOTAL 22,818 48.25% 24,471 51.75% 25.00% 75.00%
WEBSTER 1980 Senate 639 170
1990 Governor 398 202
1992 President 600 208
1992 Senate 502 172
1992 Senate** 346 125
1994 Governor 324 190
1996 President 529 235
1996 Senate 412 245
TOTAL 3,750 70.79% 1,547 29.21% 100.00% 0.00%
A-17 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:1
GEORGIA DISTRICT 1
% Dam. % REP. % D~m. % REP.
COUNTY YEAR OmcE DEMOCRAT VoTs REPUBLCAN VOTES VIcroRY VICTORY
WHEELER 1980 Senate 1,963 456
1990 Governor 550 459
1992 President 880 601
1992 Senate 912 524
1992 Senate** 399 326
1994 Governor 589 567
1996 President 751 460
1996 Senate 813 478
TOTAL 6,857 63.92% 3,871 36.08% 100.00% 0.00%
WILCOX 1980 Senate 2,160 498
1990 Governor 1,071 778
1992 President 1,365 916
1992 Senate 1,678 696
1992 Senate** 875 451
1994 Governor 698 971
1996 President 1,067 882
1996 Senate 1,228 751
TOTAL 10,142 63.05% 5,943 36.95% 87.50% 12.50%
WILKENSON 1980 Senate 2,050 1,096
1990 Governor 1,747 878
1992 President 2,286 1,232
1992 Senate 2,166 1,087
1992 Senate** 1,594 906
1994 Governor 1,603 1,310
1996 President 2,278 1,332
1996 Senate 2,221 1,206
TOTAL 15,945 63.80% 9,047 36.20% 100.00% 0.00%
WORTH 1980 Senate 2,884 1,508
1990 Governor 2,230 2,077
1992 President 2,578 3,244
1992 Senate 3,527 2,500
1992 Senate** 2,200 1,446
1994 Governor 2,219 1,979
1996 President 2,300 2,752
1996 Senate 2,893 2,401
TOTAL 20,831 53.77% 17,907 46.23% 100.00% 0.00%
TOTALS 3,819,879 55.21% 3,099,548 44.79% 78.10% 21.90%
* - Split County placed in district where majority of voting age population is located.
** - Senate Run Off Election.
REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS
COUNTY YEAR OFFICE
BANKS 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
BARROW
TOTAL
BARTOW
TOTAL
BUFFS
TOTAL
CARROLL
TOTAL
CATOOSA
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DM. % REP. % Dsm. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPuBtIcAN VoTEs VICrORY VICTORY
2,199 660
1,341 981
1,530 1,551
1,814 1,729
856 902
1,176 1,555
1,538 1,925
1,894 2,082
12,348 52.03% 11,385 47.97% 37.50% 62.50%
3,878 2,475
3,615 2,681
3,991 4,328
4,473 5,027
2,321 2,491
3,134 3,607
3,928 5,342
4,454 5,516
29,794 48.63% 31,467 51.37% 25.00% 75.00%
6,133 3,771
5,675 3,879
6,675 7,742
6,657 7,986
3,847 4,192
5,327 6,292
6,853 9,250
7,771 9,521
48,938 48.18% 52,633 51.82% 25.00% 75.00%
2,733 1,198
2,042 1,398
2,448 1,768
2,781 1,894
1,544 1,093
1,769 1,668
2,271 2,027
2,433 2,132
18,021 57.76% 13,178 42.24% 100.00% 0.00%
8,256 7,441
7,354 6,919
8,404 10,750
10,009 11,742
5,506 6,570
7,424 8,082
8,438 11,157
9,845 10,779
65,236 47.04% 73,440 52.96% 25.00% 75.00%
4,544 6,167
5,868 3,121
4,817 7,599
4,867 9,322
2,239 5,563
5,047 4,903
5,185 8,237
4,454 9,834
37,021 40.34% 54,746 59.66% 25.00% 75.00%
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CoUrrY YEAR OFFICE
CHATTOOGA 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
CHEROKEE
TOTAL
CLARKE
TOTAL
COBB*
TOTAL
COLUMBIA
TOTAL
COWETA
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
D
I
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
)EMOCRAT VOTES REPUBLICAN VoTEs VICrORY VICTORY
4,175 2,255
2,836 1,624
2,976 2,439
3,114 3,064
1,562 1,704
2,572 1,980
3,003 2,513
3,341 2,883
23,579 56.09% 18,462 43.91% 87.50% 12.50%
5,471 6,417
7,926 9,409
8,113 16,054
9,639 18,203
5,502 10,147
9,245 13,736
10,802 24,527
12,382 24,422
69,080 35.98% 122,915 64.02% 0.00% 100.00%
7,525 11,838
9,907 8,418
15,403 10,459
15,444 10,881
9,873 7,118
12,352 7,509
15,206 10,504
14,545 10,757
100,255 56.41% 77,484 43.59% 87.50% 12-50%
29,213 70,293
38,250 67,709
63,960 103,734
73,213 115,558
37,469 62,071
55,858 72,861
73,750 114,188
78,352 111,822
450,065 38.52% 718,236 61.48% 0.00% 100.00%
4,783 7,475
6,441 8,393
7,115 16,657
7,639 19,686
3,508 13,041
6,921 13,499
8,601 21,291
10,563 20,121
55,571 31.62% 120,163 68.38% 0.00% 100.00%
4,783 5,821
5,815 5,813
7,093 9,814
8,404 11,405
4,238 6,303
6,494 8,096
7,794 13,058
8,863 13,145
53,484 42.13% 73,455 57.87% 0.00% 100.00%
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REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS
CoUNTY YEAR OFMICE
DADE 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate"*
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
DAWSON
TOTAL
DEKALB*
TOTAL
DOUGLAS*
TOTAL
ELBERT
TOTAL
FANNIN
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate*t
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate*
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEM. %REP. %DEM. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VICTORY VICTORY
1,561 1,894
1,389 697
1,782 2,191
1,208 2,459
578 1,557
1,281 1,530
1,737 2,295
1,430 2,725
10,966 41.67% 15,348 58.33% 12.50% 87.50%
1,146 652
1,232 896
1,399 1,696
1,704 2,013
771 977
1,439 1,581
1,434 2.343
1,701 2,390
10,826 46.32% 12,548 53.68% 25.00% 75.00%
50,883 115,684
71,835 56,899
124,559 70,282
130,372 77,573
76,313 47,702
82,345 48,224
137,903 60,225
133,463 62,912
807,673 59.95% 539,501 40.05% 87.50% 12.50%
6,420 8,059
8,202 7,317
8,869 13,349
10,626 14,931
5,205 7,129
8,128 9,332
9,631 14,495
10,596 14,687
67,677 43.11% 89,299 56.89% 12.50% 87.50%
4,323 1,862
2,345 1,339
3,025 2,372
3,549 2,227
1,339 1,586
2,878 1,562
2,900 2,393
3,361 2,452
23,720 60.03% 15,793 39.97% 87.50% 12.50%
2,235 3,435
3,282 2,310
2,902 3,255
2,764 4,248
1,401 2,151
2,849 3,072
2,741 3,373
2,691 4,026
20,865 44.65% 25,870 55.35% 12.50% 87.50%
Sorina 19981I A-20
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
CouNY YEAR OFICE
FLOYD 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
FORSYTH
TOTAL
FRANKLIN
TOTAL
GILMER
TOTAL
GORDON
TOTAL
GWINNETI
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEm. % REP. % DEm. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VIcroRY VICrORY
11,391 12,230
10,529 8,054
11,614 12,378
13,595 13,424
9,399 8,917
9,904 10,000
10,464 12,426
11,732 12,531
88,628 49.63% 89,960 50.37% 37.50% 62.50%
3,955 3,973
5,318 4,953
4,936 8,652
6,314 10,133
3,306 5,105
5,504 7,383
5,957 15,013
6,872 15,196
42,162 37.45% 70,408 62.55% 12.50% 87.50%
3,550 1,260
2,158 1,222
2,505 2,391
3,222 2,544
1,133 1,428
2,089 2,201
2,338 2,364
2,737 2,588
19,732 55.23% 15,998 44.77% 0.00% 100.00%
1,956 2,161
2,100 1,587
2,311 2,661
1,998 2,911
1,734 1,988
1,661 2,115
2,464 3,121
2,494 3,188
16,718 45.87% 19,732 54.13% 12-50% 87.50%
4,336 3,947
3,736 2,731
4,103 5,265
4,323 5,291
2,341 2,899
3,696 3,740
4,239 5,232
4,556 5,434
31,330 47-56% 34,539 52.44% 12.50% 87.50%
16,939 36,074
40,307 51,755
44,253 81,822
51,543 92,467
26,205 47,523
39,556 55,383
53,819 96,610
57,838 96,668
330,460 37.18% 558,302 62.82% 0.00% 100.00%
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CoUlrNY YEAR OFICE
HABERSHAM 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
HALL
TOTAL
HARALSON
TOTAL
HARRIS
TOTAL
HART
TOTAL
HEARD
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTEs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VICrORY VICTORY
3,967 2,656
2,775 2,979
3,098 4,569
3,819 4,709
2,185 2,830
2,874 4,018
3,170 4,730
3,729 4,994
25,617 44.86% 31,485 55.14% 12.50% 87.50%
10,451 10,275
10,167 10,012
11,214 16,108
14,476 17,298
7,178 9,310
10,107 13,961
10,362 19,280
12,766 18,504
86,721 43.04% 114,748 56.96% 25.00% 75.00%
3,683 2,393
2,647 2,385
3,281 3,142
3,859 3,493
1,988 1,836
2,635 2,736
2,850 3,260
3,368 3,323
24,311 51.86% 22,568 48.14% 75.00% 25.00%
2,197 2,433
2,488 1,762
2,679 3,316
2,805 3,294
1,502 2,338
2,378 2,380
2,779 3,829
2,976 3,570
19,804 46.35% 22,922 53.65% 12.50% 87.50%
4,221 1,430
2,966 1,582
3,614 2,607
3,503 2,329
1,359 1,711
2,529 2,247
3,486 2,884
3,343 2,875
25,021 58.62% 17,665 41.38% 87.50% 12.50%
1,669 674
1,271 656
1,456 1,190
1,721 1,369
854 617
1,043 843
1,248 1,170
1,495 1,247
10,757 58.07% 7,766 41.93% 100.00% 0.00%
Spring 19981 A-22
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Courmy YEAR OFMCE
HENRY 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
JACKSON
TOTAL
JASPER
TOTAL
JONES
TOTAL
LINCOLN
TOTAL
LUMPKIN
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
['Vol. 25:1A-23
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEsM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPUBcAN VOTES VICrORY VICTORY
5,904 5,797
7,506 7,421
7,817 12,634
9,424 14,381
5,065 7,936
7,394 10,628
9,498 16,968
10,926 16,676
63,534 40.73% 92,441 59.27% 25.00% 75.00%
4,862 2,326
3,952 2,952
3,792 3,976
4,405 4,328
2,494 2,523
3,334 3,429
3,746 4,782
4,310 4,934
30,895 51.37% 29,250 48.63% 25.00% 75.00%
1,721 764
1,308 820
1,485 1,153
1,509 1,191
1,026 872
1,234 901
1,553 1,423
1,528 1,428
11,364 57.06% 8,552 42.94% 100.00% 0.00%
3,497 1,882
3,147 1,788
3,338 2,770
3,964 2,617
2,269 2,096
2,799 2,669
3,195 3,272
3,840 2,970
26,049 56.49% 20,064 43.51% 87.50% 12.50%
1,767 689
1,013 830
1,327 1,149
1,378 1,527
577 890
1,022 1,044
1,334 1,391
1,559 1,360
9,977 52.91% 8,880 47.09% 50.00% 50.00%
1,857 1,202
1,820 1,298
2,010 1,972
2,395 2,430
1,205 1,232
1,753 1,770
1,949 2,576
1,559 1,360
15,326 50.37% 15,101 49.63% 37.50% 62.50%
REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS
CoUry YEAR OFFICE
MADISON 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
MeDUFFIE
TOTAL
MONROE*
TOTAL
MORGAN
TOTAL
MURRAY
TOTAL
NEWTON
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate*"
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DFm. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMocRAT VoTEs REPUBUCAN VoTEs VICTORY VICTORY
3,392 1,942
2,207 1,913
2,393 3,351
2,696 3,138
1,359 2,340
2,062 2,952
2,571 3,992
2,762 4,114
19,442 45.02% 23,742 54.98% 25.00% 75.00%
2,314 2,081
1,637 2,258
2,640 2,955
2,579 3,119
1,352 2,521
1,920 2,652
2,725 3,254
3,158 3,207
18,325 45.39% 22,047 54.61% 12.50% 87.50%
2,070 1,367
2,609 1,603
2,774 2,423
3,420 2,554
1,924 1,790
2,409 2,294
2,768 3,054
3,290 2,900
21,264 54.18% 17,985 45.82% 87.50% 12.50%
2,425 1,190
1,726 1,369
2,057 1,797
2,369 1,969
1,412 1,190
1,765 1,567
2,111 2,118
2,268 2,098
16,133 54.82% 13,298 45.18% 87.50% 12.50%
2,622 1,993
2,596 1,328
2,764 3,256
2,789 4,075
1,048 1,709
2,200 2,444
2,861 3,289
2,660 4,247
19,540 46.66% 22,341 53.34% 25.00% 75.00%
5,326 3,642
5,095 3,878
5,811 5,804
6,498 6,468
3,979 3,574
5,001 4,808
6,759 7,274
7,200 7,505
45,669 51.53% 42,953 48.47% 75.00% 25.00%
Spring 19981 A-24
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CoUNTy YEAR OFFMCE
OCONEE 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
OGLETHORPE 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
PAULDING 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
PICKENS 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
POLK 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
PUTNAM 1980
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1996
1996
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate*
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% D.M. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBUCAN Vomrs VICrORY VICTORY
2,150 2,112
2,257 2,701
2,745 4,125
3,222 4,410
2,038 2,828
2,975 3,231
2,992 5,116
3,510 4,975
21,889 42.60% 29,498 57.40% 12.50% 87.50%
1,865 966
1,361 1,106
1,491 1,590
1,573 1,848
862 1,230
1,378 1,338
1,570 1,826
1,719 1,923
11,819 49.98% 11,827 50.02% 37.50% 62.50%
4,904 2,753
4,641 3,519
5,212 7,180
6,027 8,350
2,791 3,816
4,384 6,120
5,699 10,152
6,665 10,041
40,323 43.71% 51,931 56.29% 25.00% 75.00%
2,360 1,556
2,043 1,540
2,359 2,332
2,521 2,459
2,346 1,999
2,118 1,836
2,693 3,041
2,916 3,018
19,356 52.12% 17,781 47.88% 75.00% 25.00%
5,403 3,107
3,710 3,034
4,872 4,158
5,141 4,350
3,041 2,483
3,902 3,523
4,298 4,130
4,831 4,151
35,198 54.88% 28,936 45.12% 100.00% 0.00%
2,014 1,041
1,918 1,137
2,149 1,756
2,354 1,830
1,412 1,167
1,870 1,616
2,340 2,306
2,657 2,419
16,714 55.74% 13,272 44.26% 100.00% 0.00%
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REINVENTING BLACK POLITICS
CoUNTY YEAR OFFICE
RABUN 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
ROCKDALE
TOTAL
STEPHENS
TOTAL
TOWNS
TOTAL
TROUP
TOTAL
UNION
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% D s. %REP. % DEm. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPUBLICAN VoTEs VIcroRY VICTORY
1,986 1,462
1,812 1,450
1,878 1,902
2,059 2,092
1,412 1,167
1,796 1,308
1,943 2,213
2,122 2,364
15,0008 50.50% 14,709 49.50% 37.50% 62.50%
4,138 5,833
6,686 7,931
7,003 11,945
8,362 13,544
4,862 7,650
6,964 8,849
7,656 13,006
8,919 12,805
54,590 40.09% 81,563 59.91% 0.00% 100.00%
3,996 2,480
2,286 2,414
2,976 4,047
3,371 3,971
1,618 2,463
2,498 3,243
3,072 3,890
3,116 4,132
22,933 46.26% 26,640 53.74% 12.50% 87.50%
1,539 1,699
1,799 633
1,487 1,674
1,660 1,732
786 883
1,529 1,037
1,664 2,030
1,919 2,057
12,383 51.32% 11,745 48.68% 12.50% 87.50%
7,231 6,211
5,906 4,651
6,412 8,118
7,981 8,744
3,620 5,096
5,893 6,855
5,940 8,716
6,778 8,322
49,761 46.74% 56,713 53.26% 25.00% 75.00%
1,775 1,538
2,227 1,194
2,304 2,533
2,526 2,781
1,270 1,472
2,232 1,792
2,175 2,685
2,427 2,876
16,936 50.10% 16,871 49.90% 37.50% 62.50%
Spring 19981 A-26
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
COUNTY YEAR OsvCR
WALKER 1980 Senate
1990 Governor
1992 President
1992 Senate
1992 Senate**
1994 Governor
1996 President
1996 Senate
TOTAL
WALTON
TOTAL
WHITE
TOTAL
WHITFIELD
TOTAL
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
Senate
Governor
President
Senate
Senate**
Governor
President
Senate
WILKES 1980 Senate 2,241 1,233
1990 Governor 1,685 1,264
1992 President 1,955 1,535
1992 Senate 1,749 1,518
1992 Senate** 1,164 1,181
1994 Governor 1,657 1,219
1996 President 1,971 1,417
1996 Senate 1,819 1,391
TOTAL 14,241 56.97% 10,758 43.03% 87.50% 12.50%
TOTALS 3,406,313 46.42% 3,931,437 53.58% 39.19% 60.81%
* - Split County placed in district where majority of voting age population is located.
** - Senate Run Off Election.
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GEORGIA DISTRICT 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs R-PuBLIcAN VoFs VICroRY VicroRY
6,379 7,489
6,050 3,446
6,217 8,489
5,856 10,546
2,806 6,589
4,945 6,150
6,743 8,817
5,947 11,109
44,943 41.78% 62,635 58.22% 0.00% 100.00%
4,529 2,643
4,669 3,290
4,821 5,619
5,250 5,973
3,287 3,498
4,499 4,957
5,618 7,934
6,152 8,310
38,825 47.90% 42,224 52.10% 25.00% 75.00%
1,874 1,371
1,720 1,421
1,756 2,477
2,067 2,922
1,114 1,612
1,934 2,064
1,864 2,959
2,360 2,915
14,689 45.29% 17,741 54.71% 25.00% 75.00%
7,497 8,878
6,019 5,854
7,335 12,003
7,782 13,815
3,398 7,093
6,093 7,979
7,720 1,268
6,963 13,984
52,807 42.70% 70,874 57.30% 25.00% 75.00%
A-27
Spring 19981 REIVENTING BLACK POLITICS B-i
Appendix B
ARKANSAS DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % RE'. % DEM. % REP.
Coumy' YEAR OFFIcE DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBUCAN VoTEs VIcroRY VIcropy
ARKANSAS 1980 President 4,303
TOTAL
ASHLEY
TOTAL
BRADLEY
TOTAL
CALHOUN
TOTAL
CHICOT
TOTAL
CLARK
TOTAL
CLEVELAND
TOTAL
COLUMBIA
TOTAL
CRITTENDEN
TOTAL
CROSS
TOTAL
DALLAS
TOTAL
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
5,278
4,717
3,443
17,741
4,552
4,389
4,416
4,485
17,842
3,139
2,925
2,939
2,427
11,430
1,438
1,056
1,392
1,252
5,138
3,445
3,804
3,502
3,043
13,794
6,122
6,129
5,358
4,896
22,505
1,856
1,410
1,796
1,633
6,695
4,445
3,814
4,124
3,750
16,133
7,022
7,378
8,108
6,771
29,279
3,471
3,610
3,490
3,195
13,766
2,838
2,306
2,512
1,824
9,480
57.66%
53.77%
61.56%
52.88%
65.61%
64.68%
54.15%
46.48%
57.49%
55.11%
56.74%
3,409
3,301
3,402
2,914
13,026 42.34% 100.00%
3,960
4,269
3,776
3,337
15,342 46.23% 100.00%
1,650
2,000
1,918
1,569
7,137 38.44% 100.00%
896
1,438
1,130
1,114
4,578 47.12% 75.00%
2,239
1,841
1,644
1,506
7,230 34.39% 100.00%
2,743
3,266
3,029
3,254
12,292 35.32% 100.00%
1,124
1,797
1,313
1,434
5,668 45.85% 50.00%
5,259
5,397
4,103
3,820
18,579 53.52% 25.00%
6,248
5,057
4,888
5,453
21,646 42.51% 100.00%
2,895
3,131
2,425
2,764
11,215 44.89% 100.00%
1,596
2,320
1,858
1,455
7,229 43.26% 75.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
25.00%
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
75.00%
0.00%
0.00%
25.00%
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ARKANSAS DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % REP. % D m. % REP.
Cot=r- YEAR OFFICE DEMOCRAT VOTES REPuBLicAN VoTEs VICrORY VICTORY
DESHA 1980 President 3,748
TOTAL
DREW
TOTAL
GRANT
TOTAL
HEMPSTEAD
TOTAL
HOT SPRING
TOTAL
HOWARD
TOTAL
JEFFERSON
TOTAL
LAFAYETIE
TOTAL
LEE
TOTAL
LINCOLN
TOTAL
LrTLE RIVER 1980
1980
1982
1996
TOTAL
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
President
Governor
Governor
Senate
3,998
4,169
2,503
14,418
3,757
3,878
3,488
3,116
14,239
3,078
2,452
2,721
2,716
10,967
4,671
4,601
4,715
4,277
18,264
6,897
5,353
6,491
4,864
23,605
2,564
1,952
2,068
2,598
9,182
17,292
17,232
19,345
15,720
69,589
1,947
1,714
1,983
2,194
7,838
3,103
3,434
3,621
3,155
13,313
2,517
2,446
2,563
2,405
9,931
2,631
2,592
2,771
3,170
11,164
66.48%
59.72%
52.40%
56.91%
59.96%
48.71%
62.52%
51.07%
66-55%
64.16%
56.86%
2,057
1,763
1,846
1,604
7,270 33.52% 100.00%
2,272
2,423
2,502
2,406
9,603 40.28% 100.00%
2,007
2,922
2,343
2,689
9,961 47.60% 75.00%
3,852
4,147
2,686
3,143
13,828 43.09% 100.00%
3,561
5,363
3,871
2,966
15,761 40.04% 100.00%
2,386
3,085
2,234
1,965
9,670 51.29% 50.00%
10,697
11,541
9,864
9,608
41,710 37.48% 100.00%
1,756
2,460
1,750
1,544
7,510 48.93% 75.00%
1,711
1,712
1,955
1,314
6,692 33.45% 100.00%
1,243
1,516
1,460
1,329
5,548 35.84% 100.00%
2,272
2,512
1,821
1,864
8,469 43.14% 100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
25.00%
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
0.00%
25.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
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ARKANSAS DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
CouNrY YEAR OFFcE DMocRAT VoTEs REpUnucAN VoTEs VICrORY VICrORY
LONOKE 1980 President 5,605
TOTAL
MILLER
TOTAL
MISSISSIPPI
TOTAL
MONROE
TOTAL
NEVADA
TOTAL
OUACHITA
TOTAL
PHILLIPS
TOTAL
PRAIRIE
TOTAL
PULASKI
TOTAL
ST. FRANCIS
TOTAL
UNION
TOTAL
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
5,464
6,302
6,832
24,203
5,996
5,609
5,531
6,522
23,658
8,908
8,491
10,356
6,419
34,174
2,686
2,837
3,140
2,007
10,670
2,631
2,537
2,557
2,299
10,024
7,152
5,837
7,320
6,405
26,714
6,642
7,543
6,371
4,746
25,302
1,928
1,992
2,628
1,847
8,395
54,839
64,159
64,787
64,343
248,128
5,816
5,627
5,587
5,355
22,385
6,852
5,832
7,875
7,252
27,811
47.90%
47.80%
56.03%
59.45%
59.12%
58.09%
63.77%
53.34%
54.04%
57.86%
5,619
6,287
5,197
9,226
26,329 52.10% 25.00% 75.00%
6,770
7,787
5,277
6,002
25,836 52.20% 50.00% 50.00%
7,170
8,058
6,324
5,266
26,818 43.97% 100.00% 0.00%
2,027
2,086
1,789
1,376
7,278 40.55% 100.00% 0.00%
1,697
2,185
1,546
1,503
6,931 40.88% 100.00% 0.00%
4,329
5,878
4,501
4,568
19,276 41.91% 100.00% 0.00%
4,270
3,840
3,471
2,796
14,377 36.23% 100.00% 0.00%
1,855
2,158
1,635
1,695
7,343 46.66% 75.00% 25.00%
52,125
50,339
46,511
62,028
211,003 45.96% 100.00% 0.00%
4,485
4,490
3,983
3,348
16,306 42.14% 75.00% 25.00%
9,401
10,117
8,196
7,463
35,177 55.85% 0.00% 100.00%
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ARKANSAS DISTRICT 1
% DEm. % RP. % DEm. % REP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFICE DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VoTES VICTORY VICTORY
WOODRUFF 1980 President 2,452 1,204
1980 Governor 2,551 1,351
1982 Governor 2,855 1,078
1996 Senate 1,816 887
TOTAL 9,674 68.16% 4,520 31.84% 100.00% 0.00%
TOTAL 837,451 55.88% 661,158 44.12% 83.82% 16.18%
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ARKANSAS DISTRICT 2
% DEm. % REP. % DEM. % EP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFCE DEMocRAT VoTs RapunucAN VoTs VICTORY VICTORY
BAXTER 1980 President 4,789 9,684
TOTAL
BENTON
TOTAL
BOONE
TOTAL
CARROL
TOTAL
CLAY
TOTAL
CLEBURNE
TOTAL
CONWAY
TOTAL
CRAIGHEAD
TOTAL
CRAWFORD
TOTAL
FAULKNER*
TOTAL
FRANKLIN
TOTAL
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
5,693
5,063
6,323
21,868
9,231
11,939
10,081
12,224
43,475
4,576
5,249
4,595
5,028
19,448
2,977
2,954
2,275
3,498
11,704
3,985
3,144
4,294
3,444
14,867
4,021
4,215
4,329
4,163
16,728
4,698
4,626
4,984
3,464
17,772
9,231
8,747
10,980
11,893
40,851
3,948
3,723
4,088
5,255
17,014
8,528
8,199
8,949
8,581
34,257
2,716
2,362
2,726
2,746
10,550
9,526
7,546
9,215
37.81%
18,830
17,400
16,241
33,369
33.62%
6,778
6,457
5,726
7,076
42.76%
4,273
4,336
4,248
5,331
39.15%
3,091
4,164
2,537
2,283
55.18%
4,042
4,330
3,837
5,345
48.80%
4,145
4,773
3,309
3,717
52.71%
11,010
12,161
9,040
12,676
47.65%
8,542
9,216
7,454
10,523
32.25%
7,544
7,949
6,879
13,314
48.98%
3,448
4,421
3,379
3,426
41.83%
35,971 62.19%
85,840 66.38%
26,037 57.24%
18,188 60.85%
12,075 44.82%
17,554 51.20%
15,944 47.29%
44,887 52.35%
35,735 67.75%
35,686 51.02%
14,674 58.17%
0.00% 100.00%
0.00% 100.00%
0.00% 100.00%
0.00% 100.00%
75.00% 25.00%
25.00% 75.00%
50.00% 50.00%
25.00% 75.00%
0.00% 100.00%
75.00% 25.00%
0.00% 100.00%
B-6 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:27
ARKANSAS DISTRICT 2
% Dnm. %REP. % Dsm. %REP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFIcE DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBUCAN Voms VICroRY VIcroRY
FULTON 1980 President 2,037 2,101
1980 Governor 1,760 2,572
1982 Governor 1,984 1,754
1996 Senate 2,289 1,860
TOTAL 8,070 49.34% 8,287 50.66% 50.00% 50.00%
GARLAND 1980 President 12,515 15,739
1980 Governor 14,153 15,279
1982 Governor 15,378 12,614
1996 Senate 16,449 19,243
TOTAL 58,495 48.20% 62,875 51.80% 25.00% 75.00%
GREENE 1980 President 5,996 4,514
1980 Governor 5,072 5,825
1982 Governor 8,205 4,381
1996 Senate 6,106 5,475
TOTAL 25,379 55.69% 20,195 44.31% 75.00% 25.00%
INDEPENDENCE1980 President 5,683 5,076
1980 Governor 5,265 5,988
1982 Governor 6,196 4,061
1996 Senate 5,543 6,122
TOTAL 22,687 51.64% 21,247 48.36% 50.00% 50.00%
IZARD 1980 President 2,750 2,266
1980 Governor 2,628 2,667
1982 Governor 3,017 1,989
1996 Senate 2,794 2,326
TOTAL 11,189 54.75% 9,248 45.25% 75.00% 25.00%
JACKSON 1980 President 4,651 3,191
1980 Governor 3,920 4,175
1982 Governor 5,324 2,799
1996 Senate 3,980 2,472
TOTAL 17,875 58.58% 12,637 41.42% 75.00% 25.00%
JOHNSON 1980 President 3,709 3,619
1980 Governor 3,243 4,614
1982 Governor 3,439 3,558
1996 Senate 2,883 3,689
TOTAL 13,274 46.16% 15,480 53.84% 0.00% 100.00%
LAWRENCE 1980 President 3,547 3,245
1980 Governor 2,615 4,624
1982 Governor 4,132 2,660
1996 Senate 3,385 2,717
TOTAL 13,679 50.80% 13,246 49.20% 75.00% 25.00%
LOGAN 1980 President 4,098 4,511
1980 Governor 3,708 5,402
1982 Governor 3,954 4,623
1996 Senate 3,393 4,605
TOTAL 15,153 44.19% 19,141 55.81% 0.00% 100.00%
MADISON 1980 President 2,434 3,180
1980 Governor 2,500 3,321
1982 Governor 2,188 2,731
1996 Senate 2,147 3,076
TOTAL 9,269 42.96% 12,308 57.04% 0.00% 100.00%
MARION 1980 President 2,046 3,059
1980 Governor 2,277 3,291
1982 Governor 2,081 2,869
1996 Senate 2,468 3,093
TOTAL 8,872 41.88% 12,312 58.12% 0.00% 100.00%
ARKANSAS DISTRICT 2
% DEM. %REP. %DEM. %REP.
COUNTY YEAR OFnIFc DEMocRAT VOTEs REPUBuCAN VoTEs VICTORY VICroRY
MONTGOMERY 1980
1980
1982
1996
TOTAL
NEWTON
TOTAL
PERRY
TOTAL
PIKE
TOTAL
POINSETr
TOTAL
POLK
TOTAL
POPE
TOTAL
RANDOLPH
TOTAL
SALINE
TOTAL
SCOTt
TOTAL
SEARCY
TOTAL
President
Governor
Governor
Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1,878 1,585
1,577 2,023
1,655 1,612
1,664 1,780
6,774 49.18%
1,436 2,423
1,621 2,514
2,079 2,549
1,640 2,525
6,776 40.36%
1,606 1,459
1,474 1,878
1,752 1,365
1,586 1,753
6,418 49.86%
2,094 1,916
1,679 2,530
1,844 1,962
2,188 2,013
7,805 48.10%
4,894 4,040
3,749 5,510
5,784 3,265
4,213 3,167
18,640 53.84%
2,617 3,993
3,000 4,012
2,969 3,358
2,429 3,943
11,015 41.85%
6,364 7,217
5,980 8,770
7,021 6,618
6,982 11,415
26,347 43.64%
3,070 2,579
2,289 3,590
3,181 1,925
2,896 2,492
11,436 51.93%
10,398 8,330
10,138 9,830
10,761 8,030
8,159 12,510
39,456 50.48%
2,236 2,228
1,475 3,150
1,833 2,270
1,899 2,348
7,443 42.68%
1,536 2,459
1,562 3,041
2,066 2,655
1,396 2,122
6,560 38.96%
7,000 50.82% 50.00% 50.00%
10,011 59.64% 0.00% 100.00%
6,455 50.14% 50.00% 50.00%
8,421 51.90% 50.00% 50.00%
15,982 46.16% 75.00% 25.00%
15,306 58.15% 0.00% 100.00%
34,020 56.36% 25.00% 75.00%
10,586 48.07% 75.00% 25.00%
38,700 49.52% 75.00% 25.00%
9,996 57.32% 0.00% 100.00%
10,277 61.04% 0.00% 100.00%
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ARKANSAS DISTRICT 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
CouNTY YEAR OsFIcE DEMOCRAT VoTES REPuBucAN VoTEs VIcroRY VIcroRY
SEBASTIAN 1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
TOTAL
SEVIER
TOTAL
SHARP
TOTAL
STONE
TOTAL
VAN BUREN
TOTAL
WASHINGTON
TOTAL
WHITE
TOTAL
YELL
TOTAL
TOTALS
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
1980 President
1980 Governor
1982 Governor
1996 Senate
10,141 23,403
11,895 24,010
11,422 20,566
8,017 17,332
41,475 32.71%
2,854 2,502
2,778 2,763
3,066 1,917
2,446 1,929
11,144 55.02%
2,774 3,420
2,969 3,768
3,439 2,714
3,367 3,661
12,549 48.06%
1,968 1,793
1,736 2,470
2,409 1,530
2,101 2,196
8,214 50.69%
2,968 3,090
3,005 3,453
3,220 2,920
3,339 3,508
12,532 49.14%
12,276 20,788
16,223 18,334
14,299 15,406
16,957 29,931
59,755 41.43%
8,750 8,079
8,743 9,245
9,552 7,913
8,370 11,829
35,415 48.86%
3,702 3,187
3,127 4,465
3,643 3,310
3,256 3,325
13,728 49.00%
795.958 44.79%
85,311 67.29% 0.00% 100.00%
9,111 44.98% 100.00% 0.00%
13,563 51.94% 25.00% 75.00%
7,989 49.31% 50.00% 50.00%
12,971 50.86% 25.00% 75.00%
84,459 58.57% 0.00% 100.00%
37,066 51.14% 50.00% 50.00%
14,287 51.00% 50.00% 50.00%
981.078 55.21% 33.54% 66A6%
* - Split County placed in district where majority of voting age population is located.
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Coumrv YEAR OMcE
ADAMS 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
AMITE
TOTAL
ATPALA
TOTAL
BENTON
TOTAL
BOLIVAR
TOTAL
CARROLL
TOTAL
CLAIBORNE
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President"*
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President"t
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President"*
President*"
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
Appendix C
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% D.M. %REP. % DF_. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBuCAN VOTES VICroRY VICTORY
6,664 6,210
7,515 7,467
6,334 4,465
8,876 6,929
6,631 4,554
8,255 5,831
8,218 5,378
52,493 56.25% 40,834 43.75% 100.00% 0.00%
2,499 2,226
3,175 2,596
2,624 2,133
3,533 2,947
2,097 2,552
2,608 2,561
2,824 2,521
19,360 52.47% 17,536 47.53% 71.43% 28.57%
4,040 3,116
4,102 3,954
3,076 3,101
3,611 4,214
2,384 3,269
3,015 3,520
3,092 3,130
23,320 48.97% 24,304 51.03% 28.57% 71.43%
2,341 771
2,051 1,219
1,606 941
2,117 1,333
1,755 861
2,402 1,253
2,944 993
15,216 67.37% 7,371 32.63% 100.00% 0.00%
7,561 5,136
8,659 4,955
6,633 4,060
7,695 6,036
5,146 3,062
8,801 4,752
8,670 4,027
53,165 62.41% 32,028 37.59% 100.00% 0.00%
1,566 1,561
2,024 2,027
2,362 2,263
1,891 2,517
1,295 1,789
1,182 1,695
2,041 2,629
12,361 46.05% 14,481 53.95% 28.57% 71.43%
2,603 1,068
3,011 3,283
3,449 1,365
3,263 1,185
3,045 1,057
3,302 935
3,739 784
22,412 69.84% 9,677 30.16% 85.71% 14.29%
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COUNTY YEAR OFFICE
COAHOMA 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
COPIAH
TOTAL
COVINGTON
TOTAL
DESOTO
TOTAL
FRANKLIN
TOTAL
GRENADA
TOTAL
HINDS
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President*"
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
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MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBuCAN VoTEs VICTORY VICTORY
5,222 3,706
6,771 4,344
5,418 3,494
6,058 4,589
5,452 2,704
6,409 4,120
5,776 3,441
41,106 60.89% 26,398 39.11% 100.00% 0.00%
4,196 4,097
5,470 4,435
4,675 3,078
5,187 4,423
3,703 4,212
4,397 4,600
4,415 4,138
32,043 52.51% 28,983 47.49% 71.43% 28.57%
2,819 2,584
2,913 3,444
2,528 2,846
3,036 3,993
2,270 3,948
2,775 3,525
2,628 3,129
18,969 44.70% 23,469 55.30% 14.29% 85.71%
7,700 6,193
6,185 9,457
4,719 3,207
7,592 13,348
9,993 5,486
8,833 16,104
10,282 18,135
55,304 43.47% 71,930 56.53% 42.86% 57.14%
1,547 1,712
2,034 2,003
1,700 1,599
2,285 1,871
1,187 1,933
1,587 1,942
2,381 1,586
12,721 50.15% 12,646 49.85% 57.14% 42.86%
3,208 3,526
4,116 3,948
4,275 3,038
4,421 4,938
2,728 2,758
4,203 4,721
4,402 4,527
27,353 49.91% 27,456 50.09% 28.57% 71.43%
28,293 45,544
36,168 44,692
36,250 32,718
46,145 48,412
34,574 32,399
43,434 45,031
45,410 35,653
270,274 48.72% 284,449 51.28% 42.86% 57.14%
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Cotry YER OFFICE
HOLMES 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
HUMPHREYS
TOTAL
ISSAQUENA
TOTAL
JEFFERSON
TOTAL
JEFFERSON
DAVIS
TOTAL
JONES*
TOTAL
LAWRENCE
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% D~m. %RnEP. % DF_. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPucAN VOTES VICrORY VIcroRY
4,581 2,430
5,412 2,689
5,069 2,347
5,774 2,621
4,179 1,873
4,092 1,694
4,720 1,536
33,827 69.01% 15,190 30.99% 100.00% 0.00%
2,139 1,423
2,858 1,747
3,216 1,640
2,987 1,857
1,838 1,482
2,696 1,721
2,305 1,382
18,039 61.59% 11,252 38.41% 100.00% 0.00%
524 306
586 341
559 316
551 371
421 338
550 298
546 269
3,737 6253% 2,239 37.47% 100.00% 0.00%
2,521 777
2,816 731
2,566 639
2,893 639
2,799 716
2,796 562
2,531 489
18,922 80.60% 4,553 19.40% 100.00% 0.00%
2,740 1,863
3,828 2,267
2,767 2,047
3,416 2,598
2,313 2,324
2,991 2,228
2,663 1,890
20,718 57.65% 15,217 42.35% 100.00% 0.00%
10,092 11,053
11,113 12,893
8,918 10,788
7,666 16,764
5,760 12,568
8,035 13,824
7,360 13,020
58,944 39.33% 90,910 60.67% 0.00% 100.00%
2,216 2,092
2,676 2,767
2,523 1,987
3,485 2,958
2,745 3,149
2,582 2,689
2,481 2,392
18,708 50.92% 18,034 49.08% 57.14% 42.86%
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CoUNry YEAR OM'CE
LEAKE 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
LEFLORE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
LINCOLN 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
MADISON 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
MARSHALL 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
MONTGOMERY1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
PANOLA 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
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MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % RP. % DEM. % RE.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REpuBUcAN VOTES VICrORY VicroRy
3,389 2,956
3,908 3,597
2,910 2,777
3,228 3,878
3,119 3,760
3,333 3,943
2,902 3,017
22,789 48.78% 23,928 51.22% 42.86% 57.14%
5,313 5,010
6,945 5,432
5,899 5,311
6,109 6,123
5,554 3,932
6,374 5,298
6,853 4,456
43,047 54.76% 35,562 45.24% 85.71% 14.29%
3,988 6,064
5,180 7,269
6,154 5,440
6,401 7,560
3,488 6,423
4,744 7,040
4,294 5,960
34,249 42.81% 45,756 57.19% 14.29% 85.71%
5,441 4,498
7,760 5,951
8,425 7,011
8,266 10,685
7,414 8,216
9,386 12,810
9,354 14,467
56,046 46.83% 63,638 53.17% 42.86% 57.14%
6,728 2,230
7,089 3,408
5,657 2,577
7,244 4,118
4,871 1,835
7,913 3,847
7,521 3,272
47,023 68.84% 21,287 31.16% 100.00% 0.00%
2,387 2,246
2,680 2,421
2,266 1,740
2,401 2,344
1,741 1,749
2,076 2,324
1,970 1,943
15,521 51.24% 14,767 48.76% 57.14% 42.86%
5,048 3,307
6,040 4,118
5,264 3,143
6,017 5,523
4,173 2,955
6,066 4,644
5,408 3,701
38,016 58.12% 27,391 41.88% 100.00% 0.00%
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COUNTY YEAR OFFICE
PIKE 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
QUITMAN 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
SHARKEY 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
SIMPSON 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
SUNFLOWER 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
TALAHATCHIE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
TATE
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President"*
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % RE'. % DEM. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPUBLICAN VoTES VICrORY VICrORY
5,821 5,782
6,440 6,451
6,341 4,449
9,005 6,072
4,189 5,161
6,279 6,005
6,302 5,403
44,377 53.02% 39,323 46.98% 71.43% 28.57%
2,586 1,274
2,836 1,639
2,391 1,437
2,965 1,716
2,047 1,187
2,422 1,451
2,186 1,121
17,433 63.96% 9,825 36.04% 100.00% 0.00%
1,217 968
1,883 958
1,933 997
1,686 1,127
1,202 1,164
1,526 1,008
1,566 906
11,013 60.71% 7,128 3929% 100.00% 0.00%
3,585 4,292
4,027 5,234
3,855 4,435
4,038 5,644
2,904 5,052
3,213 5,358
2,851 4,455
24,473 41.52% 34,470 58.48% 0.00% 100.00%
4,259 3,420
5,021 3,690
4,689 3,398
5,863 4,210
3,871 3,068
5,050 3,726
4,960 2,926
33,713 57.97% 24,438 42.03% 100.00% 0.00%
2,124 1,748
3,434 2,163
3,151 2,191
3,696 2,369
2,861 2,230
2,902 2,213
2,990 1,676
21,158 59.19% 14,590 40.81% 100.00% 0.00%
3,695 2,465
3,852 3,303
2,372 1,638
3,591 4,297
3,752 3,495
3,519 4,196
3,195 3,694
23,976 50.94% 23,088 49.06% 57.14% 42.86%
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MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 1
% DEM. % REP. % DEm. % RP.
COUNTY YEAR OFFIcE DEMocRAT VOTF-s REPUBuCAN VoTEs VICTORY VICTORY
TUNICA 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
WALTHALL 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
WARREN 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
WASHINGTON 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
WILKINSON 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
YALOBUSHA 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
YAZOO 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
1,667
2,168
1,417
1,522
1,427
1,451
1,263
10,915 67.45%
2,614
2,928
2,255
3,319
1,556
2,476
2,240
17,388 51.67%
5,568
7,323
8,060
7,874
6,090
8,175
8,774
51,864 44.72%
9,165
10,345
8,889
10,223
5,889
10,588
10,053
65,152 58.21%
2,502
2,962
1,137
3,035
1,944
3,210
2,807
17,597 67.53%
2,586
3,399
2,266
3,139
2,489
2,617
2,437
18,933 57.97%
3,993
5,373
5,352
4,956
3,858
4,880
4,754
33,166 51.73%
1,502,887 52.16%
** - Pre-1984 Mississippi Presidential results for electors, figure represents mean tally.
934
938
789
905
452
693
557
5,268 32.55% 100.00% 0.00%
2,063
2,668
1,872
2,628
2,066
2,728
2,239
16,264 48.33% 71.43% 28.57%
8,234
9,950
6,820
10,722
3,925
10,209
9,261
64,121 55.28% 14.29% 85.71%
3,005
8,588
5,990
9,483
5,357
7,598
6,762
46,783 41.79% 100.00% 0.00%
1,268
1,432
828
1,450
1,069
1,399
1,016
8,462 32.47% 100.00% 0.00%
1,794
2,197
1,841
2,353
1,651
2,179
1,711
13,726 42.03% 100.00% 0.00%
4,237
4,679
3,782
4,746
4,243
5,113
4,152
30,952 48.27% 57.14% 42.86%
1,378,491 47.84% 70.07% 29.93%
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CounTy YEAR OapCE
ALCORN 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
CALHOUN
TOTAL
CHICKASAW
TOTAL
CHOCTAW
TOTAL
CLARKE
TOTAL
CLAY
TOTAL
FORREST
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 2
% D % REP. % Dm. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBuCAN VoT-s VICTORY VICTORY
6,914 3,430
6,236 5,159
4,809 3,029
7,281 4,676
3,070 3,216
6,373 6,249
4,964 4,960
39,647 56.34% 30,719 43.66% 85.71% 14.29%
2,689 1,874
3,237 2,504
2,362 2,263
3,223 2,626
2,612 3,208
2,462 3,191
2,178 2,470
18,763 50.85% 18,136 49.15% 57.14% 42.86%
2,838 2,559
3,535 2,468
2,747 2,235
4,115 2,568
2,657 2,691
3,220 3,150
2,971 2,535
22,083 54.81% 18,206 45.19% 85.71% 14.29%
1,519 1,561
1,727 1,918
2,014 1,349
1,851 2,035
1,611 1,354
1,435 2,026
2,247 1,715
12,404 50.92% 11,958 49.08% 50.00% 50.00%
2,758 2,843
3,271 3,283
3,324 3,253
2,981 3,961
1,755 3,967
2,259 4,207
2,337 3,470
18,685 42.79% 24,984 57.21% 28.57% 71.43%
3,488 2,967
4,188 3,406
3,375 2,649
5,444 3,009
3,131 2,192
4,620 3,297
4,267 2,948
28,513 58.21% 20,468 41.79% 100.00% 0.00%
7,848 10,730
8,275 12,601
8,030 8,795
7,053 14,751
7,371 10,072
8,333 12,432
7,965 11,278
54,875 40.49% 80,659 59.51% 0.00% 100.00%
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CoUrTy YEAR OFMCF
GEORGE 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
GREENE
TOTAL
HANCOCK
TOTAL
HARRISON
TOTAL
ITAWAMBA
TOTAL
JACKSON
TOTAL
JASPER
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT' 2
% DF-. %RE'. % DEM. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPUBICAN VoTEs VICrORY VICrORY
2,948 1,890
2,735 3,020
2,330 2,031
2,427 4,453
2,119 2,352
2,650 4,141
1,888 3,311
17,097 44.65% 21,198 55.35% 28.57% 71.43%
2,100 1,533
1,732 1,757
1,395 1,846
1,416 3,022
1,372 1,884
1,664 2,406
1,347 1,947
11,026 43.37% 14,395 56.63% 14.29% 85.71%
3,839 3,736
3,546 5,098
4,729 3,371
3,984 8,110
6,278 3,437
4,651 6,422
4,303 5,820
31,330 46.54% 35,994 53.46% 42.86% 57.14%
16,360 19,294
16,198 24,964
20,901 15,254
16,275 33,149
21,520 13,629
15,268 25,049
18,775 25,486
125,297 44.41% 156,825 55.59% 28.57% 71.43%
4,466 2,141
4,833 2,877
3,449 3,301
5,048 2,920
2,421 2,598
3,635 4,142
2,987 3,490
26,839 55.56% 21,469 44.44% 71.43% 28.57%
12,397 17,222
12,027 22,360
16,979 13,777
11,204 31,074
14,955 13,986
13,017 25,321
13,598 24,918
94,177 38.78% 148,658 61.22% 28.57% 71.43%
3,109 2,356
3,801 2,769
3,676 2,777
3,584 3,501
2,234 3,409
3,059 2,789
3,170 2,615
22,633 52.82% 20,216 47.18% 85.71% 14.29%
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COUNTrY YE OFFCE
KEMPER 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
LAFAYETTE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
LAMAR 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
LAUDERDALE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
LEE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
LOWNDES 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
MARION 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
President"*
President"*
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President*"
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
Presidenttt
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President*"
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 2
% DEM. %REP. % DEM. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VOTES REPUBIUCAN VOTES VICToRY VICToRY
2,436 1,680
2,601 1,822
1,932 1,696
2,488 2,002
1,628 2,272
2,243 1,830
2,048 1,439
15,376 54.69% 12,741 45.31% 85.71% 14.29%
4,320 3,692
4,838 4,339
3,275 3,887
4,819 5,267
3,233 3,594
5,224 5,251
4,646 4,753
30,355 49.65% 30,783 50.35% 28.57% 71.43%
3,072 4,021
2,912 5,170
3,236 5,569
2,853 9,096
2,892 6,706
3,208 8,259
3,169 8,609
21,342 31.03% 47,430 68.97% 0.00% 100.00%
9,207 13,780
9,852 14,620
9,692 9,269
9,532 16,458
6,936 12,395
8,489 17,098
8,668 15,055
62,376 38.73% 98,675 61.27% 1429% 85.71%
7,475 6,568
9,253 7,867
6,939 10,243
10,583 9,841
7,146 8,028
7,710 12,231
8,438 11,815
57,544 46.36% 66,593 53.64% 42.86% 57.14%
6,127 7,986
6,167 9,969
6,420 7,222
7,460 10,367
7,182 6,518
6,552 10,509
6,220 9,169
46,128 42.76% 61,740 57.24% 14.29% 85.71%
5,236 5,292
5,356 5,178
5,062 4,189
5,335 6,374
3,278 5,170
4,654 5,776
4,334 5,023
33,255 47.33% 37,002 52.67% 28.57% 71.43%
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MONROE 1976 President**
1980 President**
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
NESHOBA 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
NEWTON 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
NOXUBEE 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
OKTIBBEHA 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
PEARL RIVER 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
PERRY 1976
1980
1987
1988
1991
1992
1996
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President"
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President"
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
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MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 2
% DEM. %REP. % DEM. %REP.
DEmocRAT VoTs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VICrORY VICrORY
5,929 4,635
6,911 4,722
3,874 3,819
7,138 4,864
3,962 3,665
4,933 5,994
5,184 5,206
37,931 53.55% 32,905 46.45% 71.43% 28.57%
3,891 3,859
3,847 5,133
3,501 4,061
4,069 5,795
2,324 5,105
3,090 6,135
2,646 4,545
23,368 40.29% 34,633 59.71% 14.29% 85.71%
2,741 3,813
3,375 4,269
2,844 3,967
2,852 5,120
2,366 4,828
2,146 5,128
2,163 4,223
18,487 37.10% 31,348 62.90% 0.00% 100.00%
2,067 1,854
3,338 1,928
2,802 2,207
3,100 1,804
3,192 1,608
3,188 1,623
2,801 1,287
20,488 62.47% 12,311 37.53% 100.00% 0.00%
4,274 5,156
5,977 6,268
4,478 4,504
6,116 6,497
5,103 4,333
5,726 6,381
5,923 6,142
37,597 48.90% 39,281 51.10% 14.29% 85.71%
5,048 4,297
4,969 6,750
4,833 4,898
4,143 9,455
5,386 5,895
4,683 7,726
4,892 8,212
33,954 41.82% 47,233 58.18% 14.29% 85.71%
1,949 1,457
1,947 2,242
1,533 2,179
1,393 3,316
1,086 2,502
1,490 2,538
1,413 2,178
10,811 39.71% 16,412 6029% 14.29% 85.71%
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CoUNTY YEAR OFFICE
PONTOTOC 1976 President**
1980 President*
1987 Governor
1988 Senate
1991 Governor
1992 President
1996 President
TOTAL
PRENTISS
TOTAL
RANYKN*
TOTAL
SCOTT*
TOTAL
SM1TH*
TOTAL
STONE
TOTAL
TIPPAH
TOTAL
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President*"
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
President**
President**
Governor
Senate
Governor
President
President
MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT 2
% DEM. %REP. % D m. %REP.
DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VOTEs VICroRY VICrORY
4,014 2,188
4,466 3,169
2,735 3,832
4,574 3,490
2,195 3,968
2,965 4,595
2,597 4,289
23,546 47.98% 25,531 52.02% 42.86% 57.14%
4,384 2,332
4,832 3,264
3,989 2,653
5,123 2,876
2,159 2,272
3,385 4,317
3,053 3,473
26,925 55.96% 21,187 44.04% 71.43% 28.57%
6,938 11,114
7,935 16,575
9,599 13,218
8,902 20,836
9,042 18,775
8,155 24,537
8,614 24,585
59,185 31.34% 129,640 68.66% 0.00% 100.00%
3,632 3,620
3,950 4,618
3,450 4,000
4,000 5,163
2,555 4,285
3,349 5,268
3,163 4,018
24,099 43.76% 30,972 56.24% 0.00% 100.00%
2,417 3,143
2,450 3,746
2,473 3,443
2,409 4,393
1,652 4,321
1,968 4,106
1,858 3,371
15,227 36.47% 26,523 63.53% 0.00% 100.00%
1,648 1,575
1,801 1,868
2,382 1,934
1,668 3,064
1,809 2,234
1,447 2,295
1,551 2,288
12,306 44.65% 15,258 55.35% 14.29% 85.71%
4,260 1,887
3,842 3,234
2,932 2,323
4,473 3,540
2,265 2,512
3,475 4,444
2,992 3,249
24,239 53.36% 21,189 46.64% 57.14% 42.86%
Spring 19981 C-11
MISSISSIPPI DISTRIC' 2
% DEM. % REP. % DEM. % REP.
CotnTY YEAR OFIFIC DEMOCRAT VoTEs REPUBLICAN VoTEs VlcrORY VICrORY
TISHOMINGO 1976 President** 3,590 1,921
1980 President** 4,542 2,408
1987 Governor 4,338 2,246
1988 Senate 5,302 1,983
1991 Governor 2,228 1,775
1992 President 3,910 3,393
1996 President 2,709 2,766
TOTAL 26,619 61.75% 16,492 38.25% 87.71% 14.29%
UNION 1976 President** 4,993 2,480
1980 President** 4,819 3,501
1987 Governor 3,189 3,428
1988 Senate 4,885 4,070
1991 Governor 2,408 3,366
1992 President 3,714 5,173
1996 President 3,316 4,375
TOTAL 27,324 50.87% 26,393 49.13% 42.86% 57.14%
WAYNE 1976 President** 3,293 3,005
1980 President** 3,438 3,826
1987 Governor 3,081 3,570
1988 Senate 2,825 5,123
1991 Governor 2,366 4,505
1992 President 3,064 3,874
1996 President 2,652 3,219
TOTAL 20,719 43.31% 27,122 56.69% 14.29% 85.71%
WEBSTER 1976 President** 2,198 1,926
1980 President** 2,142 2,341
1987 Governor 1,588 2,472
1988 Senate 2,383 2,379
1991 Governor 1,461 2,508
1992 President 1,746 2,791
1996 President 1,379 2,254
TOTAL 12,897 43.62% 16,671 56.38% 28.57% 71.43%
WINSTON 1976 President** 3,823 3,650
1980 President** 4,378 3,934
1987 Governor 3,951 3,428
1988 Senate 4,968 4,806
1991 Governor 2,748 3,341
1992 President 3,953 4,311
1996 President 3,489 3,498
TOTAL 27,310 50.32% 26,968 49.68% 57.14% 42.86%
TOTAL 1,251,597 44.54% 1,558,158 55.46% 39.78% 60.22%
* - Split County placed in district where majority of voting age population located.
** - Pre-1984 Mississippi Presidential results for electors, figure represents mean tally.
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